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Preface 
In October 1998, Le Kha Phieu, General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist 
Party, warned a conference of publ ishers and other media executives that the profit 
motive was causing them to veer away from pol it ical issues, and general 
commercial isation of the mass media was threatening to undermine revolutionary 
cultural trad it ions.1 Some of those present must have smiled i ronical ly at this cal l for 
more pol it ics, recall ing the times when editors and journal ists had been sacked or even 
imprisoned for expressing controversial pol i t ical opinions. Of course, Mr Phieu was not 
cal l ing for pol itical d isputation, but rather a return to extensive, enthusiastic propagation 
of the Party l ine, instead of devoting so much attention to violence, crime, sex, scandals 
and superstitions - al l  of which had been off l imits to the Vietnamese mass media only a 
decade ago. Quite simply, the Party l ine was being ignored because it did not sel l 
papers or air time. 
Th is is the first book in Engl ish to describe the dramatic changes taking place in 
Vietnam 's mass media. It is not so much about the specific content of newspaper 
articles, radio broadcasts, feature fi lms or TV programs, but rather the transformations 
in organ isation, financing, technology, work behaviour and aud ience expectat ions that 
have occurred over a remarkably short period of time. Much of today 's mass media 
practice in Vietnam will be famil iar to western readers - the intrusive advertis ing, 
tabloid style, chequebook journal ism, bargain basement video movies, TV soap operas 
and l ive sports coverage. However, because all this is new to Vietnam, we have 
included some material about earl ier mass media conditions, otherwise western readers 
wil l wonder what al l the fuss is about. 
Difficu l ties encountered in producing this book offer some measure of how 
sensitive the Vietnamese authorities remain on issues relating to the mass media. For 
most of 1996 it was uncertain whether or not Vietnamese editors, journal ists, producers 
or media administrators would be perm itted to take part in a conference scheduled for 
the end of the year in Canberra. Officials of Vietnam Television in both Hanoi and Ho 
Ch i Minh City seemed especial l y  wary. Approaches to the Vietnamese ambassador and 
even a senior Communist Party official responsible for the mass media proved 
ineffective. In the end we did manage to secure the participation of a number of wel l­
informed individuals from Vietnam, as wel l  as closer to home. The conference proved a 
l ively affair, participants eventual ly  revised their papers, and editing for publ ication 
proceeded with the delays and complexities normal ly  associated with such an academic 
endeavour. Three individuals unable to attend the conference were invited to submit 
additional chapters. 
As reported by Reuters, 9 October 1 998. 
v 
I would l ike to thank Adam Fforde, Russel l  Heng, Peter Mares and Thaveeporn 
Vasavakul for timely advice and l iaison with relevant Vietnamese institutions and 
prospective workshop participants. At the workshop we benefited from papers 
presented by Tran Thi Tam and Robert Templer which ultimately did not make their 
way into the book. Nguyen Dien and Pham Thu Thuy offered professional translation 
and interpreting assistance. Hoang Oanh Col l ins provided invaluable help with general 
correspondence, organising, and preparation of the book for publ ication. Maxine 
McArthur skilful ly copy edited and indexed the final text. Kris Brown solved several 
computer problems and assisted with cover design. Beverley Fraser gave expert 
production advice and supervised final printing and d istribution. 
We are grateful to the Austral ian Agency for International Development, the 
Ford Foundation, and the Research School of Pacific and Asian Stud ies for providing 
the financial and personnel resources without which i t  would have been impossible to 
put on the conference and produce this book. 
David G. Marr 
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INTRODUCTION 
David G. Marr 
In 1907, a song exhorting people to read daily newspapers circulated in Vietnam. 
Accord ing to the anonymous author each reader could thus find out what was happening 
in the world, tel l  others, change l ives, and help the country become strong and 
prosperous. More fundamental ly, the songwriter l inked the prin ted page to veracity:1 
Truth is the medicine that cures ignorance and darkness, 
Truth is the remedy to overcome hunger and cowardice. 
Within months, the patriotic l i terati who eagerly promoted such ideas were either in 
colonial jails or toning down their rhetoric drastically, but the Vietnamese love affair 
with the printing press had just begun. 
Enthusiasm for typeset newspapers and books was provoked by the sheer novelty of 
the medium. For centuries, Vietnamese l i terati had been accustomed simply to the 
exchange of pen-and-ink manuscripts or the occasional woodblock compendium. The 
Tale of Kieu, Nguyen Du's extraord inary 23,000 character epic poem, written about 
1810, was subsequently carved onto 180 woodblocks, printed on rice paper, bound and 
distributed during the early 1870s.2 The nearest thing to a mass medium was the 
woodblock reproduction of drawings, featuring images of gods, fertil ity symbols, 
classical Ch inese expressions, folk heroes, and key scenes from epic poems or popular 
dramas.3 Far more commonly, however, information circulated by word-of-mouth. 
Poetry was memorised and recited as a form of popular education and entertainment. 
Itinerant theatre troops timed their arrival in particular towns and vi l lages to the 
calendar of festivals and rel igious observances. From the early 17•h century a few 
printed books carried in by western m issionaries and merchants attracted attention at 
court, but it was the western cannons, muskets, navigation equipment and charts, and 
assorted luxury goods that Vietnamese rulers treasured most. The first modern pr inting 
press arrived with French occupation forces in 1861 ,  being employed to publ ish an 
official gazette. A small number of books, pamphlets and serials were printed in 
subsequent decades. Not unti l the turn of the century, however, did Vietnamese 
establish a foothold in the colonial publishing business. 
'Bai hat khuyen nguoi xem nhat bao', in Vu Van Sach, et. al., compilers, Van tho Do11g 
Ki11h Nghia Thuc (Hanoi, 1 997), pp. 1 32-3. 
2 Other artisans produced three additional nom editions of Kieu in the 1 870s, and a total 
of 32 woodblock editions had appeared by 1 939. See Nguyen Khac Bay and Nguyen 
Huu Gioi, Ttuyen Kieu chu Nom da xuat ban bao nhieu Ian? Tap Chi Sach (Hanoi) 6-
1 998, pp. 22-4. 
3 A vivid collection of 1 9th and early zo•h century woodblock prints can be found in 
Maurice Durand, lmagerie populaire V ietnamie1111e (Paris, 1 960). 
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By the 1920s, scores of periodicals in Vietnamese and French were being 
publ ished, leading people to joke that whenever three intel lectuals got together in 
Saigon or Hanoi they were sure to start up another paper. Although low l iteracy l evels 
kept most circulation rates below 10,000 copies per periodical ,  i t  was common for 
issues to be passed from hand to hand, and for l iterate individuals to read or summarise 
articles oral l y  for friends and family members. Colonial censors were quick to shut 
down an offending newspaper, yet within a few months the same team of editors and 
writers often found a different publ ishing sponsor to be able to open up again under a 
new masthead. Meanwhile, hundreds of Vietnamese language books and pamphlets 
were appearing each year as wel l ,  with print runs averaging 1 ,500 copies, and school 
textbooks cl imbing to 50,000 copies per edition. Probably fifteen mi l l ion book copies 
were printed, bound and distributed in the two decades or so before 1945 - an average 
of eight or nine books per l i terate individual.4 
One might assume that the August 1945 Revolution and thirty years of war, 
d islocation and trauma which followed would put a serious dent in Vietnam's print 
media development, but this was not the case. A perusal of the Vietnam National 
Library catalog in Hanoi suggests that at least 4,000 books and booklets were publ ished 
in zones loyal to the Democratic Republ ic of Vietnam (DRY) government between late 
1945 and 1954. Many of these titles were cranked out by provincial presses, on very 
poor paper, perhaps averaging only twenty or thirty pages per copy. During this period 
the same presses produced local period icals and leaflets in abundance, al though copies 
of most of these do not seem to have made their way into l ibraries or archival 
col lections.5 Meanwhile, zones controlled by French and State of Vietnam forces 
produced about 3,000 titles, if the catalogues of the Bibl iotheque Nationale and Ho Chi 
Minh City's General Science Library (former National Library of the Republ ic of 
Vietnam) are a rel iable indicator. Period icals came out in French-occupied cities as 
wel l ,  with the Saigon press proving to be especial ly l ively. 
Returning to Hanoi victoriously in October 1 954, the DRY government soon found 
that intel lectuals who had served the revolutionary cause in various locations wished to 
revive the 1930s trad ition of publ ishing, with small groups of writers and editors 
locating the means to produce periodicals and books aimed at stimulating discussion on 
a wide range of issues. From 1947, Truong Chinh and other Communist Party leaders 
had already insisted that al l  cul tural activity serve the interests of the nation and the 
people, as defined by the proletarian vanguard .  Matters came to a head in 1956-57, 
when a few writers and editors dared to declare that in peacetime i t  was neither 
desirable nor acceptable for the Party to exercise d ictatorial control over cultural output, 
especial ly  the print media. The resulting purge saw several hundred intellectuals being 
sent to prison or labour reform camps, others denouncing themselves and others in· 
4 David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition 011 Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley, 1 98 1 ), pp. 44-9. 
5 The collections maintained by the Ministry of Defense and People's Army may provide 
some surprises in due course. 
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exchange for leniency. All publishing was nationalised, the number of period icals 
reduced dramatical ly, and tight censorship rules enforced until they became second 
nature to journal ists, a form of self-censorship that persisted for at least three decades. 
The read ing publ ic became used to perusing two daily newspapers, Nha11 Da11 (The 
People) and Q11a11 Doi Nha11 Da11 (People's Army), in search of something interesting, 
or at least wel l written. 
Ironical ly, a similar trend could be seen in South Vietnam from 19S4 to 1963, 
during the d ictatorial rule of ant i-communist President Ngo Dinh Diem. One by one the 
government closed down newspapers that dared to print embarrassing stories or 
question current pol icies, until only a couple of docile mouthpieces remained. 
Fol lowing Diem 's demise, scores of newspapers hit  the streets again, funded by 
different mi l itary, pol itical, rel igious and commercial groups, and often attacking each 
other vigorously. Only demonstrable sympathy for the communist-Jed National 
Liberation Front was certain grounds for closure. Once Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu 
consol idated his rule in 1968, the weed ing out of opposition papers resumed. In the 
early 1970s, however, as war weariness, inflation, rampant corruption and American 
withdrawals sapped non-communist morale in the South, opponents of the Thieu regime 
took more risks in publ ishing, to include printing of unauthorised papers, tracts and 
broadsides. 
After reun ification in 197S, the stern northern system of media controls was appl ied 
to the south, al though a couple of privately-owned newspapers were al lowed to continue 
for awhile with Party members added to the ed itorial staff. No one in Hanoi or Ho Chi 
Minh City dared to suggest that peacetime should bring a substantial relaxation of 
censorship, and in any event the growing confl ict with China soon provided new 
security justifications. By the early 1980s, the quality of paper used to print most 
periodicals and books had decl ined dramatical ly, due to the Soviet Union and other 
all ies refusing to continue donating stock. In a mammoth final fraternal endeavour, the 
complete works of Vladamir Lenin were translated into Vietnamese and publ ished in 
SS-volumes, tota l l ing 44,0S8 pages. Each volume had a print-run of 60,000 hard cover 
copies, the entire job consuming 3,SOO tons of paper.6 Meanwhile, researchers at the 
History Institute in Hanoi had to wait two or three years for a government comm ittee to 
release paper to print books on a title-by-title basis. Min istries and departments 
nonetheless managed to continue publ ishing on crude domestic paper ninety different 
journals and bulletins, many of questionable uti l ity or readersh ip. A huge quantity of 
domestic paper was also expanded each year on official circulars, memos and forms to 
6 Viet Nam (Pictorial), 4-1 982, inside front cover. The last volume came off the press in 
Moscow in August 1 98 1 .  
4 David Marr 
be fil led out in multiple copies. A few publ ications aimed at foreign readers continued 
to be printed on foreign paper, and Moscow sti l l  printed Vietnam 's bank notes.7 
Censorsh ip and paper scarcity did not prevent a smal l number of writers during the 
early 1980s publ ishing novels, short stories and poetry that impl icitly questioned the 
status quo. They were joined a few years later by journalists exposing specific cases of 
corruption and m ismanagement, a move legitim ised in the wake of the December 1986 
Sixth Party Congress. Rampant inflation made a mockery of the entire state al location 
system, compel l ing writers, ed itors, printers and distributors to find new ways to 
support their fam il ies. Not surprisingly, they often turned their talents to producing a 
variety of periodicals, manuals, guides, brochures and advertising copy l inked to doi 
moi (renewal, renovation) econom ic in itiatives and aspirations. A new spirit of 
experimentation and competition swept the print media, with provincial publ ishers often 
setting the pace. Between 1986 and 1989, local publ ishing enterprises printed an 
impressive average of 704 book titles and 8.6 mi l l ion copies per year, compared to only 
300 titles and 900,000 copies in 1980.8 Up to one-third of al l  book titles publ ished in 
the late 1980s were probably translations of popular fiction and non-fiction from 
Engl ish, French and Spanish into Vietnamese, meeting the pent-up demand among 
readers who had been fed translations from Russian for decades. Done quickly for 
payment by the word, many of these translations were mediocre. Provincial pol ice 
bureaus discovered another money-making formula: the tabloid. While waiting for Can 
Tho ferry in 1988, for example, I came upon Cong A 11 C1111 Long, fil led with stor ies 
about kil l ings, accidents, crime rings broken up, human foibles, grotesque babies - all 
material previously excluded from publ icat ion. Playing upon human emotions, 
combining the expected and unexpected, often possessing a simple moral punchl ine, 
Cong A11 Cuu L ong was being purchased and consumed avidly by a dozen or more 
9 people around me. 
Efforts by some authors to give as much attention to pol itical issues as to economic 
ones generated considerable publ ic interest during the late 1980s. However, whenever a 
writer moved beyond pointing out specific weaknesses in the pol itical system to 
questioning the continuing uti l ity of Marxist-Lenin ist ideology, the authorities retal iated 
promptly, usual ly by sacking the ed itor of the offending periodical or closing down the 
publ ication entirely. External events then conspired to raise the stakes, with Vietnamese 
leaders being shocked by the violent confrontations in China in June 1989, then stunned 
by the collapse of several commun ist party regimes in eastern Europe. Regulation of 
7 Sometime in the late 1 980s, Party General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh desperately 
requested Moscow to dispatch new supplies of paper currency to stave off state · 
bankruptcy. Tuoi Tre, 6 May 98. 
8 Tong Cuc Thong Ke, So Lieu thong Ke Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Clru Nglria Viet Nam, 1976-
1990 (Hanoi, 1 99 1 ), p. 1 45. 
9 Fieldwork diary, 22 March 1 988. 
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information was the subject of heated discussion at the Vietnam Writer 's Congress in 
October, then again during the end-of-year National Assembly debate over a new press 
law. From this point on, the Party moved relentlessly to restrict publ ic pol it ical debate. 
Photocopied critiques of Party pol icies continued to circulate, and people sti l l  tal ked 
. critical ly in a way they would not have dared only a few years prior, but the hopes of 
many intel lectuals, including some Party members, that the print media would serve as a 
forum for increasingly open pol it ical discourse were dashed once again.  
Pol it ics aside, newspapers and magazines have experienced a complete face-l ift 
since the early 1990s, from the dowdy old hand typeset, grey paper productions of yore, 
to new mult i-coloured, computer designed, lavishly i l l ustrated offerings on good paper. 
Primit ive newsprint was ban ished when the Swed ish-financed Bai Bang pulp and paper 
mi l l  came on l ine. New printing presses were imported, journal ists introduced to 
computer word processing, and young graphic designers allowed to experiment with 
state-of-the-art displays. Colour ads took over whole pages, much to the irritation of 
Party purists.10 Reporters cou ld access a variety of foreign news sources, rather than 
depend entirely on Vietnam News Agency as in the past. Photos of scantily-clad young 
women became standard fare. Ho Chi Minh City's pol ice tabloid boasted the largest 
circu lation in the country, while Nhan Dan, the Communist Party daily, l imped along at 
sixth or seventh place, sti l l  heavily subsid ised, occasional ly  making a grudging 
concession to current tastes. 
Competition is intense between the major papers in Ho Ch i Minh City and Hanoi. 
Within topical constraints monitored by the Party, reporters ferret out new stories and 
push them to the hi l t, even if it sometimes means fudging the l ine between fact and 
fict ion. When a particular h igh-flying entrepreneur or official becomes fair game for 
press charges of mismanagement, corruption or nepotism, basic rules of evidence are 
often ignored, no right of reply is offered, and l ibel or defamation charges have no 
opportun i ty of being heard in court. The indiv idual being attacked can seek protection 
from the Party, but in all l ikel ihood newspaper editors have already ascertained in 
advance that his/her 'umbrel la '  is tattered or removed entirely. Occasionally, editors 
mis-read the situation, for example not realising that the accused has more than one 
umbrella. This appears to explain the recent case of Nguyen Hoang Linh, editor of 
Doa11/z Nghiep (Enterprise) newspaper, who received and published inside information 
from one government agency pointing to serious fraud in the customs service when 
purchasing patrol boats from overseas, only to be arrested for revealing state secrets, 
subsequently reduced to 'abusing democracy'.11 
10 The current compromise for major papers involves ads being consolidated to the middle 
pages, where they are technically regarded as an insert. 
11 In October 1 998, after two postponed hearings, Nguyen Hoang Linh tried, convicted 
and given a jail term equivalent to time already spent in prison, hence released. 
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Newspapers routinely present themselves as defenders of truth and justice, yet 
many readers remain sceptical ,  and can cite numerous examples of papers being less 
than d isinterested parties. They know that each publ ication functions under a particular 
Party, state, mi l itary or Fatherland Front supervisory organ. They know that some 
newspapers have substantial property investments and financial connections with big 
business enterprises, domestic or foreign. And they are aware that it is common 
practice for journalists and editors to receive gratuities for favourable reporting. 
Nonetheless, readers have come to identify with specific papers, buying copies 
regularly, enjoying certain columns or features, appreciating the style of one writer, the 
investigative skil ls of another. Editors have bui lt  on this reader affil iation by sponsoring 
scholarsh ips for poor h igh school students, musical performances, publ ic seminars, and 
a wide variety of contests. Thus, in 1998, to commemorate the 3001h anniversary of the 
found ing of Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City, T11oi Tre (Young Age) organised a contest for 
the best old and recent photographs of the city, together with a serial ised l ist of history 
questions, to which thousands of readers sent in answers in hopes of winning prizes. 
More ominously, when someone began slashing children riding on the back of 
motorbikes in Hanoi, and every newspaper in the city took up the story with heartfelt 
expressions of shock and comments about recent social degeneration, Lao Dong 
(Labour) went a further step by offering a reward for identification and capture of the 
culprit(s) responsible.12 
Letters-to-the-ed itor columns have existed in Vietnamese newspapers since the 
early 201h century. From the late 1950s, fol lowing Soviet precedent, DRY papers 
encouraged readers to mail in complaints and critic isms, a few of which were publ ished, 
and all sent to government agencies for collation and possible action. This practice 
became very ritualised, but was given new credibility under the tenure of General 
Secretary Nguyen Van Linh (1986-1991). It has since functioned on an ad hoe basis, 
with ed itors sometimes passing letters to reporters to check out, sometimes dispatching 
them to officials for comment or action. Some newspapers period ical ly  inform readers 
how many complaints have not been responded to by the authorities. If letter-writers 
report being harassed by local officials as the result of communicating with the press, 
this too can become news. Most major papers also contain 'Dien Dan ' (Forum) 
columns, wherein a particular topic is declared open for d iscussion by readers, a 
selection of responses is publ ished over several months, and a wrap-up ed itor ial 
summarises opinion and gives the political ly appropriate conclusion. Occasional ly  a 
particular letter provokes a big batch of rebuttals and supporters. Although one is left 
with the impression of serious two-way communication, readers are not unaware that 
the process remains vulnerable to manipulation or contrivance by the ed itors. 
Newspapers are seen as useful intermediaries, even the 'people 's friend ' on certain 
occasions, but few readers believe that ed itors can or will stand up to sustained pressure 
from above. 
12 Lao Dong, 8 Apri l 1 998. The amount of the reward was not sp�cified. 
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The Cinema 
Moving pictures arrived in Indochina during the 1910s, for viewing by French 
residents need ing amusement and anxious not to lose touch with the metropole. Within 
a decade, Vietnamese city folk were flocking to the cinema as well. No one appears to 
· have researched the impact of film on Vietnamese society and cul ture, but we know 
from novels and short stories of the 1930s that writers frequented movie theatres often, 
talked among themselves about actors, plots and imagery, and appreciated the 
modernising implications of the medium. Charlie Chaplin's films, Tarzan offerings, 
Les Miserables, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, and Sinbad the Sailor appear to have 
attracted almost anyone in Saigon, Hanoi, Haiphong or Can Tho who cou ld afford the 
price of admission. 
French cinematographers used Indochina as a sett ing for feature films, and 
documentaries were produced about the colony, during which occasions a few 
Vietnamese may have picked up techn ical skil ls, but it was not until the 1950s that a 
small domestic fi lm industry grew up in Saigon. By the early 1960s, a modest but 
steady fare of melodramas, romances, adventure stories and adaptations of cai luong 
operettas was capturing audiences in provincial towns as wel l  as the cities. The RVN 
government continued to subsidise feature film production in the face of hundreds of 
Hol lywood imports, as well as cranking out propaganda documentaries. 
Hanoi's first motion picture was produced in 1959, and henceforth the medium of 
film was utilised extensively for DRV propaganda purposes, specificaily 10 heip 
mobilise support for the two principal slogans of 'Liberate the South' and 'Build 
Socialism in the North'. Mobile projection teams reached even the most distant villages 
of North Vietnam, screening feature films, newsreels and documentaries to transfixed 
audiences. City theatres offered a steady diet of Soviet, eastern European and Chinese 
films in add ition to local productions. Fol lowing unification in 1975, western fi lms 
were banned from the South, and Chinese films soon disappeared throughout the 
country in the face of growing tensions between Hanoi and Beijing. Despite mounting 
financial stringencies, the state continued to al locate significant resources to domestic 
film-making. In 1980, ninety-five newsreels and documentaries and sixteen feature 
films were released, but by 1989 priorities had been reversed, with the former category 
fal l ing to twenty-four and the latter ris ing to th irty-three. Reflecting the h igh cost of 
imported fi lm stock, each production was only dupl icated to the average number of 
three or four copies, then circulated to Vietnam 's 345 movie theatres, 101  'open air ' 
cinemas and 998 mobile projection teams. Imported fi lms made the rounds in similar 
fashion, although ·the total number dropped from two hundred in 1980 to 1 33 in 1989, 
presumably reflecting a growing disincl ination in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe 
"d f . 13 to prov1 e ree copies. 
13 Tong Cuc Thong Ke, So Lieu T/ro11g Ke, pp. 1 46-9. 
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From the early 1980s, Vietnamese cinematographers had started to expand the 
envelope of permissible topics and to experiment with new techniques, only to 
encounter major production limitations as government funding was cut back and in 
some cases discontinued entirely. On the other hand, a few creative artists who 
managed to acquire video cameras and associated audio equipment chose to concentrate 
on whatever could be accomplished cheaply and sold on the open market. The Party's 
cultural czars and the Ministry of Interior were slow to realise how easy it was to video, 
duplicate and sell thousands of copies of a particular tape, unlike movie films. Popular 
singers, cai luong groups, dramatic troupes and musical ensembles soon went beyond 
face-to-face performances to marketing video (and audio) cassettes commercially. 
However, they quickly faced intense competition from foreign tapes, mostly smuggled 
into the country as single copies and then reproduced by private entrepreneurs. By 
1990, not only the cities but also a number of provincial towns sported video shops for 
customers who boasted video machines at home, and video parlours for the less 
fortunate. Pirated feature films on video flooded the market from China, Hong Kong 
and Thailand. Movie theatres responded by screening Hollywood blockbusters acquired 
overseas without payment of royalties, yet still lost customers and money. In Hanoi, the 
number of operating cinemas dropped from sixteen down to only two in 1996.14 
Repeated campaigns mounted by the Party, Fatherland Front and local police to 
confiscate and destroy video tapes and other 'poisonous cultural commodities' imported 
illegally had the effect of disrupting the market for a month or two, after which business 
returned to normal. 
Since December 1997, when the United States and Vietnam signed a copyright 
agreement, the state monopoly film distributor, Fafim, has been compelled to pay an 
average of US$7000 for each American film imported for screening in the decreasing 
number of movie theatres around the country. In March 1998, Fafim reported earnings 
on average of only $2000 per imported film.15 Already by that time the number of 
foreign films being screened in theatres had dropped to only 20 per cent of pre­
copyright figures, the remaining offerings coming mostly from studios in China, Hong 
Kong, Russia and India.16 The number of legally imported American videos declined 
similarly, but illegal video copies of recent Hollywood releases continued to be sold or 
rented in even the most out-of-the-way district towns. 
In recent years the three remaining state film production companies have lobbied 
the Party and government vigorously for increased financial subsidies. As one producer 
put it publicly: 
14 Vietnam News (Hanoi), 31 July 1 996. 
15 Ngo Ngoc Ngu Long, ' Phat hanh phim va chieu bong ... ', Saigon Giai Phong, 22 
March 1 998. 
16 N.L., 'Se con phai ban bao nhieu rap chieu bong nua? ' ,  Thanh Nien, 1 8  March 1 998. 
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Why th ink that the state is ' piggy-backing' us? Maybe the state needs us and we 
are carrying on our shoulders the responsibil ity for elevating a good society, in l ine 
with our Party 's slogan: Build a society of wealthy cit izens, a strong country that is . d . · 1 · d 1 7 JUSt an CIVI 1se • 
In 1997, the government al located 12 bi l l ion dong (US$940,000) for domestic fi lm 
productions, which unimpressed commentators pointed out was only 0.3 per cent of the 
amount spent by Hol lywood on just one film  - 'Titanic ' .  It appears that one-quarter of 
that 1997 allocation was earmarked for one film  about Ho Chi Minh, which drew luke­
warm reviews and l im ited theatre audiences. 18  An average Vietnamese production can 
only afford to shoot about 10,000 meters of third-class Kodak film, compared to ten 
times that amount of first-class fi lm in international productions. The Party has floated 
the idea of consol idating all fi lm production and d istribution, and possibly television as 
wel l ,  into one big state company, citing China as precedent. On the other hand, some 
cinematographers urge equitisation of relevant enterprises, which would take the 
bureaucrats out of the decision-making process, leaving producers, screen-writers, 
directors, actors and other professionals to sink-or-swim in the marketplace. 1 9 
Music 
The French introduced sheet music for sale in Indoch ina at the turn of the century, 
. mostly for the colon community, but also for use in the schools, where Vietnamese as 
wel l as French pupils were introduced to musical notation. Published sheet music began 
to circulate more widely in the 1920s, and Vietnamese period icals occasional ly printed 
the scores of popular songs. Gramophone players appeared in the homes of bourgeois 
Vietnamese, using 78rpm vinyl records imported from France. Listeners of the 1930s 
were especial ly attracted to the songs of Tino Rossi ,  Mistinguett and other 
contemporary romant ics. Youths who could afford a guitar, mandol in or harmonica 
were key members of singing groups formed at schools and offices. By the early 1940s, 
a few young Vietnamese were composing and publ ishing their own songs, at first 
mostly variations on sad European Jove themes, but then switching to a Western martial 
beat and creating lyrics that harkened back to ancient Vietnamese battles and heroes. 
Both tunes and words spread quickly throughout the country, becom ing part of the 
extraordinary upsurge of patriotic fervour during the A'1gust 1945 Revolution and 
subsequent Anti-French Resistance. 
Phonograph machines remained wel l  beyond the means of most Vietnamese 
famil ies throughout the 1950s, leaving government radio stations in Hanoi and Saigon 
to monopol ise music output. During the 1960s, however, Japanese tape cassette 
1 7  Xuan Son, as quoted i n  Thu Ha, 'Van dang tim mot loi ra', Tuoi Tre, 7 March 1 998. 
18 Thu Ha, Tuoi Tre, 2 October 1 997. 
1 9  Ngo Ngoc Ngu Long, ' Phat hanh . .  . ', Saigon Giai Phong, 2 2  March 1 998. Th u  Ha, 
'Van dang tim .. . ', Tuoi Tre, 7 March 1 998. 
1 0  David Marr 
recorders entered the markets of South Vietnam in quantity, along with transistor radios 
and electric fans. After national un ification in 1975, the Party mounted a major 
campaign in  the South against ' neo-colonial culture ' ,  with Fatherland Front adherents 
confiscating offensive books, magazines, calendars, films, sheet music and especial ly 
cassette tapes. The mass media continued to rai l  against 'blue music' (depressing, 
defeatist) and 'yellow music' (l icentious), yet pre-1975 music cont inued to be played in 
private in  the south, and by the early 1980s had infiltrated the north as wel l .  
Meanwhile, students and  workers return ing from the  Soviet Union and eastern Europe 
also carried home cassette recorders and tapes of punk rock, hard rock and other 
western music considered h ighly offensive by the Hanoi authorities. Viet Kieu from 
France, return ing to visit relatives, smuggled in tapes by popular southern singers who 
had fled the country and continued to perform overseas. Many of these foreign 
cassettes were quickly reproduced by the thousands and sold on the street. From the 
early 1990s, CD players and CD disks joined cassettes, with most of the disks being 
pirate dupl icates produced in China. The December 1997 US-Vietnam copyright 
agreement seems not to have put a dent in the marketing of i l legal CDs. 
To reverse this prol iferation of western recorded music, heard blasting day or n ight 
from coffee shops and karaoke bars in even the smal lest towns of Vietnam, the 
authorities would have needed to confiscate privately owned cassette recorders and CD 
players. Hanoi 's leaders may have considered this option on more than one occasion 
since the late 1970s, but never implemented it . Instead, campaigns have been instigated 
repeatedly against 'decadent ' ,  ' noxious' ,  ' polluting' music, with wel l-publ icised raids 
on shops and bars, and the ceremonial bul l -dozing or burning of thousands of cassettes 
and CDs, along with the videos mentioned earl ier, yet each t ime the publ ic becomes 
more sceptical of government intentions, especially since customs officials and local 
pol ice are believed to profit from the extensive trade in i l legal commodities. 
Undoubtedly  many Party members are sincerely disturbed by the cultural impl ications 
of so much 'al ien' music being played, while ' trad itional ' and ' revolutionary' music is 
sidel ined or forgotten. Perhaps most disconcerting, an ominous convergence can be 
observed recently between Vietnamese diaspora video music variety shows on the one 
hand, and domestic musical creations on the other. Not only do they offer similar 
content, but sometimes they share production faci l i ties, funding, singers and 
. • 20 musicians. 
Radio 
Radio arrived in Indochina at about the same t ime as the cinema, but for a couple of 
decades its function was primarily to facilitate colonial government and French business 
20 Ashley Carruthers, 'National identity, diasporic anxiety and music video culture in 
Vietnam', paper delivered at ASAA Conference, Sydney, 30 September 1 998, 
Carruthers points out that older anti-communist emigre leaders are as troubled by this 
convergence as communist culture czars. 
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operations, as a backup to the telegraph and undersea cable system. Vietnamese 
working in  bureaus, plantations or newspaper offices became fami l iar with radioed 
bulletins, price l ists, shipping schedules and weather reports. Government transmitters 
in Saigon and Hanoi also broadcast news and music. Although mostly aimed at French 
residents, the small Vietnamese bourgeoisie purchased radio receivers as wel l ,  with 
neighbours sometimes gathering to l isten. A few colonial officials toyed with the idea 
of employing radio to reach mi l l ions of farmers around Indochina, for example by 
setting up a single one-frequency receiver and loud-speaker at each vi l lage office, where 
everyone would be expected to convene at specified intervals to l isten to government 
notices, news, and farming advice interspersed with entertaining music and drama. 
However, no one in authority was prepared to grapple with the various language, 
techn ical and logistical hurdles, much less allocate the necessary funding.21 
As war clouds gathered in the late 1930s, alert, concerned Vietnamese sought out 
friends, relatives or work mates who possessed radio receivers with shortwave capacity, 
so that they could tune in to broadcasts from Tokyo, Nanking, Manila, Singapore or 
New Delhi .  The power of the rad io to reach mi l l ions of people in d isparate locations 
could not have been demonstrated more vividly. After the French wartime 
admin istration confiscated many rad ios in native hands, attention qu ietly sh ifted to 
cult ivating Vietnamese employed in the colonial P'IT, where the international airwaves 
continued to be monitored assiduously. 
Vietnamese revolutionaries understood the power of the rad io, whether it was the 
American-supplied transmitter which l inked Ho Chi Minh's mountain headquarters to 
Kunming in the summer of 1945, the Bach Mai (Hanoi) radio station released by the 
Japanese Army to provisional government control on 31  August, or the scores of 
receivers employed subsequently by local Viet Minh units and people's committees to 
keep in touch with ' the Centre ' (Tnmg Uong). In late 1945, retreating in the face of 
French attacks, southern revolutionaries managed to lug several old transmitters from 
one jungle location to another, powering them with d iesel generators, evading enemy air 
sorties, and seeking out precious replacement parts, especial ly vacuum tubes, on the 
Saigon black market or in  Bangkok. When hosti l ities broke out in the north as wel l  in 
December 1946, equipment from Bach Mai for the DRV's 'Voice of Vietnam' was 
carried into the hi l ls, being relocated a total of 14 t imes during the next seven-and-one­
half years.22 During this period a network of transmitters and receivers was bui l t  up 
across Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in  the first instance used to communicate 
confidential orders and reports, and secondly to d isseminate government propaganda. 
Because Morse code signals could travel much further than voice transmissions, i t  was 
common for higher echelon stations to key out edicts and newspaper articles in Morse, 
2 1  For intriguing British experiments along these l ines, see Joselyn Zivin, 'The Imagined 
Reign of the Iron Lecturer: vi llage broadcasting in colonial India', Modem A sian 
Studies 32, 3 (1998), pp. 717-38 
22 Nua the ky Tieng Noi Viet Nam (Hanoi, 1995), p. 46. 
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to be copied down by numerous local operators, who then gave the texts to propaganda 
teams for use in printed bul letins and broadsides. 
In October 1954, fol lowing the victory at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords, and 
the triumphant return of People's Army forces to Hanoi,  'Voice of Vietnam ' broadcasts 
resumed from the capital of the DRV. Two 7.5 ki lowatt transmitters and several smaller 
machines beamed programs l ive in Vietnamese, French, Engl ish, Cantonese, Mandarin, 
Lao and Khmer. A year later, big Soviet tape recorders arrived for the main station, and 
in 1958 Hungary donated smal ler portable recorders, which enabled radio reporters for 
the first time to col lect material in auditoriums, factories, cooperatives, laboratories and 
schools. About the same time, a new 150 ki lowatt Soviet transmitter boosted medium­
wave broadcasts, eventual ly  replaced by 1000 kilowatt equipment in the early 1 970s. 
U.S. bombers destroyed the central transmitters in December 1972, but programming 
was quickly re-routed to a backup transmitter in Kunming, as wel l as several smal ler 
transmitters in the Vietnamese countryside. The Hanoi facil ities were rebui l t  with 
fraternal social ist help and capital service resumed in 1974. 
Throughout these two decades very few famil ies in the DRV possessed rad io 
receivers. Instead, the state rel ied primarily on loudspeakers installed every few city 
blocks, or in front of vi l lage communal houses, to be able to relay Hanoi radio news, 
exhortations and patriotic music each morn ing and evening. Famil ies were also 
encouraged to instal l small speakers in their homes, l inking them to the local repeater 
stations. Anyone- with direct access to a rad io receiver who was caught l istening to the 
BBC, VOA or other enemy stations was l i kely to be imprisoned. St i l l  worried about 
reception of dangerous ideas and information, the DRV sometimes electron ical ly 
jammed particular frequencies. 
Radio operations in South Vietnam during the period 1 954-1975 were less tightly 
controlled than in the North, al though stations were state owned and RVN censors 
checked all programming in advance of broadcast. During the regime of Ngo Dinh 
Diem (1954-1963), local ly manufactured receivers were devoid of shortwave bands 
capable of picking up Radio Hanoi, Radio Beijing or Radio Liberation (from early 
1962). Imported receivers often evaded this wavelength restriction, yet anyone caught 
l istening to communist stations risked arrest and jai l .  From the early 1 960s, powerful 
transmitters belonging to U.S. Armed Forces Radio beamed western pop songs and 
news to Gls in South Vietnam, of course being picked up by Vietnamese as wel l .  The 
news broadcasts in Engl ish were almost as careful ly censored as Radio Saigon, but the 
pop music influenced a whole generation of young southern Vietnamese. Widespread 
acquisition of inexpensive battery-powered Japanese transistor rad ios, usual ly  
accompanied by a small earphone, meant that farmers, fishermen and sold iers at distant. 
outposts could tune in to the station of their choice, domestic or foreign. 
After 1 975 unification, People's Army troops l iberated tens of thousands of 
transistor radios in the South and shipped or carried them North. These were 
supplemented by rad ios transported from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe by 
Vietnamese students and workers. Radio l istening patterns appear to have altered 
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dramatical ly i n  the North by the mid-1980s. Fami l ies turned off the speakers wired into 
their homes, the fear of being discovered l istening to al ien stations diminished, and the 
use of neighbourhood loudspeakers decl ined. Jamming became an unusual occurrence. 
By 1990, local ly  assembled radios which included shortwave bands were being sold in 
. quantity at the main state department store in down town Hanoi .  23 The BBC attracted 
l isteners because of its respected Vietnamese language news programs and its wel l­
crafted Engl ish language instruction for foreigners, whi le the Voice of America and 
Radio Austral ia were considered to possess the best popular music. Radio Beijing 
boasted the strongest signal, but only classical Chinese music and the occasional 
traditional theatre performance generated much interest. 
Hanoi remained qu ick to condemn foreign radio stations for al leged interference in 
Vietnam 's internal affairs. Thus, VCP commentators reacted furiously to the BBC's 
decision in December 1990 to broadcast repeatedly a long set of interviews with Bui 
Tin, former deputy editor of Nha11 Dan, who had defected to the west. More recently, 
Vietnamese newspapers have routinely condemned the U.S. for establ ishing Radio Free 
Asia (subsequently renamed the Asia Pacific Network), along the l ines of Radio Free 
Europe, which Hanoi analysts consider partly responsible for bringing down social ism 
in eastern Europe. Other than urging Vietnamese not to l isten, however, the authorities 
do not seem to have taken concrete countermeasures. 24 
Partly in response to competition from foreign broadcasts, the Voice of Vietnam 
slowly began to d iversify its domestic content, amel iorate the heavy didacticism of its 
news and commentary, and give some latitude to local stations when developing 
programming. Compared to the print media, however, radio broadcasters were far 
slower to take advantage of the relative relaxation of state controls from the m id-1980s 
onward. This reflected an institutional hardening of the arteries at Voice of Vietnam, 
with the top leadership remaining intact for almost half a century, very l ittle authority 
being delegated to section heads, and directors of local stations reporting directly to 
Hanoi, unl ike newspaper editors, who dealt mostly with diverse city-level supervisors. 
Over the decades, radio staff had come to bel ieve they understood the medium 
intimately, with only technological upgrades being needed, not transformations in 
outlook. 
The dramatic upsurge of television during the past five or six years has shaken 
radio broadcasters out of their complacency. Elder leaders have reti red, new managers 
have travelled overseas and conducted l istener surveys, younger staff members have 
been sent to western countries for training. Advertising has been introduced. To meet 
the perceived publ ic demand for l ively music, novelty, exposes, instant news and 
23 Dr Dean Forbes, then a colleague at the ANU, observed people buying these radios on 
one of his 1 990 visits to Hanoi. 
24 Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 26 August 1 996, rebroadcast on Voice of Vietnam the same day. 
Saigon Giai Phong, 1 4 October 1 996. 
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feedback, Voice of Vietnam stations are experimenting in a way that would have been 
unthinkable only a decade ago. On the other hand, the Communist Party continues to 
see radio as a vital means to transmit instructions, propaganda and 'authentic' culture to 
the countryside and upland regions, where more than 75 per cent of Vietnam 's citizenry 
sti l l  l ive. Only a small fraction of people in d istant vi l lages read newspapers. For 
reasons of topography, radio reception remains far better than television in many 
localities, and poor fami l ies cannot yet afford a TV set in any case.25 Party leaders who 
insist that farmers and minority peoples are not ready for the innovations in content and 
style that urban Vietnamese have come to expect continue to argue for restraint in radio 
programming. 
Television 
Early television in South Vietnam was part of the aid package deposited by 
American experts in the name of development and integration to the Free World. While 
RVN TV transmissions during the 1960s did not reach beyond Saigon and several other 
cit ies, the U.S. Armed Forces Television station possessed a more powerful signal, and 
could afford to screen recently released Hol lywood movies as well as weekly features 
l ike 'Dragnet', 'Batman ', 'I Love Lucy' and 'The Ed Sul l ivan Show' .  The rapidly 
expanding South Vietnamese urban middle class purchased Japanese black-and-white 
TV sets, along with other favoured consumer goods, thanks to the American-financed 
commodity import program, which heavi ly subsid ised the sale of such products as a 
device to restrain wart ime inflation. Television projected the American Dream to 
mi l l ions of South Vietnamese until April 1975. 
The DRV set up a television stud io in Hanoi in 1968 and broadcast its first program 
in 1970, al though transmissions were infrequent and reception l im ited to a few hundred 
official l y  designated sites around the capita l .  Upon seizing TV faci l i ties in Saigon on 
30 April 1975, the People's Army renamed the main station Saigon Liberation 
Television and convinced some local technicians to remain on the job until they trained 
a new contingent arriving from Hanoi .  Some TV equ ipment was shipped northward, 
where daily transmissions final ly began in July 1 976. After prolonged lobbying, 
television cadres final ly convinced the government in 1984 to separate the Giang Vo 
TV station in Hanoi from the Voice of Vietnam rad io establ ishment, al though it took 
several more years to implement this decision. The main l im itation on television during 
the 1980s was the extreme paucity of TV receivers, with most pre- 1975 southern sets no 
longer functional, replacement sets not being imported, and most famil ies having other, 
more pressing purchasing priorities in any event. Films from the Soviet Union and 
eastern Europe occupied much programming time. 
In the late 1980s, consequent to the more general loosening of government controls, 
a few western films began to appear on television in Vietnam, news programs became 
25 Nguyen True Linh, 'Dua van hoa den mien nui, hai dao va vung nong thon sau', Niian 
Dan, 2 November 1 996. 
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more interesting, and reporters greatly expanded their interviewing of ordinary citizens 
on the street, in  the marketplace, and in private homes. More spectacular, as it turned 
out, were the dai ly news feeds from a Soviet satel l i te, which increasingly offered scenes 
of parl iamentary confrontation in the Duma, large anti-government demonstrat ions, and 
. the eventual demise of communist regimes in a whole series of capital cities. By 1 990, 
imported Samsung colour TV sets were available in state stores, sell ing for 450,000 
dong. Buyers included farmers in vi l lages surrounding Hanoi, and famil ies in Ho Chi 
Minh City with remittance income from relatives overseas. Even more than radio 
receivers during the 1930s, TV sets acqu ired by relatively affluent Vietnamese fami l ies 
more than half a century later became magnets that attracted scores of fascinated 
neighbours during prime time in the evening. Samsung soon had negotiated with 
Vietnamese officials the establ ishment of a local TV assembly plant, and marketing 
shifted from state stores to numerous small private shopfronts in every city and town 
within range of a TV transmitter. 
During the early 1990s, a number of western embassies and private companies 
approached television stations in Vietnam with free-to-air programs, in hopes of gaining 
an early edge over their foreign competitors. Some of these offers were taken up with 
alacrity, much to the del ight of viewers eager for new entertainment experiences. The 
need to dub Vietnamese language over foreign soundtracks qu ickl y expanded, providing 
employment for translators, narrators and technicians al ike. The hugely successful 
Japanese serial 'Osh in'  prompted Tokyo to donate state-of-the art laser dubbing 
equipment to VTV, yet it was seldom used. Between 1995 and mid-1998, using older 
equipment, VTV dubbed six hundred feature films, serials and documentaries, often 
coming under criticism from an increasingly sophisticated audience for improper 
t I . . h . . 26 rans at1on, monotone narration or poor sync romsallon. 
Also in the early 1990s, foreign companies starting to sell consumer products on the 
Vietnamese market made tantal ising advertising offers to television stations, often 
quickly accepted. Many of these expensively produced, artistical ly sl ick, technical ly 
advanced foreign TV advertisements for soft drinks, cosmetics, condoms, motorbikes 
and CD players captivated Vietnamese viewers, especial ly adolescents and chi ldren, 
even more than accompanying serial productions l ike 'Charl ie's Angels' ,  'Lost in 
Space ', or ' Little House on the Prairie ' .  The Communist Party, beginning to worry that 
it was losing control of television, proceeded to rein in local stations, redirect 
advertising revenues, and scrutinise foreign program content and ads more rigorously. 
From about 1996, foreign program providers, losing patience with the glacial pace of 
contract negotiations, began to terminate their free-to-air 'donations ' .  At another level, 
the Party instructed local officials to enforce restrictions on satel l ite d ishes being used 
by tens of thousands of people to access foreign TV transmissions directly. 
In the face of al l  this foreign programming, domestic television production has not 
been standing sti l l .  On the eve of Tet 1 996, for example, VTV organised its first 
26 Tlwnh Nien, 15 July 1998. 
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simultaneous l ive coverage emanating from multiple locations inside the country, 
including a mobile station positioned for the occasion in the S�ratly islands, a 
transparent d iplomatic gambit and appeal to Vietnamese patriotism. 7 The first TV 
game show also appeared in 1996, featuring jeans-clad youngster competing against 
each other on the greased pol l  climb, bal loon grab, wooden horse bronco buster, and 
other such contrivances - accompanied by the squeals and cheers of a l ive studio 
audience::& Live coverage of Vietnamese soccer matches is extremely popular, 
al though viewers continue to disparage the level of play compared to foreign 
competitions screened as wel l .  A current TV quiz show pitting teams from several h igh 
schools against each other is qu ite popu lar in Hanoi.  Most surprising is the loud, barely 
controlled cheering, stomping and banner waving of high school support groups in the 
audience, total ly contradicting the dul l  questions drawn from past official university 
entrance examinations. 
For many years, domestical ly produced TV dramas were compared with the 
inedible soup sold at state shops ('pho mau dich, kich TV'). Recently, however, 
viewers have grudgingly compl imented some dramas that manage to treat contemporary 
social issues in a non-doctrinaire manner. Sets remain primi tive and re-fi lm ing is 
discouraged, due to meagre budgets, yet writers, directors and cameramen are learning 
from experience, and actors reach their unseen, increasingly demanding audience using 
less styl ised mannerisms and presentation.29 Soap operas from America, Brazil ,  Hong 
Kong and Japan featured on Vietnamese television over the past decade have been 
stud ied by teams in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, the basic formula then mod ified· 
sl ightly to accord with local conditions. Early productions are being viewed with 
curiosity, if not outright enthusiasm. More ambitiously, VTV has joined several times 
with foreign funders and TV experts to try to create dramas of sufficient qual ity to be 
distributed overseas as wel l  as screened local ly.  From late 1 996, a thirty-part serial 
titled 'Gio qua Mien Sang toi '  ('Wind Blowing Through Light and Darkness ') 
appeared, the fru it of cooperation between the European Commission, CARE 
International, Australian screenwriters and technicians, and Vietnamese writers, 
directors and actors. Exploring fami ly relationships amidst a troubled transition from 
vi l lage to city, from wartime stringency to peacetime consumerism, with a specific 
message about HIV/AIDs incorporated as wel l ,  the story may have proven too d idactic 
for current aud ience tastes.30 
Television daily news and current affairs programs remain subject to particular 
Communist Party survei l lance, yet they have come a long way since the days of talking 
27 Saigon Giai Pliong, 22 February 1996. Such live TV simulcasts had been accomplished 
between Moscow and Hanoi as early as 1980. 
28 Vietnam Nam Business Journal, October 1996, p. 13. 
29 Tuoi Tre, 28 March 1998. 
30 So far as I know, the serial has not been picked up overseas. 
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heads merely read ing newspaper articles or quoting provincial poul try statistics. When 
report ing foreign stories, the newly perceived need to be immediate, to pick up the latest 
satel l ite cl ip from CNN, BBC or NHK, often al lows vrv only a few hours to make 
selections and prepare a script to accompany the foreign images. Under such time 
pressures the domestic pol it ical impl ications of a story receive less consideration than 
with the print media, the Party l ine is often forgotten as foreign narratives are translated 
and read confidently by vrv news presenters. Domestic news coverage is more 
predictable, with a continu ing h igh proportion of excerpts from official speeches, of 
panning relentlessly across rows of stol id l isteners at meetings, of farmers and workers 
expressing their undying gratitude for party and government leadership. To such 
longstanding pol itical content, however, has recently been added 'human interest ' news, 
with TV reports from traffic accident sites, pol ice stations, flooded vi l lages, beauty 
contests, soccer matches, local festivals and much more. An increasing proportion of 
such stories are being presented l ive, in frank imitation of CNN, which of course puts 
greater responsibil ity on individual reporters, some of whom clearly aspire to status as 
national ly recognised media personal it ies. 
Aside from the 'fire engine chasing' tradition of journalism, TV reporters are also 
being assigned to investigate particular stories in depth and to pursue them over periods 
of weeks or months if necessary. New curre"nt affairs shows allocate fifteen minutes or 
more to a single topic, with the better segments amounting to mini-documentaries. 
Thus, an expose of widespread pilferage of coal from Quang Yen m ines, connecting 
freight trains and seaport stocks managed to conveyed to viewers an image of rough­
and-ready, wild west style behaviour by a substantial portion of the local population, 
requirin� forceful intervention from outside the region to be able to tum things 
around. A th irty minute report on a government meeting in Da Nang skilfu l ly 
employed techn iques of editing and juxtaposition to argue that central Vietnam was 
being discriminated against compared to southern Vietnam when it came to foreign 
investment incentives, infrastructure priorities and transport charges.32 Panel 
discussions which impl icitly pit d ifferent interest groups and viewpoints against each 
other are increasingly acceptable. For example, ranking government officials, state 
enterprise managers and economists pol ite ly d isagreed with each other on the topics of 
taxation pol icy and how to revive flagging foreign investment, during two VfV3 panels 
screened in m id-April 1998. No longer is i t  requ ired that every participant present a 
national united front to the viewer. 
Televised press conferences are rare in Vietnam, and h ighly styl ised, careful ly 
edited occasions when they do appear. It was thus qu ite a surprise to observe General 
Secretary Le Kha Phieu on television in early May 1988, facing a phalanx of foreign 
journal ists not requ ired to submit questions in advance, appearing relaxed, responding 
to each query with a wry smile and more-or-less cogent answer. When the Dow Jones 
3 1  Hanoi TV, evening of 28 March 1 998. 
32 Da Nang TV, 18 March 1 998. 
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correspondent bluntly doubted that Vietnam could reach its end-of-year economic 
targets, the General Secretary stuck to his figures, but said he respected her position, the 
leadership checked developments every week, and was prepared to revise its 
calculations if new evidence warranted. Other pointed questions about conservative and 
reformist factions within the Party, and the lack of rel igious freedom in Vietnam, were 
handled by Phieu without apparent irritation, if not necessarily to the satisfaction of the 
interlocutor. More remarkably, VTV was authorised to rebroadcast the press 
conference only a few hours later, after some quick editing and dubbing, yet leaving a 
lot of the questions intact. The contrast with Le Kha Phieu 's dour, dul l  predecessor, Do 
Muoi, was striking and undoubtedly del iberate. A check of newspaper accounts of the 
press conference revealed that they had left out several of the more sensitive 
components of both questions and answers revealed on television. 33 
Aware that Vietnamese viewers are becoming more demanding and discriminating, 
television executives search for ways to upgrade domestic programming. When asked 
to name the biggest single d ifficulty currently facing Vietnam Television, Deputy 
Director Vu Van Hien responded:34 
No opponents. We must try hard to create for reporters an atmosphere of healthy 
competition. Without competition it is not easy to advance. 
Not wishing to increase the amount of direct chal lenge from foreign television 
stations, VTV has permitted some competition between its own channels. Since 1996, 
the national flag carrier, VTVl, has been compelled to look over its shou lder at 
experiments taking place at VTV3, where a number of entertaining cultural, social and 
sports features have been trialed. There is said to be more flexibil ity and esprit de corps 
at VTV3, attracting many of the brighter, more creative minds. From the end of March 
1998, with considerable fanfare, VTV3 launched itself as an independent channel ,  at 
one stroke almost doubl ing the number of viewing hours provided by national-level 
VTV. Initial audience response was qu ite favourable .  VTVl felt the pressure, with Vu 
Van Hien pred icting it could improve its performance as a result. However, he also 
admitted that VTVl would  continue to serve the Party and state as prime transmitter of 
information and prop�anda, ' perhaps a bit heavy, but able to foster the general cares or 
concerns of society . '3 Some VTVl staff must feel the odds are stacked against them. 
Television as an educational medium has long attracted Vietnam 's leaders in 
principle, but without bothering to become acquainted with its specific strengths and 
weaknesses. Televised pre-school programs have been produced for many years, 
featuring l i ttle boys and girls dressed to the hi l t, singing nursery songs, and answering 
their teachers with l i lting voice and careful ly memorised l ines. The message is 
unchanged: motherly love, fatherly protection, teacher's ordering of the world beyond 
33 Lao Dong, 6 May 1 998. Tuoi Tre, 7 May 1 998. 
34 Interviewed by Thu Ha, in Tuoi Tre, 2 April 1 998. 
35 Interviewed by Thu Ha, Tuoi Tre, 2 April 1998. 
/111roductio11 1 9  
the family, and unquestioning obedience from children. I n  December 1996, VTV and 
the Min istry of Education and Training signed an agreement to develop a six-pronged 
TV curricu lum aimed at: pre-school chi ldren; pre-school and primary school teachers; 
adul t  Engl ish language students; secondary school pupils preparing for exams; students 
of management and accounting; and general viewers.36 Implementation has moved 
very slowly, however. 
In a more diffuse manner, the state aims to educate and acculturate mi l l ions of 
clusters of parents and children sitting in front of TV sets throughout the country, 
especial ly in basic moral values, reverence for (selected) Vietnamese trad i t ions, and 
respect for authority. Government mobi le fi lm projection teams and cultural troupes no 
longer make the rounds of vi l lages, one writer pointed out, so it is up to television to not 
on ly fi l l those gaps but also prov ide basic tra in ing in, for example, 'how to prevent 
AIDs, how to use clean water, and how to overcome nutritional defic iencies in 
children . '37 Unfortunately, a substantial number of vi l lages in Vietnam are sti l l  out of 
range of television transmissions, wh ile others are within range but lack sufficient 
electricity, or conta in a majority of fami l ies too poor to be able to purchase a TV set.38 
Wh ile television is undoubtedly transform ing the l ives of those who view it regu larly, it 
is also helping to widen the gap between town and countryside in Vietnam. As if to 
symbol ise this incongru ity of modern isation, Tuoi Tre described how a television 
transmitter in the Mekong delta is pumping out so much power that impoverished 
squatters nearby have fash ioned crude antennas to secure sufficient watts to drive 
several l ight bulbs each, wh ile better off residents with TV sets worry about the health 
dangers, cit ing an article rece ived from relat ives in America.39 
The Internet 
In the early 1 990s, several teams of Vietnamese computer scientists l inked up with 
colleagues overseas to experiment with email commun ication. Most successful was the 
project developed by Hanoi 's Institute of Information Technology and the Austral ian 
National University's Coombs Computer Unit, which led to an explosion in 
international email traffic, the quantity of incoming and outgoing messages doubl ing 
every five months from 1 994 onward. However, repeated proposals to upgrade the 
connection to 24-hour service and experiment with accessing databases and websites via 
the Internet met with rejection by the Hanoi government. The Ministry of Interior was 
concerned about the national security impl ications, while the Directorate General of 
36 Lao Dong, 7 January 1997. 
37 To Hoang, 'Nam 1995 - - Nam van hoa truyen hinh', Lao Dong, 7 January 1996. 
38 Nguyen True Linh, 'Dua van hoa den mien nui, hai dao, va vung nong thon sau ' ,  NhOll 
Dan, 2 November 1996. Most notably, the author revealed that only about ten percent 
of hamlets in the mountains could receive rel iable TV signals. 
39 Tuoi Tre, 7 May 1998. 
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Posts and Telecommunication wished to make sure that it monopolised whatever system 
was agreed upon. 
Eventually in December 1 997 Vietnam was declared open to the Internet. User fees 
were set high to discourage most current Vietnamese owners of computers from 
attempting to hook up. A crude fi rewall screened out much foreign information, while 
the Ministry of Interior also maintained a blacklist of overseas addresses that could not 
be accessed, focusing especially on the many Vietnamese diaspora list servers 
function ing across North America, Europe and Australia. Inside Vietnam, the Internet 
is accessed mainly by government agencies and commercial enterprises, plus a range of 
UN offices, foreign embassies and foreign NGOs. Outside the country, it is possible to 
access a slowly growing number of websites in Vietnam. In June 1998, Nlw11 Dan 
became the first periodical to place each current issue on a web page, hoping to attract 
overseas Vietnamese readers in particular. Vietnam News Agency also set up a website 
for its regular bulletins in Vietnamese, English, French and Spanish, then ended a 53-
year tradition by closing down its shortwave broadcasting of these same bulletins. 
Proposals to establish a 'domestic Internet', complete with mirror sites of foreign data to 
reduce communication costs, have so far met with little success. For some years to 
come it seems likely that foreigners will gain more from Vietnam's Internet connection 
than the vast major ity of Vietnamese, although one should not ignore the capac ity of 
some inst itut ional addresses to be used informally by large numbers of colleagues, 
friends, and relatives. 
Advertising 
If a Vietnamese Rip Van Winkle were to wake up today after a fi fteen-year sleep, 
one of the first things he would notice (after the motorbike explosion and the brightly 
coloured clothing) is the proliferation of advertisements in the mass media, whether 
newspapers, radio or television. True, if he were old enough he might remember the 
Nestle condensed milk and Bastos c igarette ads in colonial period journals. If he came 
from Saigon, he would recall 1960s ads for Hynos toothpaste, National radios and 
Salem cigarettes. If he lived north of the 171h parallel, advertising would have been 
denounced as an insidious capitalist practice and el iminated by the end of the 1950s. 
This happened south of the 1 ?1h parallel as well after April 1975 . 
Throughout the 1980s the 'advertising question ' simmered inside the VCP, not 
because vital issues were deemed to be at stake, but because any concession would be 
visible immediately to the public at large. Amidst the ongoing, overarching debate 
about where to draw the l ine between socialism and capitalism, whether to permit 
advertising or not assumed a certain symbolic s ignificance. In 1 98 1 ,  Saigon Giai Phong 
began to accept and print modest ads, undoubtedly with approval from then party 
secretary of the city, Nguyen Van Linh. Two years later Tuoi Tre was allowed to 
follow suit. In early 1 984, an order from the Secretariat of the Party yielded 
considerable ideological ground, as it redefined advertisements to be economic news, 
hence acceptable, providing they helped to raise product quality, improved distribution 
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and promoted healtliy l ifestyles.40 For the rest of the decade, however, ads remained 
few in number, small in size, d iscreet in content and amateur in style. The reasons by 
this time probably had as much to do with lack of money, domestic or foreign, to be 
able to fuel ad campaigns, than the continued sniping from within the Party. 
As foreign products final ly  began to penetrate the Vietnamese market in the early 
1990s, advertising agents natural ly followed, offering cash to anyone with the power to 
help promote their brand names, al though they sti l l  encountered suspicions, ignorance 
of Madison Avenue marketing culture, and endless red tape. Local ad companies 
popped up, eager to represent foreign firms. Scores of market surveys were 
commissioned, the first t ime the Party had allowed others to evaluate cit izen attitudes 
meticulously, much less use this knowledge for private profit. Most pervasive were the 
big bi l lboards in the cit ies, advertising beer, softdrinks, motorbikes and cigarettes, 
fol lowed by the brand name shop signs in almost every neighbourhood and small town. 
Sales agents usual ly bypassed h igher level authorities to negotiate displays with local 
committees and property owners. Not surprisingly, d isputes arose over who should 
approve and benefit from such publ ic advertising. When the government discovered 
that only 8.5 per cent of bi l lboards in Ho Chi Minh Cit(' had been properly l icensed, for 
example, it stepped up pressure on interested parties.4 Campaigns were also mounted 
to reduce the number of foreign words used in bi l lboards and shop signs, or even to 
el im inate foreign language entirely along with foreign logos. While presented as a lofty 
defence of Vietnamese cul tural values, these campaigns probably had more to do with 
assert ions of authority and a desire to share the money flowing in from foreign 
advertisers. Much to the rel ief of the foreigners, internal understandings were reached 
and signs restored. 
Fore ign corporate al locat ions for advertising in Vietnam cl imbed to US$67 mi l l ion 
by 1996, with the biggest spenders being Tiger Beer, Coca Cola, Dunhi l l  Cigarettes, and 
Pepsi Cola.42 Television had become the driving force in advertising, as foreign 
execut ives tracked the rapid increase in viewers - a s izeable proportion being urban, 
youthful and possessed of d isposable income. Major city newspapers earned 
considerable advertising revenue as wel l .  With an impressive circulation of 180,000 
copies, Tuoi Tre featured 20-page advertising ' i nserts ' which contained: ful l-page 
colour spreads by Sony, Phil ips, Daewoo and Sharp; smal ler black-and-wh ite ads for 
sports shoes, shampoos, watches, mob ile phones, lubricants and pumps; four  pages of 
40 Nguoi Lam Bao 5-1985, p. 60, as quoted in Russell Heng, 'Discourse boundary, 
interactive mode, oppositional effect and individual effort: the dynamics of print and 
politic in Vietnam', (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, forthcoming), 
chapter 5. 
4 1  Viet Nam News, 23 May 1996. 
42 David Ki lburn, 'Asia rising: the region's surging economy brings sweeping change to 
media,' A dweek (Eastern Edition), 19 August 1996, p. 24. A sian A dvertising and 
Marketing, 25 March 1997. 
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ads for public and private school enrolment; and five pages of employment and 
classified ads.43 Local radio stations were still experimenting with a variety of ad 
formats for both foreign and domestic products. 
The Ministry of Culture and Information routinely fires off regulations about 
advertising quantity and qual ity. It often demands more balance between foreign and 
domestic product ads, more free space for state supplied information, e l im ination of all 
sexual ly suggestive advertising, and termination of unfair  marketing techn iques. There 
is a decree in force banning the use in advertising of the national flag, anthem and 
symbol , as wel l  as any photographs of national leaders. Ads are not supposed to occupy 
more than ten percent of space in newspapers or five per cent of time on TV and 
rad io.44 A 1997 regulation specifies a maximum of five minutes per hour of TV 
advertising, yet any viewer of evening prime time can count ten or even fifteen minutes 
per hour. Occasional letters to the editor about TV ads reveal more concern about 
offensive content than t ime consumed. For example, one viewer complained about a 
soap flakes ad that showed one woman sneaking off with another's preferred brand, and 
a motorbike ad featuring a young man crash ing through plate glass to reach his girl 
friend and invite her to cl imb aboard .45 
Aware of continu ing Vietnamese reservations about certa in hard sel l techn iques, 
advert isers are prepared to spend l iberal ly on contests, lotteries, sponsorships and 
donations to disaster rel ief and other worthy causes. One of the most successfu l 
promotions involved each purchaser of a Sony product becoming part of a lottery which 
awarded one Honda Dream II motorbike per day over a three month period, with 
winner's photo's being incorporated to full-page newspaper ads.46 Advert isers compete 
vigorously for sponsorship of sporting events on TV, with Coca Cola covering the 1996 
Atlanta Olympics, Dunh i l l  regularly hosting the FA Premier League, and a consortium 
handl ing the 1998 World Cup. San Miguel Beer targeted soccer lovers with a campaign 
featuring a Vietnam team member catching a can of San Miguel . Local companies, not 
able to afford such big investments on sports programs, try to target popular TV serials, 
documentaries or musical events. Thus, the Phong Thanh company scored h igh with 
viewers when it sponsored the serial ised 'Tale of Three Kingdoms ' from China. With 
the help of new PR firms, companies are also eager to be seen fostering community 
projects. Several hotels built 'gratitude houses ' for elderly mothers of deceased 
revolutionary heroes. The local makers of '333' Beer were less successfu l  when 
photographed passing out gift satchels to these same mothers, obviously disoriented 
amidst the hul labaloo.47 
43 These examples are taken from Tuoi Tre, 18 January 1996 and 16 July 1996. 
44 Reuters (Hanoi), 9 January 1995. 
45 Tran Thi Thi, 'Te nan xa hoi da len vao quang cao', Van Hoa, 19 January 1997. 
46 This campaign ran from November 1995 to January 1996. 
47 Photo in Saigo11 Times, 16 December 1995, p. 13. 
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Amidst the recent Asian economic meltdown, foreign advertising budgets in 
Vietnam have been cut back, in some cages severely. Ambitious plans to advertise via 
satel l ite, cable and interactive media have been postponed indefini tely. This may be an 
opportun ity for a return to lower-key forms of advertising, with local ad firms and 
marketing agencies factoring in Vietnamese cultural and psychological preferences, 
producers more concerned with bui ld ing brand cred ibil ity, customer loyalty, and 
company good wil l .  In any event, newspapers, TV stations and rad io stations are 
having to learn how to operate with lower advertising revenues. 
Chapters that follow 
In Chapter One, Russell Hiang-Khng Heng surveys the factors which fostered 
media reforms in Vietnam in the 1980s, then takes us below the day-to-day output of 
more recent times to examine media organ isations, the ideological context, and the legal 
parameters, mainly as they relate to newspapers and journals. During the 1980s, new 
tabloids employed previously taboo techniques to bui ld circulation, in the process 
demonstrat ing that the market was an acceptable force for altering society at large. As 
state subsid ies became increasingl y meaningless, the need for period icals to complete 
for readersh ip became ever more pressing. News had to be timely, the best journal ists 
paid wel l ,  sensational stories printed ahead of other papers. The press was also an 
essential vehicle for growing intellectual d iscontent, eventual ly re ined in by the 
Communist Party. Mr Heng then del ineates skilful ly the Party 's methods for 
maintaining organ isational control over the media, and suggests that the system is 
hardly free of ideological prem ises, especial ly the degree to which information should 
be regarded as a marketable commodity. He explains the legal regime in respect to 
journalists, ed itors and supervisory organs, also pointing out how the law helps the 
Party to remain exempt from press scrutiny. He concludes that, while determ inations by 
the Party which involve the media can sometimes be delayed or resisted, if the Party 
insists then the decis ion wil l be enforced . 
Chu Van Lam, in Chapter Two, introduces us to the category of econom ics-related 
period icals, which number at least forty in Vietnam today. He points out how editors 
and writers enjoy access to a much wider range of economic data than was the case ten 
or fifteen years ago, and how they engage increasingly in economic commentary and 
forecasting. Dr Lam has no doubt that period icals are a commodity, hence staff 
members must work hard to attract readers and increase market share. On the other 
hand, he acknowledges that the state considers the press as 'a tool to mobi l ise people's 
participation in implementing the pol itical l ine and pol icies of the rul ing Communist 
Party ' .  Within those restraints, economics-related journals still are able to address basic 
national problems, for example reform of the tortuous legal system, admin istrative red 
tape, inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises, and corruption. 
The practice of Vietnamese writers moving back and forth between journal ism and 
fiction is explored by Ho Anh Thai, in  Chapter Three. From the 1 930s, some of the best 
authors produced devastating fictional ind ictments of the colonial system, then joined 
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the anti-French Resistance and put their pens at the service of the revolution, reporting 
victories, drafting stirring manifestos, urging readers to sacrifice for the cause. This 
continued during the anti-American war, but after 1975 ' the press seemed to drop out of 
view',  according to Mr Thai. From 1985, however, some periodicals dared to publish 
specific accounts of total i tarian behaviour, gross m ismanagement and corruption, which 
led creative writers to abandon thoughts of composing their magnum opus, instead 
entering the fray, producing a stream of articles about everyday problems. Under new 
open market conditions this journal istic regimen has also proven quite lucrative for 
some authors, as Mr Thai explains in detai l .  Investigative journal ism and documentary 
fiction are sometimes hard to d istinguish. Mr Thai concludes by urging the 
government, social organ isations and generous sponsors to provide creative writers with 
the ' t ime, money and the small qu iet places they need to write the works which haunt 
and torment them . '  
Voice o f  Vietnam Radio i s  described by  Nguyen Long, in Chapter Four. After 
outl in ing VOV's origins, internal structure and program offerings, Mr Long 
concentrates on the new challenges facing the rad io medium both global ly and inside 
his own country, making some especial ly interesting comparisons between publ ic 
broadcasting in Austral ia and Vietnam. While he acknowledges that VOV is 
encountering increasingly stiff competition from television, the print media, foreign 
rad io stations, satel l i te and wire services, Mr Long points out that VOV stations retain 
large daytime audiences, particularly in the countryside, and the government is  
committed to financing technological upgrades, overseas train ing of young staff, and a 
range of programming innovat ions. 
One of those innovations, l ive rad io, is recounted by Ngo Phuong Dung, in Chapter 
Five. From 1993, the Swedish International Development Cooporation Agency 
sponsored a pi lot project at two provincial rad io stations, in  Hue and Can Tho, which 
resulted in 39 per cent to 57 per cent of total air time being produced l ive, rather than 
pre-recorded. As Ms Dung describes, the Swedes also encouraged al l  members of staff, 
from station manager to drivers, to participate in the training classes. Ironical ly, this 
represented a return to the heady days of Viet Minh radio broadcasting in  the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, when sharing of tasks was essential and foreign tape recorders had yet 
to arrive. Hue and Can Tho stations also have interacted more often with the smal l 
d istrict-level stations, in the process shifting the operational centre of gravity away from 
Voice of Vietnam headquarters in Hanoi .  More recently the experiment has been 
extended to other provincial stations, although the central authorities appear determined 
to l im it the amount of local program autonomy. 
In Chapter Six, Jan Forrester offers us a l ively, reveal ing account of television 's 
burst to prominence in Vietnam during the past five or s ix years. All the major actors 
take the stage: the Communist Party, the Director-General of Vietnam Television, 
station staff, advertisers, and key foreign programme providers and sate l l ite owners l ike 
Kerry Packer and Rupert Murdoch. The Party expects VTV to d isseminate the current 
propaganda l ine and to generate ever more advertising revenue for government coffers, 
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whereas many staff members observe an increasingly demanding viewing aud ience 
wanting h igher quality feature films, entertainment, sports competi t ions and critical 
investigative reporting. VTV hopes to finesse foreign satel l ite competitors with its own 
mult i-channel Microwave Distribution System, featuring CNN, French TVS, Discovery, 
Star Sports, MTV and others, but its recent decis ion to encode the signals and charge 
everyone for decoders may not attract sufficient numbers of customer. Ms Forrester 
concludes that Party trad itional ists are looking for ways to adapt without yielding any 
ground, and especial ly choosing to fol low television developments in China, the source 
of so much cultural influence as wel l  as geo-pol itical angst for Vietnam over the 
centuries. 
Ngo Phuong Lan, in Chapter Seven, introduces us to Hanoi fi lm-making, which 
grew out of the 1960s propaganda cinema designed to boost wartime morale and foster 
national pride. From the mid-1980s cinematographers tackled such topics as 
bureaucratism, fraud, family tensions and personal al ienation. After losing thei r  state 
subsidies, establ ished film companies gave way to scores of smal l ,  privately financed 
enterprises producing videos for the entertainment market. Since 1994, the government 
has reinstituted subsidies for selected motion pictures, a trend supported by Ms Lan, 
who argues that the marketplace alone cannot possibly support artistic creations of 
redeeming social and cultural value. A new generation of young fi lm directors has 
returned to the subject of the thirty-year war, exploring d imensions of horror, tragedy 
and moral ambiguity which would have been unth inkable two decades ago. 
In Chapter Eight, Mark Sidel exam ines Vietnamese press coverage of an incident in 
January 1993 in wh ich a pol ice officer named Nguyen Tung Duong kil led a motorbike 
courier crossing Hanoi 's  Chuong Duong bridge, with a satchel of 50 mi l l ion do11g 
(about US$5000) going missing in the process. Three months later, two Hanoi 
newspapers publ ished articles questioning the pol ice investigation report of this episode. 
A flood of public commentary fol lowed, the prosecution eventually raising the charges 
against the pol iceman to murder, crowds gathering repeatedly outside the court to l isten 
to the proceedings over loudspeakers, and the accused being convicted and sentenced to 
death. In the appeal phase, other newspapers came to his defence, but the judgement 
was upheld and Lieutenant Duong executed by firing squad in March 1995. According 
to Mr Sidel, this case demonstrates how sometimes the press has taken the investigative 
and argumentative space al located to i t  by the state and proceeded to nudge the 
parameters beyond what the authorities may have foreseen or wished - along the way 
bolstering its claims to represent public opinion. However, he admits that we sti l l  know 
l ittle about how the system works internal ly when journalists, editors, supervisory 
organs and Party leaders are confronted with a story fil led with potential for factual 
d ispute, public agitation and protracted d ispute. 
A substantial number of translations into Vietnamese of foreign social science 
works have been d istributed by Vietnam's publ ishing houses in recent years, a print 
media category surveyed by David Marr and Mark Sidel i n  Chapter Nine. As m ight be 
expected, Engl ish and French originals el ici t  the largest interest, and the d iscipl ine of 
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economics is most heavi ly represented. However, Chinese-language titles are being 
translated routinely as wel l ,  and beyond economics we find sign ificant attention to 
h istory, international relations, ' futurology ' ,  law, management and ' understanding 
America ' .  Some translations are meant for upper and m iddle level cadres, others 
designed to serve as textbooks, sti l l  others aimed at the general reading public. As a 
new generation of Vietnamese returns from MA and PhD degree programs at western 
universit ies, such translations wil l be joined if not supplanted by original Vietnamese­
language monographs on the same social sciences issues. 
Final ly, in Chapter Ten, by way of interesting comparison, we include an account 
by Peter Mares of his two years of reporting from Vietnam for the Austral ian 
Broadcasting Corporation. Actually, his extensive encounters with the Vietnamese 
authorities, his interactions with his press assistant, and his contrasting of television, 
radio and print media operat ions, tell us qu ite a bit about conditions under which 
Vietnamese journalists work, not just the fore igners. Mr Mares concludes that much of 
the sympathy and professional anticipation which foreign journal ists brought into 
Vietnam in the early 1990s has now evaporated, as a result of tightened controls and the 
recent downturn in foreign investment. Although a more l iberal government attitude 
would undoubtedly  mean add it ional critical information finding its way into the 
international media, the benefits need to be weighed up by the authorities too, not just in 
terms of better overseas image, but thanks to improved two-way communication and 
substantive cooperation. 
ONE 
MEDIA IN VIETNAM AND THE STRUCTURE OF ITS MANAGEMENT 
Russell Hiang-Khng Heng 
Media in Vietnam is based on a Marxist-Leninist prototype developed in the 
erstwhile Soviet Union, derived largely from the writings of Lenin, and then moulded 
by the practice of Stal in. Its ideological essence can be summed up with the fol lowing 
tenets (Khoa Bao Chi 1978:38-39): media is a weapon for class struggle and should first 
and foremost represent the interest of the proletariat. Borrowing the term inology 
originated by Lenin and later affirmed by Resolution 60 of the Vietnam Communist 
Party (then known as the Workers Party) on 8 Dec 1958, the press was seen as ' the 
col lective agitator, propagandist and organ iser, an instrument of the Party to lead the 
masses, a sharp weapon in the class struggle against the enemy, and to construct a new 
l ife ' .  Such ideological text continues to mark Vietnamese media l iterature whether i t  is 
in the form of a train ing manual for journal ists or h istorical narratives about the 
development of the press. There is also a paucity of scholarly research which was 
acknowledged by the Party-run Media and Propaganda School (Ta Ngoc Tan et. al .  
1993: 1 1 ): 
In our country, it is almost certain that nothing sign ificant has been ach ieved in 
developing a theoretical approach to the med ia. There are sti l l  few materials on the 
press or any publ icised research programs. In the past few decades only the course 
material for the Propaganda Train ing Col lege at the end of the 1 970s, a few historical 
accounts of the press by Hong Chuong and Nguyen Thanh, plus a few memoirs of 
journal ists such as Huu Tho, Vu Bang, etc have been publ ished. There have also been 
some articles scattered in newspapers, journals and magazines. 
With the advent of pol itical and economic l iberal isation beginning in the 1980s, a 
critical perspective on how the press system operates can be found in the pages of 
newspapers or the trade journal of the Vietnam Journal ists Association (VJA). This is 
popularly known as the doi moi (renovation) of the media, the Vietnamese term itself 
being the namesake of the general reform pol icy endorsed by the Party's Sixth Congress 
at the end of 1986. In add ition, recently publ ished memoirs of Vietnamese exiles who 
used to be journal ists have been useful in providing h itherto unknown details. (Thanh 
Tin 1991,  1993; Tran Thu 1 996; Vu Thu Hien 1997.) 
Literature on this topic, written in languages other than Vietnamese, is even more 
sparse, comprising reports, journal articles or monographs (Pike 1 973; Ungar 1991 ;  
Nguyen Xuan Tho 1 992; Kennedy 1 993; Beaul ieu 1994; Palmos 1 995; and Smollar 
1995) plus a few post-graduate theses by Vietnamese students in the Soviet bloc, 
beginning in the 1980s. A few works deal ing with the larger topic of society and 
pol itics in Vietnam have also mentioned media or media-related issues (Thayer 
1992a:39-43; Marr 1 993; Porter 1 993 : 167-69; Tonneson 1 993 : 18-30; Wurfel 1 993:34-
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35; and Wurfel 1 989:34-39). Among these works, only Douglas Pike(1973) attempted 
to theorise the Vietnamese mass communication system. He observed that the 
communication of ideas under that kind of system was considered an ideological task 
and that the theoretical basis and practical form had many things in common with other 
Communist states. Pike identified five features defining such a mass communication 
system: 
a) It is a device for social control managed exclusively by Party and State; 
pervasive and monopol istic; intrudes into all areas of l ife at all times and does 
not al low non-participation. 
b) It is motivation-oriented and not information-oriented : seeks to inform only to 
a degree necessary for motivation and mobi l isation of the population. 
c) It introduces i ts own exclusive semantic base, provid ing new words and new 
definit ions of old words; it is h igh in value judgment and also its emphasis on 
codification, precedence and hair-spl itting legal ism. 
d) The basic medium of communication is the social organ isation or social 
movement al though the system makes use of the mass media. This system of 
communication rests on a simple claim to truth and thereafter employs 
passionate emotional appeals. Fundamental Marxist concepts may be present, 
e.g., class consciousness, proletarian international ism, etc., but are of lesser 
importance. The system rel ies on group situations to make people accept 
emotional , i rrational argument more read i ly.  
e) It does not regard the individual as a passive recipient of information. He is 
expected to struggle with h imself to absorb the information provided and help 
propagate the message. Dissemination of information under such a system is 
very rel iant on the social movements tasked to carry out this job under the 
guidance of agitprop cadres. Therefore depending on the abi l ity of the agitprop 
cadres, communication can be very good or very bad. Due to the difficulties in 
finding and train ing large numbers of good cadres in this field in Vietnam, 
communications tend to be badly done. 
Pike's observations parallel what other Western scholars had said about Marx ist 
media elsewhere such as in the Soviet Union or China: (lnkeles 1 950; Schramm 1956; 
Yu 1 963; Buzek 1964; and Lendvai 1 981  to name just a few). This col lection of works 
tend to perceive the media system largely  as an appendage of the total i tarian regime 
running these societies, resulting in controls so extensive that very l i tt le room is left for 
editors, journal ists and readers to react freely and independently to information. Where 
Vietnam is concerned, Pike was also describing a system at war, where mobi l isation and 
propaganda were intensified by mi l itary needs. Many such features of regimentation 
have s ince been visibly reduced in the wake of the VCP's doi moi pol icy, thus 
warranting a key question to be posed when any study is made of the Vietnamese media 
system: Just how much has i t  changed? The l iterature in non-Vietnamese languages has 
acknowledged the fact of change with doi moi but almost al l  have also qual ified the 
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observation with cautionary statements. These range from a prediction of osci l lation 
between relaxation and crackdowns in the future which would still broaden the sphere 
of public debate(Ungar 1 991 :52-3) to an ind ictment that the l iberal isation was cosmetic 
and after August 1989, i t  was a ' return to the old ways of strictly controll ing both 
personnel and their publ ished words' (Palmos 1995 :40) 
This paper wil l  first look at the forces which contributed to the media reforms in the 
1 980s and then delve below the empirical top layer of media content to look at the 
underlying structures which have a role in determin ing content: organisational control , 
ideology and legal regime. A more integrated picture of the Vietnamese media would 
have to include an examination of how these not-so-easi ly-observable structures have 
also undergone doi moi. 
The Doi Moi Media 
My description of the doi moi media is based on the printed press because it is more 
read i ly available, al though the l iberal isation pol icy extended to television, radio, films, 
l i terature, drama and music as wel l .  That the Vietnamese press has changed can no 
longer be disputed by anybody who picks up a newspaper today and compares it with an 
edit ion publ ished before 1 980. A much-cited (although some also deem it  regrettable) 
i l lustration of how much the Vietnamese press has been l iberal ised is the emergence and 
success of tabloids. The most prominent example would be Cong A 11 Thcu1h Pho Ho 
Chi Mi11h (Ho Chi Minh City Pol ice). In the guise of running stories on the problems of 
law and order, it pr�vides readers with a steady d iet of the perverse and the violent in 
Vietnamese society today. Each issue of the publ ication has an imprint of 600,000 
copies, considerably more than the 150,000 to 180,000 print run of each issue of Nhcu1 
Dan, the Commun ist Party daily. 1 The tabloids were not the only ones peddl ing 
sensationalism; in October 1996 when a young movie actor Le Cong Tuan An 
committed suicide in Ho Ch i Minh City after breaking up with h is fash ion model 
girlfriend, major newspapers based in the city l ike Tuoi Tre, Thcu1h Nie11 and Nguoi Lao 
Do11g ran extensive stories on the private l ives of the couple. Circulation was clearly on 
the mind of ed itors as Nguoi Lao Do11g increased i ts print run from the usual 25,000 to 
beyond 50,000 and Tuoi Tre, which usual ly  sold around 200,000 copies, raised it to 
250,000 (Le Hong Minh.  1996). Such journal istic practice underl ines the legitimacy of 
entertainment as media content which in the earl ier pre-reform period that Pike was 
theorising about would be considered ideological ly incorrect. Newspapers are also 
using sign ificantly less of the old ideologicall y-driven semantics and Marx ist 
terminology. 
Circulation rates can be inflated but estimates for Cong An Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh 
have consistently been cited as 600,000 or more by several sources such as Vietnam 
Journalist Association and Ringier's Vietnam Media Guide 1995. The figure for Nlran 
Dan was provided by the newspaper itself in October 1993 but estimates provided by 
other sources have placed it around the 100,000 mark with Ringier's Media Guide going 
as low as 38,000. 
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A deeper ideological significance underlay the prol iferation of tabloids and other 
recreational publ ications: the acceptance of the market as a legitimate force in shaping 
society. Media played a role in pushing such a market reforms agenda which, in turn, 
won for the media more space, of both the economic and journal istic kind. The 
imperative for market reforms is frequently traced to the late 1 970s, the beginning of 
grim economic shortages. This was to affect newspaper production d irectly. Free 
newsprint which was supposed to be provided by the State was irregularly suppl ied. 
Deprivation intensified into the 1 980s and, under those circumstances, the Party al lowed 
rudimentary market reforms at the local level within the over-arching socialist central­
planning model .  Newspapers, l i ke al l other organisations, started to fend for themselves 
by engaging in a range of economic activit ies other than their official roles/what they 
were supposed to be doing. But it was not just an economic crisis that the press had to 
grapple with. It was also a crisis of faith as the media real ised that i t  was fast losing 
cred ibil ity with i ts readers by presenting a predominantly Party-sanctioned rosy picture 
greatly at odds with harsh real ity. The world outside Vietnam was also changing: China 
was launching i ts economic reforms under Deng Xiao-Ping; Eastern Europe was also 
l iberal ising and the NIEs were record ing impressive growth in contrast to the problems 
of Vietnam. Newspapers started to ask questions of themselves: Can they survive 
without State subsidy? Can the press as the voice of the Party also not reflect d ifferent 
opinions coming from the masses? Can the press criticise pol icy if it is wrong or cadres 
of whatever level if they are corrupt? Arising from al l  these questions was a mounting 
real isation that the top-down information flow which so dom inated media content was 
no longer legitimate or effective in this new set of circumstances.2 In that frame of 
mind, media tended to support the experimental market reforms and did this by 
h ighl ighting their positive outcomes. The press c l imate of that period was starting to 
soften and al lowed for that level of editorial flexibi l ity and init iative. Ngoc Dan 
(1995:81 -83) described how Party dai ly Nhm1 Dm1's pro-active coverage of the 1979 
experimental program with the ' contract ' system in agricultural cooperatives in 
Haiphong contributed to the landmark Directive 100 (Chi thi 100) of the Central 
Committee in January 1 981 .  The ' contract ' system returned some private incentive to 
cooperative agriculture by al lowing fami l ies to keep the surplus once they have 
produced the contracted amount for the State, a practice which was h itherto carried out 
surreptit iously. In Ho Chi Minh City, where the local authorities were init iating even 
bolder market reforms, the c ity's papers were also providing supportive publ icity, 
al though they had to do i t  carefu l ly  so as not to provoke censure from Party central that 
l iberal isation had gone too far. 
Besides reporting the benefits of reforms, the media was also implementing and 
testing the l imits of market reforms on its own. In h is memoir (1994:41-42), �o 
2 This reconstruction of the mood in the press from 1 978-1 985 is based on 
interviews/conversations with journalists in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City during the 
writer's two field trips in 1 993 and 1 996. 
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Phuong, General Director of Vietnam News Agency, described h is 1982 effort to 
publ ish a dai ly four-page bulletin Espa11a 82 as there was a great demand for news about 
the World Cup soccer competition. Unl ike other publ ications, this was sold at a market 
price which could cover production cost as wel l  as make a small profit. This 
publ ication went ahead without a proper perm it but Phuong argued that, given the 
bureaucracy in Vietnam, the World Cup would be over by the t ime a permit was 
granted. Al though he had to write a self-criticism for it, he was vindicated when the 
Agency decided official ly to publish a weekly sports magazine a few months later and 
appointed him the editor. So despite the overall economic hardship, the relaxation of 
overbearing authority sti l l  enabled the media to grow. Besides the sports weekly, 
Vietnam News Agency was to publ ish two more weekly titles in  1983 - T11a11 Ti11 Tue 
which provided general news and T11a11 Ti11 Khoa Hoe - Ky Tlmat - Ki11h Te The Gioi 
which covered economics, science and technology. In Ho Chi Minh City, Tuoi Tre 
started Tuoi Tre Cuoi, a magazine for satirical cartoons in January 1984. The weekly 
Tuoi Tre itself grew to two issues per week in 1981 and three issues in 1982. But the 
concept of al lowing market forces ful l  play was sti l l  far from being read i ly accepted and 
more l iberal reforms had to wait till after the Sixth Party Congress to pick up 
momentum. 
Statistics from the Office of Information and Culture (So Va11 Hoa Tho11g Ti11) of 
Ho Chi Minh City underl ine the media boom after 1986. In 1985, the ci ty had 15 
different regular newspapers (including the weekly, half-monthly and month ly 
publ ications) but this figure rose to 57 by 1991 ,  which was an increase of four times. 
General ly, media reports have referred to a similar emergence of publ ications 
throughout the country. Part of the economic reform process had also involved the 
State abandoning much of its subsidy pol icy, which pushed newspapers to adopt 
market-rationalised practices in how they run their newsrooms and produce the news. 
Revenue was now l inked more closely with c irculation and the desire to raise 
circulation would mean putting out a competitive product. Once the need to compete 
was establ ished, a corollary of other neglected concepts fol lowed and became absorbed 
into the changing media culture; concepts such as news having to be timely; raised 
information content, and paying journal ists differential ly accord ing to productivity and 
quality of work. All these can be termed a regularisation of the Vietnamese media but 
market reforms have also brought in their wake a slew of other professional problems. 
As sensational stories sel l ,  some journal ists are using a style which fudges creative 
fiction with investigative report ing (Dang Nguyen Truong 1996) Cheque book 
journalism has arrived in Vietnam . There have also been cases of journal ists or people 
masquerad ing as journal ists attempting to blackmail newsmakers with exposure of 
financial scandals. (Vu Anh 1996; Lao Dong 5/10/96:2; Pham Viet Hai 1996; and Tuan 
Minh 1993) 
The economic hard-times of the late 1970s, besides providing the impetus for 
market reforms, also fomented intellectual d iscontent which found public expression in 
l i terature and media. At the height of the doi moi pol icy in 1987 and 1988, efforts were 
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made with in the media establ ishment to sanctify some of the newfound l iberties from 
new ideological perspectives. At the second meeting held by the Vietnam Journalists 
Association in early 1988 to prepare for the association's 5th Congress, two senior 
journalists Phan Quang and Huu Tho argued that the three duties of journal ists - ' nguoi 
tuyen truyen tap the (col lective propagandist), nguoi co dong tap the (collective 
agitator), and nguoi to chuc tap the (collective organ iser) ' - were proposed by Lenin in 
1901 at a time when the Communist Party of Russia was not yet set up. The situation in 
Vietnam where the Communist Party was already in power was fundamental ly different 
and the media should keep step with this new real ity. They proposed that the foremost 
task of the press should instead be to ' inform ' (thong tin) and, together with that, to 
'educate ' (giao due) and 'manage ' (quan ly), and where the broadcast media was 
concerned, to ' enterta in '  (giai  tri) as wel l  (Nguoi Lam Bao No 15 .  3/1988:2-4.). 
Media restiveness coincided with and was promoted by the Party leadership's need 
to boost its flagging legitimacy. The corruption, irregularit ies and excessive 
bureaucracy which plagued the system required some form of redress and delegating the 
press to oppose such ' negativism ' helped to some extent. Be that as i t  may, press 
censure of officialdom before 1986 sti l l  tended to proceed no further than publicising 
low-level municipal issues and did not mention names of senior cadres. The emphasis 
was still on using the more discreet and control lable mobi l isation channel to address the 
' negativism ' problem. This took the form of seminars held by respective departments 
or organisations in the years 1 983/84, but they became ritual istic sessions where people 
made general pro f omia statements and recommended broad ineffectual solut ions, with 
the findings final ly publ ished by the Party for internal c irculation. (Nhwr Dw1 
2/12/88:3). 
A benchmark was set in media campaign against corruption in the months leading 
to the Sixth Party Congress. This was a series of press exposes on the abuse of power in 
Thanh Hoa province which impl icated the province Party Secretary, Ha Trong Hoa, 
who was also a Central Committee member. The case was outstand ing for the seniority 
of the target (possibly the h ighest ever up till that point) and the eventual success of the 
press in removing him from power. That the media campaign was paralleled by an 
intense struggle within the Party as Hoa called upon his mentors and all ies in  the 
leadership to counter the press campaign (Dinh Van Nam 1 988; and Thai Duy 1988) 
would also remove any suggestion that this was a cosmetic affair entirely orchestrated 
from the top. Nevertheless, the whole episode was also an indication that media's 
freedom to tackle sensitive issues was dependent on el ite patronage as the newspapers 
could not have won the struggle if they had nobody contending on their behalf in the 
Party machinery against Hoa's powerful protector. This question of media controversy 
as a function of intra-el ite contention is too large and complex to be deal t  with 
adequately here; suffice i t  to say that a consensus exists in many studies and articles that 
the 1980s was a decade of contestation between different groups and individuals within  
the  Party el i te (Stern1 993; Bui Tin1995 : 137-163; and Vu Thu Hien  1997:293-294), and 
i t  is with in  this larger cl imate of contention at the top that media could be more d iverse; 
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the leadersh ip could not agreed on the kind of uniformity to impose or different leaders 
and interest groups sought to use media to further their pol i t ical objectives. The last 
was clearly i l lustrated by the appearance of Party General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh's 
regular column in the Nhm1 Da11 dai ly beginn ing in May 1 987, just five months after he 
attained the top Party position. Linh also encouraged writers to write more truthfu l ly 
which led to a string of controversial works in the years 1 987/1988 and the weekly 
magazine Van Nghe of the Vietnam Writers Association came to symbol ise the doi moi 
media in its most outspoken phase. 
The dynamics for l iberal reforms were not only derived from home-grown forces. 
During this period, those pushing the l iberal isation agenda drew moral support from 
Gorbachev's pol icy of glasnost in the Sov iet Union. (Huynh Kim Khanh 1988:2; 
Nguyen Khac Vien 1988; and Porter 1 993:98). However, the centrifugal impact of 
radical l iberal reforms in the Soviet bloc countries also startled the Vietnamese 
leadersh ip in  1989 and the conservative backlash began with the Seventh Plenum of the 
Party Central Committee in August 1989. As part of an overal l  t ightening of control, 
l iberal tendencies in the media were also reined in (Nguyen Xuan Tho 1992:28-32; 
Thayer 1992:40-42; and Palmos 1995). 
The official pol icy of doi moi has continued despite some backpedall ing on 
pol it ical l iberal isation, with the emphasis now centred on economic reforms. Market 
growth in the media sector has continued. Accord ing to Vietnam Journal ists 
Associat ion figures, in 1990 there were 240 newspapers throughout the country using 
7 ,OOO tons of paper a year but by 1993 there were 350 titles using 1 2,000 tons of paper a 
year (Hoi Nha Bao Viet Nam. 1994). As for the tightening of control,  wh ile almost 
everybody can agree that i t  has taken place, it is harder to define the extent of the 
re imposed restrictions and what they mean in the total ity of the media. The number of 
tabloids has been reduced but tabloids and sensational report ing continue to keep a h igh 
profi le. One benchmark frequently used has been to observe whether the press 
continued to report corruption among the powerful .  This had not ceased; for instance, 
in February 1990, Tuoi Tre rocked Ho Chi Minh City with its exposure of Duong Son 
Quan, a brothel in  the suburbs patron ised by senior cadres and abetted by the city's 
pol ice. In 1992/1993, the media reported the corruption involving Central Committee 
member and Energy Min ister Vu Ngoc Hai which led to his imprisonment. However 
the scale of corruption has grown stead i ly, e.g., the embezzlement in the Tamexco trial 
reported in March 1 997, amounting to 40 mi l l ion US dollars, which has in tum 
prompted both media and the public to query how such huge sums of money could have 
been misappropriated without the endorsement of leaders far more senior than those 
brought to trial . The exercise of exposing corruption has become difficu lt, with almost 
all journal ists interviewed lamenting that the investigative journal ism involved was no 
longer as professional ly  rigorous as i t  used to be, being too rel iant on pol ice reports; 
which in tum begs the sensitive question of how the police decide which case to release 
to the media. Beaul ieu's essay (1994) on the media c l imate captured the flux and 
ambigu ity of the post- 1990 situation by identifying the fol lowing features: 
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a) There was a feel ing of constraints on what they could write but 30 journal ists 
and editors spoken to could not identify where the l ine was drawn except for 
some obvious taboo issues l ike advocat ing mul ti-party democracy. 
b) Constraints were not un iform and varied from paper to paper, province to 
province. Within one newsroom, it could also depend on who was the editor 
on duty for the day. 
c) Between the newspaper and the censorship authority, constraints could be 
negotiated . 
d) Journal ists were also aware that they could be used by pol it ical e l i tes to 
advance sectorial interest when writing crit ical articles and that it was not a 
simple parad igm of bargaining for more journal istic space by testing the l im its 
of censorship. 
Organisational Control 
Hewing to its Stal in ist proto-type, the media organ isational structure in Vietnam 
ensures that al l l i nes of control can be traced upwards to a common authority which is 
the Party Central .  This involves a network of criss-crossing horizontal and vertical l i nes 
of control . The core feature of this system is that al l media come under the leadership 
and ownersh ip of the Party and State or a Party-approved mass organ isation. Another 
feature of this system is sectorial content where, for instance, a paper P/111 Nu belonging 
to the women's organ isation will focus on women's issues and the army daily Quan Doi 
Nhan Da11 will cover mi l itary matters. Regulation of sectorial coverage has become far · 
more relaxed under doi moi, and major papers l ike Lao Dong and Tuoi Tre which 
represent trade un ions and youth respectively have become general interest newspapers 
catering for al l readers rather than just their original constituencies. Tuoi Tre, which is 
a Ho Chi Minh City paper, has also transcended the regional focus expected of it to 
provide coverage of national issues of a qual i ty which can surpass that of many central­
level newspapers. In admin istrative terms, such a pattern of ownership means each 
newspaper comes under the charge of a mass organisation or some Party and State 
organ, which the official terminology cal ls the co qua11 chu qua11 (supervisory 
organisation). Besides that, all media come under the control of two organs, the Party's 
Ba11 Van Hoa Tu Tuo11g (Culture and Ideology Department or Ideology Department for 
short) and the Bo Va11 Hoa Thong Tin (Ministry of Culture and Information) of the 
government. Both these bodies are known collectively as co qua11 qua11 ly (control 
organisations) and are the authorities which approve publ ication perm its, vet the content 
of the press and mete out penalties when ed itors err. The Ideology Department is the 
more powerful of the two, al though the Ministry's functions and prerogatives have 
increased in recent years in l ine with a more earnest attempt after the 1991  Seventh 
Party Congress to have government min istries handle the deta i ls  of governance while 
the Party restricts itself to setting down general pol icy guidel ines. However, the 
Ideology Department is still regarded as the foremost authority in matters concerning 
the press and is far more involved in the task of vetting media content than the Ministry. 
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The latter concerns itself with adm inistrative tasks ranging from pol icing the 
techn ical ities of media-related laws to setting down the salary structure for al l  
journalists or issuing permits for newspapers after the Ideology Department has so 
decided. Viewed in simple terms, a newspaper has to report to three authorities: the 
Ideology Department, the Ministry of Culture and Information and its own supervisory 
organisation.3 All of these come under the Party Central with the ult imate authority 
vested in the Pol itburo (see chart). 
Th is pattern gets repl icated at the provincial level as wel l  as for those c ities with the 
comparable status of a province l ike Hanoi, Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh City (see 
chart). Here there is also a regional Party authority known as the Thanh Uy (for city) or 
Tinh Uy (for province) wh ich also has its own Ideology Department; s imi larl y, a 
regional government, known as the Uy Ban Nhan Dan (People's Committee), also has 
its equ ivalent of a min istry in charge of culture and information, the So Van Hoa Thong 
Tin (Culture and Information Office). Supervisory organ isations which own the 
newspapers are also part of this mult i-layered bureaucratic pattern. For instance, the 
labour movement at the Central level wil l  run its national paper for workers wh ile 
regional branches may also have their own publ ications. In principle, regional organs, 
whether they are of the Party, the State or mass organ isations, wil l  have to defer to their 
national level body but in practice the chain of command is compl icated. Major 
decis ions travel l ing down from Central to regional level (e.g., from the central Min istry 
to the Culture and Information Office of Ho Ch i Minh City) must be referred to the 
ci ty's People's Committee before the local office can implement it. Major decisions 
made by the People's Committee for its Culture and Information Office will be referred 
upwards to the central Min istry before the decision is implemented. (Vo Ngoc An, 
1996: 1 1). Manifested as a media-vett ing bureaucracy, it means newspapers, 
particularly regional ones, have to deal with too many sources of instructions at any one 
time (The Thanh, 1991 :7). This breeds a cautious attitude with the press general ly wary 
of taking init iatives or only acting after written official instructions are issued. This 
compl icated bureaucratic structure has remained physical ly unchanged even with doi 
moi. 
During meetings I had with the Ideology Department, the Min istry of Culture and 
Information and the Vietnam Journal ists ' Association at the end of 1993, al l the 
interv iewees stressed that pre-publ ication censorsh ip was not practised in Vietnam. In 
broad terms, this was correct because the Ideology Department did not have to approve 
every page before i t  went off to the printers and much was left to editorial boards to 
self-censor. However post-publ ication disapproval of any editorial ind iscretion would 
be prompt. Such censorious feedback is also regular and i nstitutional ised. The 
3 In reality, editors have to contend with more sources of possible interference. These 
include powerful individuals seeking to prevent embarrassing stories, the security 
organs, and individual Ministry for case-specific reasons, e.g., the Foreign Ministry may 
object to a story on grounds that it damages foreign policy. 
VIETNAM'S MEDIA: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MANAG EMENT FROM CENTRAL TO PROVINCIAUCITY LEVEL" 
CENTRAL LEVEL MASS 
ORGANIZATION, e.g., 
YOUTH, WOMEN, etc. 
IDEOWG Y DEPARTMENT 
• Below the provincial/city level, there is also local media but of a very rudimentary form and l imited circulation. 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
MINISTRY OF 
CULTURE/INFORMATION 
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department meets al l  the press once a week and individual editors can also be cal led up 
as and when necessary. Chief editors can only be appointed with the endorsement of 
the Ideology Department. This pattern has not been altered by doi moi but, in their 
substance, the department's weekly briefings and other meetings have become less 
d idactic and give editors more leeway to defend their positions. Nevertheless, this 
mandatory routine of frequent contact, regardless of its content, still serves as a salutary 
check on any over-vigorous desire to test censorship l imits. By d int of its official role, 
the Ideology Department also labours under two susceptibilities, one old and one new. 
Its permanent duty of upholding ideological rectitude had always incorporated a 
tendency to be suspicious of innovations. Almost al l ed itors and journal ists interviewed 
saw the Ideology Department as conservative. Some also pointed out that even in the 
most l iberal years of doi moi, 1987 and 1988, the Ideology Department was not credited 
with any enthusiasm for reforms and it was the Culture Department of the Party (in 
those years separate from the Ideology Department) which was instrumental in 
promoting a more tolerant intel lectual cl imate. This was a key reason leading to its 
absorption into the Ideology Department in 1989. The second susceptibil ity of the 
Ideology Department is a derivative of doi moi and comes with having to uphold 
doctrines which are increasingly viewed as irrelevant in Vietnam. Ideological 
uncertainty sometimes translates into confused and uneven censorship standards and a 
double-edged impact on editorial in itiative: those editors who lack self-confidence or 
powerful mentors would err even more on the side of caution while others who are 
themselves influential or wel l -protected would see the confusion as room for 
manoeuvre. That is to say patronage is essential when ed itors seek to contend with the 
Ideology Department on more equal terms, which means censorship can be highly 
discretionary and a function of personal ity pol it ics. As one writer said, 'When no 
agreement can be reached in an argument, it becomes a question of whether my boss is 
stronger than your boss. Or else it is the notion that my boss does not want to meddle 
with your boss and if the issue can be ignored, let's ignore it. But in the wel l-practised 
nature of give-and-take in Vietnamese pol itics, the party who started the problem wil l  
not do it again too qu ickly. ' Final ly, publ ic discussion of the relationship between the 
Ideology Department and the press has always been taboo and even during the most 
l iberal years of doi moi before 1 989, when journalists were frequently criticising their 
profession, nothing was ever publ ished about this. Since this relationship is quarantined 
from public scrutiny of any sort, it is l ikely to be more resistant to change than most 
other features of the media culture. 
The other key relationship is between a publ ication and its supervisory 
organisation. Market reforms have changed this in significant ways. A newspaper can 
no longer count on its supervisory organisation for ample financial subsidy (Ha Thi 
Hong 1995). Being responsible for its own financial wel l-being increases a 
publ ication's independence. There have even been situations where the supervisory 
organisation looked away while its publ ication engaged itself in dubious money-making 
publ ishing projects such as putting out tabloids. The organisation then expected a share 
of the earnings. The practice was criticised in the Seventh Plenum Resolut ion of the 
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Sixth Party Congress in August 1989 (Nghi Quyet Hoi Nghi Lan Thu Bay Ban Chap 
Hanh Trung Uong - Khoa VI. 1989) as wel l  as the Secretariat Resolution 63 in  July 
1990 (Chi thi 63. 1990: 138), in  which the Party leadership sought to introduce measures 
aimed at controll ing the media more effectively. Both documents accused supervisory 
organisations of giving ' khoan trang' mean ing carte blanche to the publ ications under 
their charge. 
However, in  real ity, the relationsh ip between a supervisory organisation and i ts 
newspaper is more complex than just a top-down money-oriented attitude. Senior 
journalist Tuan Minh4 (1992a) provided a fu l ler account of this relationship by 
identifying three broad types of supervisory organ isation management style :  
The supervisory organisation sees i ts  function as just  providing information 
about the broader pol itical environment, usual ly  in  the form of the resolut ions 
and decisions passed down by the Party; the paper's Chief Ed itor should be 
guided by this information and take the in itiative to do what is right and proper. 
This is the most lax form of control .  
Some supervisory organ isations take a more formal approach and meet 
regularly to issue official d irectives to the newspaper and also suggest topics 
for the newspapers, but general ly do not interfere in the work of the Chief 
Ed itor. 
Some supervisory organ isations are h ighly intervention ist and would issue 
orders specifying how topics should be treated, including asking to vet articles 
or entire issues of the newspaper. 
The management style of a supervisory organ isation has an impact on the qual i ty of 
its publ ication; where the organ isation is dominant, i t  tends to stifle in i t iative and 
creativity and would breed an editorial style which is frightened of responsibi l ity. An 
ideological ly safe-and-sound publ ication was not a l iab i l ity before doi moi because low 
circulation did not really matter financial ly, but as market reforms proceed in Vietnam, 
supervisory organ isations have become more sensitised to market needs, which means 
allowing their publ ications more scope to cater to readers' interest. In many instances 
that also would mean allowing a Chief Editor to differ qu ite substantively from the 
prescribed model of the press as an ideological weapon of the Party. Therein is the 
d ilemma which has made relationship between a supervisory organisation and its 
newspaper more compl icated: should a newspaper give priority to its readers or its 
supervisory organ isation? 
The 1988 sacking of Nguyen Ngoc, the Chief Editor of the weekly Van Nghe 
(Literature and Arts) whose supervisory organ isation is the Vietnam Writers ' 
Association, i l lustrated this problem. Van Nghe under Nguyen Ngoc, who assumed 
4 Tuan Minh is the pen-name of Tran Cong Man who was editor of the important army 
daily Quan Doi N flan Dan in the doi moi years until he retired in 1 989. 
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editorship in mid-1987, was a vehicle for some of the more radical views of that time 
and it became unprecedentedly popular in a market where readers rel ished something 
different.5 In the wake of the political mood starting to tum against l iberal reforms at 
the Party 5th Plenum in June 1988, the Writers' Association attempted to reassert its 
control of Nguyen Ngoc and Van Nghe. The pol itical intricacies behind that struggle 
need not be dealt with in this study; what is pertinent are the steps taken by the Writers '  
Association that i l lustrated the complex ities in the relationship between a supervisory 
organisation and the Chief Editor of its newspaper. On 9 September 1988, the 
Executive Committee of the Writers '  Association met to consider the fail ings of Van 
Nghe to represent adequately the l iterary concerns of the time and, with that, the matter 
of removing Chief Editor Nguyen Ngoc. The latter, who was present at the meeting, 
left town after that on an assignment for three weeks. During that time, the Writers' 
Association Secretariat sent one of its officials to serve as a l iaison officer between V m1 
Nghe and the Secretariat. In fact, his role was to read every article and exercise the 
right of veto. When Ngoc got back, he protested and the l iaison officer was withdrawn. 
Ngoc 's relationship with his supervisory organisation had been a d ifficult one. For 
example, when the Association's Vice General Secretary Huu Ch inh rang too often to 
request publ ication or withdrawal of certa in pieces, Ngoc asked that henceforth such 
requests from the supervisory organisation should be in written form (Nguyen Ngoc. 
1 989). At the end of November, a meeting was held between the Writers ' Association 
and Va11 Nghe's editorial board whereby Nguyen Dinh Th i, the General Secretary of the 
association, proposed a compromise under which an ed itorial council would be set up to 
advise Ngoc, who would also sit on the body, but the Council would make the final 
decision on what to publ ish. Ngoc rejected this on the ground that it  was the chief 
editor who was ult imately responsible for what was published. Thi then offered that the 
Advisory Council would run on a decision-by-majority format. When Ngoc rejected 
this, Thi proposed a third option which was to transfer Ngoc to perform other duties 
while, at the same time, occupy a permanent seat in a newly set-up supervisory council 
for Van Nghe. Ngoc also turned that down. (Van Nghe 6/5/89:3&7) Nevertheless, by 
the end of December, Ngoc was, in practice, no longer the Chief Editor al though no 
formal written notification was served on him nor on h is replacement (Nguyen Duy. 
1988). 
Articles drawing attention to the sacking of an editor for pol it ical reasons was not 
someth ing readers expect to find in the Vietnamese press. Yet Nguyen Ngoc's removal 
received unprecedented exposure, thereby d istingu ishing the event as one of the big 
struggles for press freedom. The press coverage also demonstrated the abil ity to give 
equal space to the various contending parties rather than skew publicity to side with 
officialdom, in the course of which the press laid bare aspects of the sensitive issue of 
5 Nguyen Ngoc was not only chasing high circulation rates; he also had an aggressive 
l iberal agenda aimed at ral lying writers to challenge the many ideological constraints on 
literature. 
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ideological censorsh ip. The press reports also brought home the fact that a supervisory 
organ isation's authority was not always readi ly accepted and that the Chief Ed itor m ight 
have pol itical resources to negotiate for a compromise solution.6 All these represented 
the impact of doi moi, but the Nguyen Ngoc affair and its aftermath also brought into 
focus an enduring authoritarian feature of the media system; that a supervisory 
organisation seeking to discipl ine an editor would ult imately have its way. Since 1989 
when the Party decided to re in in l iberal reforms, supervisory organ isations have been 
enjoined to tighten control on their  publ ications and this has broadly been the trend in 
media management since. In the Secretariat Directive 63 of 25 July 1990 aimed at 
strengthen ing the leadership of the Party in newspaper and publ ication work (Nang Cao 
Chat Luong Hieu Qua Cong Tac Bao Ch i ,  Xuat Ban. 1992: 136-43), several clauses 
stated that supervisory organ isations should be total ly in charge of the ir newspapers and 
the head of the organisation should meet regularly with editors and cadres in charge of 
the press to see that they did not stray from the official objectives. It carried precise 
instructions on the occasions on wh ich a Chief Editor must consult his paper's 
supervisory organ isation : 
"Tuy theo trinh do, nang luc thuc te cua dong chi phu trach bao, dai, nha xuat ban 
ma cap uy Dang quy d inh nhung van de gi dong chi do khong duoc tu y quyet dinh,  
nhat th iet  phai  th inh thi cap uy dong chi dai dien co quan chu quan nhat la nhung 
van de co quan he den viec giu gin bi  mat cua Dang va Nha nuoc, t inh hinh an ninh 
chinh tri va quan he doi ngoai ." 
'Depending on the standard and abi l ity of the comrade who is running the 
newspaper, broadcast station or publ ishing house, the Party branch within the 
supervisory organ isation shall stipulate which problems he should not decide for 
himself and must consul t  with the comrade who represents the supervisory organ isation 
especial ly  concern ing those issues which are about keeping State secrets, pol itical and 
security situations and foreign relations ' .  
Since Nguyen Ngoc, a series of  Chief Editors of  other newspapers have been retired 
or replaced but the one which has been most frequently remarked was the removal of 
Kim Hanh as Chief Editor of Tuoi Tre in 1991 by the paper's supervisory organ isation, 
the Communist Youth League of Ho Chi Minh City. Kim Hanh was a well-respected 
editor who gave Tuoi Tre its reputation as a major critical voice in the country. Her 
removal caused much unhappiness at the newspaper and was resisted by journal ists but 
never had any publ icity. A more recent example of another Chief Editor removed for 
her daring to test editorial l im its was The Thanh of Pim Nu Thanh Pho Ho Chi Mi11h 
(Wome11 of Ho Chi Mi11h City) who was transferred in May 1996 to work in the paper's 
supervisory organisation, the Ho Chi Minh City's Women's Association. Again noth ing 
was said in the press, thus underl ining the fact that if Nguyen Ngoc's dism issal was able 
to generate a h igh level of public controversy, i t  was an exception made possible by a 
6 Nguyen Ngoc was backed by Tran Do, the head of the Party's Culture Department (Ban 
Van Hoa) but the pol itical impl ications of that relationship need not be unpacked here. 
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window of opport�nity i n  the early years of doi moi. The rule, as it has always been, is 
to keep away from public scrutiny the issue of how supervisory organisations (as wel l  as 
the control organisations mentioned above) manage the media under their charge. For 
want of such an engagement with the publ ic, the potential for change in this area is 
going to be much less than what has been observed in the area of media content. 
Ideology 
Since ideology aims to guide media, there is an aspect of it which has to be open for 
all to see and heed . Th is is manifest in the official pronouncements on media which 
continue to use doctrinaire language and codified terms to remind media of its 
ideological dut ies, e.g. ' Information should 'bear the Party's standards' (mang tinh 
Dang), newspapers should be a vanguard for class struggle, and the media, besides 
provid ing information, should fulfil the demands of propaganda, agitation and 
organisation ' .  (Nguyen Tri Dung 1990) (Ta Ngoc Tan 1993) (Trinh Dinh Thang 1 993) 
(Do Muoi 1 997). Newsmen interviewed said that ideological exhortations tend to be 
too broad to mean anything concrete, and the finer points of Marxist semantics no 
longer d irect the professional day-to-day activi ties of a newsroom. Some even claim 
that the advocates of orthodoxy no longer bel ieve in what they themselves are saying 
any more. That raises the question of why the charade is maintained. This cannot be 
answered with any certainty as yet but Thomas F. Remington (1 988) addressed a similar 
phenomenon when he stud ied the ' ideology complex ' beh ind the Soviet media system 
and he provided a useful insight to the problem. Remington found plenty of evidence 
that even as ideological indoctrination was fall ing on deaf ears, the propaganda 
mach inery d ispensing it was growing. His answer was that the content of the message 
was not as important as the structure of its organised dissemination. Even if they did 
not bel ieve in what they were doing, members of the intel lectual and managerial el ite 
who made up this ideological mach inery persisted because they were drawn into a 
nexus of power and privilege. This was important for promoting el ite sol idarity and 
doctrinal cohesion. It was not that ideology was no longer important; rather that the 
system should be seen as increasingly not dependent on what ideology had to say, but 
neither was it free of ideology. 
Can parallels be found in the situation of Vietnam? An ' ideology complex ' which 
has co-opted the managerial and intel lectual el ites does exist in Vietnam al though its 
scale may vary from that which obtained in the Soviet Union of the 1980s. The 
Vietnamese run a routine of instructional courses and discussion sessions for Party 
branches and cel ls with the aim of famil iarising the rank and fi le with the latest 
ideological del'iberations. Propagation of some important Party resolutions may even 
include non-Party members at such gatherings. While such mobil isation reaches out to 
a large number of people, it is also privileged in the sense that direct knowledge is kept 
within the confines of each small group. In the context of what is observable, this 
mechanism does not get the same ubiquity of publ ic attention as ideological text 
publ ished in the media, but the intimacy of small group discussion enhances the 
admonition effect of the communication. Hence there is a paradox to ideology as 
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control. What is visible as so much propaganda text is what creates the least impact 
because very few would bother to read such anodyne and turgid tracts. But there is a 
manifestation of ideological control, more amorphous and intangible, and kept away 
from publ ic scrutiny, and these conditions render the control more effective and also 
resistant to change. 
Remington's second premise is that whi le the system was increasingly not 
dependent on what ideology had to say, it was also not free of ideology. Vietnam's 
media system does labour under such an amorphous situation and the extent of market 
reforms that media could embrace provides an i l l ustration. A better understanding of 
this problem would begin with an appreciation of what has been happening in the larger 
economic arena. The pol icy stance of the late 1980s aimed at creating a 'multi-sectoral ' 
economy in which the private sector would play a central role.  Yet through the 1990s, 
industrial pol icy increasingly gave priority to the state sector so much so that by the late 
1 990s, no privatisation drive was visible; and at the Eighth Party Congress in 1996, the 
' leading role '  of the State sector was strongly asserted (Fforde. 1997:4). In the events 
running up to the Congress, intense debate arose with in the Party el ite over the meaning 
of socialist orientation and social ist deviation when carrying out economic reforms 
(Vasavakul .  1 997). That being the case, it would approximate the condition which 
Remington described as one not total ly beholden to the dictates of ideology, but also not 
free of it. If the reform momentum already achieved in the general economy could stil l 
be challenged, market practices in a sensitive sector such as media can logical ly expect 
to be even more circumscribed. Here, the central ideological issue would be: ' Should 
information be regarded as a commod ity? ' .  Tuan Minh (1992b) referred to the problem 
that information as a product was sti l l  a capital ist concept alien to a social ist society 
such as Vietnam. Linked to this are important questions such as private ownersh ip of 
media and whether or not the fledgl ing foreign investment in media should be 
encouraged or phased out. The 1990 Press Law had removed the possibil ity for private 
ownersh ip of media which was al lowed under the previous legislation in 1 957. During 
the National Assembly debate in December 1989, advocates stoutly defended this 
proscription of private ownership on ideological grounds by pointing out that ' the way 
to the future for Vietnamese society was to expand col lective ownersh ip ... and not 
private ownership'  or that ' private ownership of media would real ly mean newspapers 
would either be at the behest of this class or that class ' (Nha11 Dan. 28/1 2/89: 1 &4) 
The post-1989 media situation has also witnessed a more guarded approach when 
challenges are made to ideological shibboleths which contrast with Phan Quang and 
Huu Tho pointing out in early 1988 that Lenin's teachings on the socialist media may be 
outdated for present day Vietnam. Two examples, Tuan Minh (1992b) and Nguyen 
Thanh Son (1995), i l lustrate this. Both argued for more media competition and · 
therefore the need for news to be more information-oriented in order to attract readers. 
Both were also careful to point out however, that competition was congruent with the 
Party affirmation of the market economy and Son qual ified his cal l for more 
information-based content by saying that 'propaganda' and ' agitation' ,  as prescribed by 
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ideological orthodoxy, could sti l l  be able to draw readers if they were done wel l . Minh 
also qual ified himself by acknowledging that social ist practices and principles stil l had a 
role to play; th is being for the State to invest in infrastructure so that newspapers cou ld 
keep their prices low. 
Legal Regime 
The legal regime that tends to media has two major components: one set of rules 
originates from the Party and the other from the State legislative and admin istrative 
organs. With publ ic discourse 7 tend ing to focus almost entirely on the effectiveness of 
the 1990 Press Law (a product of the National Assembly legislative process and then 
implemented by government agencies such as the Min istry of Culture and Information), 
it creates an impression that government prerogatives are supreme in regu lating the 
media when, in real ity, Party decrees hold the preponderance of influence. This 
importance accorded to State laws, even if not qu ite warranted yet, may be viewed in 
the context of a Party pol icy since the Seventh Congress to devolve more admin istrative 
power to State organs. 
The predecessor of the 1990 Law went as far back as 1957 which argues for the 
necessity of new legislation to address the changes brought about by doi moi. But 
given that many of the reforms actual ly  took place prior to the enactment of the new 
legislation, it would support a view that attributes less sal ience to legal endorsement as 
the promoter of change where media is concerned. Furthermore, in a country where 
ru le of law is general ly regarded as far from being institutional ised, it is reasonable to 
share some of the same reservations about the efficacy of the 1990 Press Law. As is the 
practice in Vietnam, in addition to a broad sweeping law passed by the National 
Assembly, a complex array of rules and regu lations from central and regional 
government bodies would seek to manage the media at the level of minutiae with 
instructions covering issues l ike journal ists ' pay, freelancers ' rates, permissible 
advertisement-copy page rat io and the sell ing price of a newspaper. This creates a 
situation similar to what is happening to the country as a whole where ru les are too 
numerous to keep track of or bogged down with details, yet imprecisely written, and, in 
some instances, contrad ict each other. As a result a situation evolves where rules are 
sometimes at odds with the real ity and so risk being seen as irrelevant. An example 
would be the regulation which set the proportion al lowed for advertisements at 10 per 
cent of printed space (Clause 1 7.2 of Nghi Dinh cua Hoi dong Bo truong So 133-HDBT 
7 This refers to media coverage of the topic as well as discussions with Vietnamese 
editors/journal ists. The debate on the draft of the 1 990 Press Law was well reported by 
the standards of the Vietnamese press, a development never observed for Party 
prerogatives. In recent years, journalists have claimed rights as provided by the Press 
Law, two cases of which arc cited in this paper. The inadequacies of the law continue 
to be discussed in media articles. Such responses have not been recorded for any Party 
regulation since the Secretariat Directive 1 5  (Chi thi 1 5) of September 1 987. 
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ngay 20 thang 4 nam 1992 quy dinh chi tiet thi hanh luat bao chi) but it is not difficul t  
t o  find newspapers which regularly d isregard this rul ing.8 
The Press Law is not only presented as an instrument to regulate but also one which 
protects the rights of journalists. It has clauses affirming the right to information and 
the right to maintain confidential ity of sources. Given the nature of Vietnam's pol itical 
culture, nobody would take these written provisions entirely at face value but editors 
and senior journal ists have pointed out that a sound knowledge of the law does provide 
journal ists with more resources to negotiate when confronted by obstructive officials. A 
good example would be an incident in Hanoi in July 1996 when the press went to check 
on the police trying to evict . some residents forcibly from a build ing. The officer 
warned reporters against covering the event but they, in return, invoked the 1990 Press 
Law which stipulated that it was i l legal to stop journal ists in their legitimate pursuit of 
news. The officer then threatened them with arrest and also hit a reporter as wel l  as 
smashed his camera; another reporter had his press card torn and camera confiscated. 
The journal ists lodged reports with the city's Legal Office and wanted the office to press 
charges (Cong A 11 Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh 7/8/96:7). Another instance of a reporter 
exercising his legal right happened in a courtroom when a reporter (Minh Tuan 1996) 
was prevented from tape record ing the proceedings. He challenged the court that this 
violated articles in Decree 133 issued by the Council of Min isters on 20 April 1992 
(Nghi dinh 133-HDBT quy dinh chi tiet thi hanh Luat Bao chi). Finally, the court 
backed down. The fi l l ip for all these have come as much from market opportunit ies as 
from the more l iberal pol itical cl imate of doi moi. In essence, what journal ists have in 
the Press Law is a rough set of guidel ines which is very much a part of the country's 
evolving legal culture, st i l l  unsettled in many ways. As much as its injunctions can be 
discretionary, its protective clauses may also have to be negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the relative power of the parties to a confl ict. 
Laws, however, are not as crit ical as the regular resolutions and directives issued by 
the Party Central, which are instrumental in fomenting the pol itical environment in 
which media changes can take place as wel l as issuing up-to-date specific instructions 
on what the leadership would l ike to see. For example, in the years before and after the 
8 The question of advertisement quota received a dismissive response from majority of 
editors and journalists interviewed. A popular view held that the way around this 
restriction was to print any amount of advertisements in a separate pullout and that 
would be all right. Major publications like Saigo11 Giai Plro11g and Tuoi Tre of Ho Chi 
Minh City have advertisement pullouts which have more pages than the actual papers 
themselves. An editor at Vietnam Investment Review said his paper worked to a 35 per 
cent l imit for advertisement and he understood that to be an overall ruling for all the 
press. The 10 per cent limit was repeated in a Ministry of Culture and Information 
communique reported in Saigo11 Giai Phong on 5 Jan 96 but it added a qualifier that 
newspaper could apply to the Minister for a higher quota. 
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Sixth Party Congress, Party decisions widened the scope for the press to criticise 
government inefficiencies: 
a) Directive 79 (Chi Thi 79 ve cong tac phe va tu phe trong Dang vien cac cap va 
cac nganh chuan bi cho Dai Hoi Dang toan quoc) of 1 1  March 1986 launched a 
countrywide campaign to criticise and self-criticise and the scope was widened 
to al low the press to write about the shortcomings that emerged in these 
criticism sessions (Nhan Dan 15/3/86: 1). 
b) Secretariat Directive 15 (Chi thi 15) on 21 September 1987 empowered the 
press to expose corruption in high places and was titled 'Strengthening the 
leadersh ip of the party with the purpose of better util ising the press in the 
struggle against negativism' (Doi Moi Thong Tin Bao Chi 1988:17-24). In 
particular the directive strengthened the prerogative of the Chief Editor in 
deciding what was to be publ ished. 
c) Secretariat Directive 19 (Chi thi 19) on 20 November 1 987 entitled 'Reforming 
news about protocol events ' freed the press of the obl igation to give 
prominence to unimportant protocol news about top leaders (Ibid. 25-27) 
d) Pol itburo Resolution 05 on 28 November 1987 concerned writers of creative 
l i terature more so than journalists but the bold l i terary works which were 
encouraged by this directive also had an impact on newspaper work. (Nhm1 
Dan 5/12/87: 1 &4). 
But the mood began to shift with the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Congress in June 
1988 where the Plenum resolution warned against the media straying from the Party l ine 
(Nhan Dm1 22/6/88: 1). This was to contribute to the dismissal of Nguyen Ngoc from 
the position of Chief Editor of Vm1 Nghe. But the Party decision wh ich was decisive in 
pull ing back from bold pol itical reforms was the Seventh Plenum Resolution in August 
1989, a meeting which took place in the wake of the Tiananmen incident in China and a 
restive Eastern Europe. It bore the evidently anxious title 'Some pressing problems in 
the field of ideological work in view of the present domestic and international situation . '  
(Nghi Quyet Hoi Nghi I an  thu bay Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong Dang (khoa VI) Mot so 
van de cap bach ve cong tac tu tuong truoc tinh hinh trong nuoc va quoc te hien nay.) 
From then on, the cautious mood deepened and if Directive 15 of 1 987 was a document 
which enhanced the Chief Editor's prerogative, the years after 1 989 saw the issuance of 
Secretariat Directive 63 (cited earl ier) which constrained the Chief Editor. Then in the 
aftermath of the d issolution of the Soviet Communist Party in 1991,  the Secretariat 
issued Directive 08 (Chi thi 08) on 31 March 1992 which was aimed ·at 'strengtheni¥ 
leadership and control in order to raise the qual ity and results of the press and 
publ ications ' .  In practical terms, it meant the Party sought to raise flagging media 
enthusiasm for its traditional mobil isation duties. This directive set a deadline of three 
months for al l  party committees and responsible agencies to complete reorganisation of 
their press and publ ication activities by 'enhancing qual ity in the pol itical, ideological 
and cultural domains' (FBIS-EAS-92-072:53-55). It has continued to serve as the basis 
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for ideological management of the press t i l l  the present and this is evident in the 
organising of a national conference in August 1 997 to review the implementation of the 
directive (Do Muoi. 1997). 
Since Party decrees are meant to be instruments of mobil isation, their d issemination 
through mass media and grassroots organisations is always assured. However, two 
features distinguishes such Party initiatives from those of the State: 
a) Party documents need not always be released in ful l  or at a l l .  On the other 
hand, ful l  text of National Assembly laws are always released as public 
documents. The cut and thrust of debate over draft legislation in the National 
Assembly are increasingly reported in the press; this is not the case with 
del iberations by the Party Central Committee which carry with them an air of 
secrecy. Media attention is instead geared towards publ icising the final Party 
decision and its implementation, usual ly in a celebratory way. 
b) Journal ists view the 1990 Press Law as safeguard ing some of their rights to 
gather information and this is reflected in the period ic media reports of the 
Press Law being violated. Within the same period, no attempt has been 
recorded of any Party decree being invoked to protect journal istic prerogative. 
Hence the media operates under a legal regime where control is vested more in that 
component which is quarantined from the moderating influence of publ ic scrutiny. This 
has been a feature of the Vietnamese media from its origins in the 1950s and while doi 
moi has relaxed the management style of the Party vis a vis media, it has not al tered the 
orthodoxy of structural control in any fundamental way. 
Conclusion 
So how much has the media changed? This question becomes more manageable if 
it is narrowed down to just how much has pol itical control of the Vietnamese media 
been reduced, al though that is not the only way by which change can or should be 
measured. There is no simple answer mainly because pol itical control is difficult to 
quantify and, as this paper seeks to argue, it depends on what yardstick is being used. If 
it is gauged purely by how much media content has changed, then there is no denying 
that the media of doi moi has changed significantly and often to a degree which 
impresses the uninitiated. This level of observation is also the most easi ly accessible. 
Yet underlying content are structures which are fundamental to control of media - the 
whole managerial structure, ideology and regulations. They should also be taken into 
account in any examination of the issue of pol itical control, not to mention that these 
structures, more so than what newspapers publ ish day to day, are integral to how 
pol it ical and bureaucratic institutions go about their business. At these deeper layers, 
doi moi has also had its influence but things have been more resistant to change, not 
least because they are less directly exposed than media content to change-inducing 
agencies such as public visibil ity. 
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Deciding the extent of pol itical change has also been a key question in the larger 
field of Vietnam Studies where researchers have tried to find a meaningful conceptual 
framework to capture how doi moi has al tered state-society (state here refers to the 
overall establ ishment comprising both the Party and State organs) relations. So far there 
is no ready consensus and Kerkvl iet (1995:398-9) summarised the discourse as shaking 
out into three schools of thought. Thayer (1992b: l l l - 12), Womack (1992: 180) and 
Porter(1993 :101)  represent the Vietnamese system as ' mono-organisational social ism ' 
where major decisions are made within the bureaucracy and are influenced by it rather 
than by extra-bureaucratic forces in society. Turley(1 993a:269-70; 1993b:330-31) 
modifies the first argument and suggests a concept of ' mobil isation authoritarian ism ' 
where social forces may influence pol icy but only through organisations that the state 
itself dominates. A third view by Thrift and Forbes(1986:81 -83,101 -104) bel ieves the 
Vietnam state frequently does not have the resources to impose policies, which 
therefore al lows social groups resistant to state control to shape society as much as or 
more than state pol icy. This may be described as a form of 'penetrating civil society ' .  
I f  these terms of  debate were transposed to  the question of  state-media relations, 
anecdotal evidence can provide examples of state-media relations to suit each of the 
three categories. It is not possible to do justice to this debate, given the need for brevity 
at the closing end of this paper. However I personal ly  find 'mono-organisational 
social ism ' in the form conceptual ised by its originator T.H. Rigby (1 990) for the 
erstwhile Soviet Union most satisfactory when it comes to analysing Vietnamese 
society and media in transition. This is because when the detai ls of Rigby's model arc 
examined, they do make al lowances for situations when the state is not as effective as is 
assumed in its dispensation of power. Hence the ' mono-organisational ' system does not 
stand apart from the phenomena of ' mobil isation authoritarian ism ' and 'penetrat ing 
civil society ' .  In the context of the Soviet Union, Rigby chose to term non-state or anti­
state associations and activities as representing a 'vestigial civil society' meaning what 
l ittle remains of the flourish ing civil society which existed before the Bolsheviks took 
over in 1917 (Rigby 1 991 : 1 1 1 -14). While the scope for intel lectual discourse and other 
social or personal l iberties had significantly increased after the Stal in era(1 929- 1953), 
the mono-organisational system remained intact with its structures of power basical ly 
unaltered. The system only started to be seriously challenged in 1 987, partly with 
Soviet leader Gorbachev's acquiescence or sufferance, and the momentum for change 
final ly reached a stage where no single leader or group could arrest it. Only then did the 
elements of a vestigial civil society stop being vestiges (Rigby 1 990:207-44). Vietnam's 
pol itical restiveness has never gone that far. As this paper has shown in its exploration 
of the deep and not easi ly visible structures which continue to manage media, in the 
final analysis the key decisions continue to be taken by the mono-organisation which is 
the Party; and while the implementation of these decisions can sometimes be tardy or 
resisted, there is no doubt that Party decisions can be enforced when it so insists. 
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TWO 
ECONOMICS-RELATED PERIODICALS 
Chu Van Lam 
Before renovation in Vietnam, very few newspapers or journals special ised in  
economic matters. Tap Chi Nghien C1111 Kinh Te (Economics Research Journal) 
founded in 1 961  by the Economics Institute, appeared monthly.  Other journals such as 
Tap Chi Ke Hoach Thong Ke (Statistical Planning Journal) l imited themselves to 
narrower fields. A few newspapers, for example Thuong Mai (Commerce), and Tim 
Cong (Handicrafts), offered economic information. All these publ ications had the 
principal function of making the pol icies of the government known to specific 
audiences. 
After the Sixthth Party Congress in 1986, and especial ly from 1990 onward, the 
number of economics-related period icals increased dramatical ly. Over forty 
newspapers and journals appeared that concentrated on economic matters, not to 
mention more than four hundred other period icals which contained economics pages or 
feature columns. In addition to regular staff writers, hundreds of freelance writers 
submitted articles for publ ication. Among these freelancers were numerous 
pol icymakers and enterprise managers, perhaps a un ique characteristic of Vietnam 's 
press. Economics writ ing in the press played a significant role in the 1980s transit ion, 
as relevant issues were discussed first among scholars and eventual ly reached the ears 
of party and government officials. This happened on the vital topic of agricultural 
contracts, and also on the decision to separate industrial production from the direct 
control of various l ine min istries. 
Today, economic problems are covered more broadly in the press than ever before, 
reflecting the general desire to move ahead in economic development, to overcome the 
'danger of lagging far beh ind ' other nations, as emphasised in Communist Party 
resolutions. The decision to transform from a command and central ised economy to a 
market-oriented economy with the participation of various economic sectors as wel l as 
to promote more open pol itical pol icies, has enabled the press to col lect information 
more efficiently, upgrade technical qual i ty, improve content, and disseminate 
information more qu ickly. The number of one-sided or very general articles has been 
reduced. The press no longer is only a device for information to be imposed from the 
lop downward, but instead has become a two-way channel ,  a veh icle reflecting the 
aspi rations and requirements of the people in general and of businessmen in particular. 
The Increase in Economics Information 
Editors and writers have access to a much wider variety of economic data than was 
the case ten or fifteen years ago. Communications facil i ties, both international and 
domestic, have been greatly improved. Of course, rel iable statistics are sometimes 
difficult to secure, and need to be checked and double-checked. Compared to before, i t  
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is easier to request interviews with government officials, to ask pointed questions, and 
to publ ish the resul ts. Officials are more wil l ing to talk  with us informally as wel l ,  and 
they pay closer attention to issues raised in  the press. 
Besides articles on domestic and international economic events per se, we also 
write about the relationship between econom ics and social problems, and between 
economics and culture. Readers of general newspapers want and receive feature stories 
on economic matters of current concern. Regular columns offer advice to consumers. 
Such innovations are wel l  received by the publ ic, and they help sat isfy the demands of 
society. 
Substantial progress has been made with regard to journal istic professional ism, 
writing style, and forms of presentation. Freedom of the press is respected, mainly 
designed to encourage entrepreneurs in their business act ivities, and to encourage the 
publ ic to fight corruption, smuggl ing, i l legal trad ing and other violations of the interests 
of the people. Economic commentary and forecasting is on the increase. Competition 
between newspapers for readersh ip is more intense. Being a type of commodity, 
period icals work hard to increase market share. Even special ised econom ic publ ications 
offer a mix  of articles for econom ists, enterprise managers and officials in economic­
related agencies on the one hand, and the wel l- informed general reader on the other. 
The Prime Min ister's Office has establ ished a press department to col lect 
information from newspapers, cod ify it, and report to the Prime Min ister on a dai ly 
basis. Qu ite a few decis ions by the Prime Min ister have been made after receiving 
information in this way. Other m in istries and state economic organ isations have 
proceeded to set up the i r  own press departments to col lect data from newspapers to use 
in formulating pol icies. 
The Economics-related Press, the People, and the State 
In Vietnam, the state considers the press a tool to mobil ise people's participation in 
implementing the pol itical l ine and pol icies of the rul ing Communist Party, to get 
people to abide by the laws of the state, and to protect the national interest. At the same 
time, the press acts as the voice of the people. 
While the economy is in a transitional period into the market economy, ambiguous 
or undefined elements sti l l  remain. Inconsistent ' rules of the game' are unavoidable. 
For example, the foreign investment law promulgated in early 1988, despite careful 
preparation, has already been amended three times. A lot of legal documents in 
economic fields, especial ly sub-laws, have been amended or adjusted even more often. 
The state also has issued many new laws and sub-laws which were unavailable in the 
previous command economy. Besides, an important h istorical characteristic of Vietnam 
should be noted here: up to now over 70 per cent of the population has l ived in the 
countryside, where actions are often governed more by rules of vi l lage community than 
by state law. The influence of such feel ings and way of l ife is quite strong even among 
urban inhabitants. 
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For example, people tend to conduct their business activities without applying for 
an official l icense. If they have to apply for a business l icense, they avai l  themselves of 
personal contacts (with state officials) rather than going through the principles or formal 
channels. Officials also prefer to resolve problems based on personal relations, 
especial ly when both s ides do not always have a clear knowledge of the specific content 
of relevant legal documents. For this reason, legal documents in various forms are 
given extensive coverage by the Viet11am Eco11omic Times (VET). Like other 
newspapers, the ed itorial board and the reader's column of VET receive large numbers 
of letters from readers everyday, asking for explanations about tax pol icies, procedures 
to set up an enterprise, how to solve confl icts among economic organ isations, or how to 
resolve d isputes among citizens. 
But this is only one side of the story. On the other side, and no less important, one 
finds that stipulations in qu ite a few legal documents are very general or vague. 
Guidel ines issued by relevant agencies are inconsistent and even confl icting in a number 
of cases. In recent sessions of the National Assembly, delegates have complained a lot 
about this situation when d iscussing the process of law promulgation in Vietnam. 
Moreover, provisions in a number of legal documents or guidel ines that do not conform 
to real ity are not detected or rectified by law-making bodies unti l  pointed out by the 
press in the first instance. 
Additional ly, the press helps to discover urgent economic problems and contributes 
to resolving them to a certa in extent. Many examples can be cited. Economic 
newspapers and journals were the first to cover a controversial story about the exchange 
rate between the Vietnamese dong and the US dollar, pointing out how appreciation of 
the dong would affect Vietnam 's trade balance, and how to deal with the problem. 
When the State bank was slow to adjust its pol icy, many economic newspapers and 
journals argued that problem needed to be resolved as soon as possible, since the longer 
the story lasted the h igher the price the Vietnamese economy would have to pay. 
Simi larly, the press also mentioned many sensitive issues in Vietnam concern ing the 
role of the state-owned economic sector, which has not been as effective as it should be. 
Despite playing the key role in the national economy and enjoying preferences, the 
efficiency of the state-owned sector remains very low, and i t  seems no clear way out of 
this situation has been found. 
Another burning issue in economic newspapers recently has been the exposure of 
corruption and smuggl ing. The Prime Minister cal led corruption a ' national enemy' at 
the National Assembly, and labelled it an ' enemy from with in ' .  The press is a task 
force in the fight against this evi l .  Corrupt ion scandals are widely covered in most 
newspapers and over a period of many edit ions. The press thus places strong pressure · 
on the authorities to resolve this problem. 
In order to encourage businessmen and smal l-scale producers to participate in 
d iverse business activit ies, the economic newspapers and economic articles in  the 
general press introduce portrai ts of successful entrepreneurs, fe.ature wel l -performing 
enterprises, and describe the business experiences and skills of businessmen in  the 
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region and throughout the world. These articles are widely read by Vietnam's young 
entrepreneurs. 
Many newspapers earmark some space for ' letters from readers' columns, where 
the publ ic can express opin ions directly on certain topics or describe the injustices or 
unfair treatment they are facing. Many of these letters concern the economic interests 
of citizens. 
Shortcomings on the Part of Economics Reporters 
Before doi moi, a number of newspapers had their own economic or socio­
econom ic editorials, but writers were not tru ly economics reporters. So far, no special 
school or course to train economic journal ists or economic editors has been held, and 
reporters who normally write about economic issues are not wel l  equ ipped with 
necessary knowledge of the market economy. When our state-led economy shifted into 
the market economy, writers on general or social issues also sh ifted to write about 
econom ic issues. In some cases they failed to correctly reflect the situation for lack of 
special ised knowledge. So far there are but a few sharp economic commentators or 
economic analysts working for the newspapers. 
Al though the National Assembly  has a lready issued a press law, l ike other laws its 
stipulations are very general or vague, leading to inconsistent appl ication by both 
members of the press and law enforcement officials. In some cases there is no apology 
or correction for incorrect or d ishonest stories, and the writers of these stories do not 
bear any responsibil ity before the law at a l l .  On the other hand, in qu ite a few cases 
reporters have been harmed physical ly for exposing 'negative phenomenon ' (corruption, 
bribery, embezzlement). 
Conclusion 
Vietnam pursues the renovation process with economic reform as the starting point. 
This faci l i tates the development of the economic press in Vietnam. In spite of many 
shortcomings on the part of econom ic reporters and inappropriate mechanisms, the press 
not only  reports the news or gives information to the publ ic, but also plays a no less 
important role in reflecting the aspirations and complaints of citizens to the authorities. 
Economic newspapers and journals are also beneficial to people in terms of promoting 
their business activities and protecting their economic benefits. Vietnamese leaders 
acknowledge that administrative reform has not kept pace with economic reform. This 
situation also constitutes an obstacle for the press in general and the economic press in 
particular in Vietnam. 
THREE 
CREATIVE WRITERS AND THE PRESS IN VIETNAM 
SINCE RENOVATION 
Ho Anh Thai 
A veteran writer who had worked for over thirty years as a journal ist and editor-in­
chief of a magazine reti red on a very small pension. Five years later, he had bui l t  a new 
two-storey house, with 120 square metres of floor space. Where did he get the finances 
to bui ld such a house? It caine from the energetic freelancing he did for newspapers 
after the beginning of Vietnam 's period of renovation. 
Before 1986, the central ly-subsidised mass media in  Vietnam existed in a qu iet 
atmosphere of self-imposed restraint. Most creative writers did not want to write for the 
press, s ince they felt such writing did not offer an opportunity to ful l y  express either 
their intellect or their social and civic opinions. The press seemed engaged almost in a 
monologue, a one-sided conversation which would only present the best and brightest 
aspects of society, i l lustrated with examples of the ' the good man and the good act ' .  
Any so-called d ivergence m ight merely be  a paragraph about social abuses in a certain 
place, or a shortage of materials and work stoppages in  a factory, or the problems of 
peasants in a particular vi l lage. 
The meagre payment writers would get for articles discouraged them further. The 
period of central ly-subsidised media created two d istinct c ircles: writers and journal ists. 
Few writers wanted to work also as journalists, and some even treated the mass media 
with contempt, regarding journal ists as government employees who were paid to 
produce propaganda. Although both l i terature and the press were restricted during this 
t ime, creative writers general ly  chose to concentrate on fiction, since in doing so they 
could find individual ways to indirectly reflect the real i t ies of our society. This paper, 
however, wi l l  not d igress into the ach ievements of fiction except in the ways in which i t  
relates to journal ism. 
It seemed forgotten that most of the great Vietnamese writers during the period of 
French domination, and during the two wars aga inst the French and American invaders, 
were talented, sharp-witted correspondents. Often an unjust situation described in  the 
mass-media, in  an article seemingly too immediate and hurriedly-written, would affect 
people and leave a more lasting impression in their minds than a novel .  This can be 
seen in the short articles written before 1945 by Ngo Tat To (1894-1954) describing the 
brutal domination of the French imperial ists and the misery and suffering they caused 
the Vietnamese people, or in several non-fiction books by Vu Trong Phung (1912-1939) 
such as The Whores a11d the Whore Hospital, concerning social abuses under French 
domination. Also in this genre are: I Pull a Rickshaw by Tam Lang, describing the 
hardsh ips of the downtrodden, or Hanoi, Thirty Six Streets by Thach Lam (1909-1942), 
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concerning the customs of Hanoi .  These works remain fresh and valuable while a 
whole slew of popular novels publ ished at the same time have been tota l ly  forgotten. 
During the anti-French war (1945-1954), a l l  journal ists worked in the resistance 
and wrote in the service of the urgent pol it ical duties of the time. The targeted 
readersh ip of the press were the ' intellectuals, peasants, workers, and soldiers '  who 
made up the main forces of the resistance, as President Ho Chi' Minh said. The press 
was regarded as an effective instrument to transmit information, to encourage the 
morale of the people and the fighters, and to be a weapon against the enemy. In this 
situation, creative writers stopped producing novels and instead devoted themselves to 
journal ism. Al l  of the writers who were wel l-known before 1945 wrote for the press. 
Ngo Tat To, Nam Cao (1917-1951 ), Nguyen Cong Hoan (1903-1977), Nguyen Huy 
Tuong (1912-1960), Nguyen Tuan (1910-1987), To Hoai (b. 1920), and more, l ived 
among and wrote about the intel lectuals, peasants, workers and sold iers. Some of the 
l ivel iest articles and documentary fiction from that time include The Way to the South 
and Living in the Jungle by Nam Cao, New Year Presellts for Soldiers by Ngo Tat To, 
The Battle in Rang Street and One Visit to the Capital by Tran Dang (1921 -1949). 
As successors of the tradition of using the pen as a weapon against the enemy, the 
writers of the anti-American war (1954-1975) also made many efforts to write for the 
press. Many valuable works from that period are sti l l  avai lable, including Our Hanoi 
fights the A mericans by Nguyen Tuan and The Mother with a Rifle by Nguyen Thi 
(1928-1968) about a Southern woman who fought the invaders while raising six 
children. 
After the reunification of Vietnam in 1 975, the press seemed to drop out of view. 
The entire press system in Vietnam is control led and funded by the government. A 
newspaper belongs to one governmental organ isation or another; for example, Nhan 
Dan belongs to the Communist Party, Quan Doi Nhan Dan belongs to the army, Tien 
P/iong(Pioneer) is publ ished by the Youth League and P/111 Nu Viet Nam (Vietnamese 
Women) by the Vietnamese Women's Association, etc. The years 1975 to 1985 made 
up one of the most difficu l t  periods in the economic and social l ife of Vietnam. Many 
problems emerged, but the press usual ly avoided writing about them. Therefore, unti l  
1986, the dark sides of issues were not touched upon. 
The potential of journal ism was suddenly awakened in the m inds of writers at the 
dawn of the renovation period, and the renewed mass media soon became a l ively part 
of the market system of that period. 
Influence of the Press on Writers' Thinking 
By the end of 1996, the Vietnam Writers '  Association consisted of 700 members, 
of whom 90 percent work in the mass media. There are approximately  400 newspapers 
and magazines publ ished al l  over Vietnam, from dai ly and weekly newspapers to 
monthly  and quarterly magazines. 
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After ten years of operating under the renovation pol icy, writers can now look back 
and evaluate the role of the press and i ts effects on society. Such an examination shows 
that the press has definitely rediscovered i tself. These days the press has become a 
forum for people from al l  walks of l ife, including writers, who wish to openly  express 
their ideas and opinions about various issues. The press does i ts job as a responsible 
watchdog, pointing out problems in  areas which may have been overlooked by official 
inspectors. The press has become a receptive l istener at t imes when there are not 
enough avenues for people to have their problems or suggestions heard. Renovation has 
al lowed the press to actually become a force that helps push the country further along 
the path of renovation. 
By effectively performing that role, the press at present has a considerable affect on 
many facets of society. It publ ishes and encourages various examples and models of 
renovation. But the press not only sings the praises of new methods and trends. It also 
plunges into the fight against corruption and social abuses that e i ther already exist or 
that have emerged since the beginning of the open-door free market economy. The 
press has substantial ly defended the interests of workers, peasants and intellectuals, and 
has struggled for the social welfare of the poor and downtrodden. In the forefront of 
this struggle is the newspaper Lao Dong, publ ished by the Vietnam Trade Union, with 
the novel ist Xuan Cang as editor- in-chief. During 1985, a year before renovation, 
articles appeared in this newspaper concern ing several factory d irectors who had 
attacked and d ismissed workers who had spoken out about problems they saw in  the 
workplace. This kind of article had never before been al lowed publ ication in  any 
newspaper. In 1986 Lao Dong actual ly began the struggle that other newspapers took 
up after renovation, with a series of investigative articles about total i tarian behaviour 
and corrupt activities of the leader of a province and about workers and peasants who 
were the victims of injustices committed by h igh-ranking officials. These investigations 
were taken to and used as case files by concerned and competent judiciary boards. 
Along with Lao Dong, the other newspapers joined the struggle against corruption, 
total itarian ism, authoritarianism, conservatism and stagnation within the system of 
administrative management, and against social i njustices and the decl ine of traditional 
values. Also outstand ing in  this struggle was the Vietnam Writers '  Association 's Van 
Nghe (Literature and Arts), which publ ished articles such as 'What Happened That 
Night?' By Phung Gia Loe, 'Confession of the Accused ' by Nhat Linh, 'The Kneel ing 
Woman ' by Tran Khac, and 'Justice: Don 't Forget Anyone' by Nguyen Thanh Ha. 
There have also been many provocative articles in the Tien Phong, Phu Nu Viet Nam, 
Tha11h nien cua Thanh pho Ho Chi Minh (Youth of Ho Chi Minh City), and Saigon Giai 
Phong (Liberated Saigon). The press no longer sits qu ietly in a central ly-subsid ised 
ivory tower, but actively and effectively exerts a positive influence on the process of 
economic, social and cultural development. 
The writers who now work for the press also seem startled out of a stagnant 
daydream. Literary writers have changed the nature of the mass media and in turn, the 
mass media has strongly influenced writers '  ideas about the relationship between 
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journalism and l i terature. Writers understand that now i s  not the time to sit back and 
only write the big book, the magnum opus. Writers feel they have to and should write 
for the press, d irect ly observing everyday problems and participating in solving them. 
The l ife of a journal ist, ful l  of worry, excitement, and the need for timely reactions, has 
turned the l iterary writer into a more dynamic, real istic and resourceful person. 
The press in  Vietnam has become more interesting and l ively since writers have 
become wholehearted insiders. In the quickly-written articles and in the investigations 
by talented writers, readers not only  get detai ls of events, but are also able to experience 
the typical flavour of l ife in a group or circle, or even society as a whole. The human 
and l i terary quality of newspaper articles has become stronger and more profound. 
Because of this, many Vietnamese newspapers now avoid their former fate of going 
straight to the rag or trash heap. And as a newspaper becomes more popular, i t  is able 
to attract wel l-known writers and to compete for their services with h igher fees. 
Influence of the Press on Writers' Daily Lives 
Since 1986, the press has not only changed writers '  thinking, but also their dai ly 
l ives. The end of central ised subsidies to publ ishing houses and the flood of foreign 
movies, video cassettes, music tapes and other kinds of entertainment led to a reduction 
in the publ ication of l i terary writing. Today serious works of l iterature are only 
publ ished in a small quantity, a maximum of 2000 copies compared to 50,000 copies 
before 1988, and even such smal l ed it ions are difficu lt  to sell in a short time. The 
publ ication of a 300 page novel wi l l  bring the author a sum of approximately US$200 
dol lars, which equals the earnings from 8 articles of 1500 words each. Works of poetry 
sel l  even less: usual ly only three or four hundred copies. To give one example of how 
th is has changed the l ives of writers . .  . there was one poet who retired and started 
writing journal ism. He wrote regularly, so that he had an art icle publ ished every day in 
either a newspaper or magazine, and his monthly earnings averaged about US$400 
dol lars - an amount five times h igher than his pension ! Before 1986, he was unable to 
have any of his col lections of poetry publ ished. However, since he has become 
involved in journal ism, he has publ ished, at his own expense of US$500 a book, up to 
four col lections a year. Of course his col lections are mostly presented to h is friends and 
relatives. 
At this time in l i terary circles there is a proverb that goes 'eat art icles to feed 
fiction ' .  That is, creative writers have to l ive on the earn ings they make from their  
articles to beable to write fiction, wh ich doesn' t  earn as much money. A writer wi l l  
usual ly write for the four or five newspapers which are h is favourites, which pay the 
most, and the editors of whichhe works with most comfortably. The poet ment ioned 
above has to write for a score of newspapers to be sure he has one article publ ished 
everyday. The retired novel ist Vu Bao is eager to travel ei ther to the far North or the far 
South, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Vietnam rai l roads, or 
the provincial authorities. He wi l l  write for any newspaper that sol icits articles from 
him, no matter how small or large, and he has a loyal following among readers no 
matter which publ ication he writes for. 
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That is why, at present, journal ism has become the most popular l ivel ihood among 
Vietnamese creative writers, almost all of whom are writing for newspapers or working 
as editors. 
Impact of the Press on Literature 
In the late 1980's, during the most vigorous blooming of the mass media in 
Vietnam, stories and novels marked by qual ities of journal ism began to appear in 
Vietnam's l iterary marketplace. These were fictions that real isticall y  depicted existing 
conditions in the country 's urban and rural areas, and that documented the struggles 
against corruption and social abuses. In the turbulent atmosphere of that time, such 
novels and col lections were welcomed warmly. Although after just a few years, readers 
gradual ly  became reluctant to read such books and began to return to true l i terary 
works, the writing and publ ication of these works clearly show the influence of the 
press on l i terature, as wel l  as the real talent of some of these writers, since such works 
fit into the long-standing and world-wide l i terary tradition of documentary fiction. 
Among the dozens that have been publ ished recently, there are several remarkable 
documentary novels, such as The Quiet Days A re 811mi11g by Xuan Cang and The Land 
Crowded with People and Ghosts, by Nguyen Khac Truong. The first, publ ished in 
1987 when the author was editor-in-chief of Lao Dong, is set in an editorial office at the 
time the press started its fight against corruption and injustice. Readers were interested 
in stories about journal ists who had to overcome great difficul ties, meet with notorious 
and/or influential contacts, and even endanger their l ives in order to expose brutal 
truths. In the second novel ,  by focusing on a feud between two vi l lage fami l ies who 
hate each other, Nguyen Khac Truong exposes the real ity of the Vietnamese 
countryside, where people cl ing to outdated customs and quarrels, and where d ictatorial 
practices and incompetent management cause tragedy. Prior to 1986, these subjects 
were ' restricted areas ' to both the press and l iterature. 
Journalism requires most of the writer's time, energy and intel lect. But even 
though writers are engaged in journalism, they can ' t  escape their l i terary karma. Even 
with better l iving conditions, writers sti l l  lack time, money and the small quiet places 
they need to write the works which haunt and torment them. So far, the loss of 
government financial support has only had a modest affect on some writers. But in the 
future, writers wil l  need more support from the government, social organisations and 
generous sponsors. 
The mass media in Vietnam is now vigorous. Over 400 newspapers and magazines 
and the network of radio and television stations that broadcast to the d istricts are funded 
by the central government, provincial governments, and industry. But the prospects for 
some sections of the media are not al together bright. Many newspapers will be 
suspended because of the poor quality of their work: they tend to simply rewrite and 
reprint articles from foreign newspapers over and over. Many newspapers wil l  also 
close because their funders can not continue their i nvestments. These things wi l l  
probably  help end some of the present chaos of the press. FinaHy, the participation of 
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writers, who always ·need and flourish best in ful l  freedom and a tru ly democratic 
atmosphere, wi l l  have a positive and effective affect on the development of the press. 
FOUR 
VOICE OF VIETNAM RADIO 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Nguyen Long 
Role, Responsibility, and Organisation 
As a state-run institution, Voice of Vietnam (VOV)'s role is to disseminate the 
Party l ine and State pol icies. It also acts as a two-way forum between the publ ic and the 
government. VOV is authorised by the government to manage the planning, techn ical 
and professional aspects of 53 local radio stations throughout the country. 
VOV is responsible for plann ing and implementing a five-year development plan 
for the national broadcasting network, and control of the budget of the national 
broadcasting system. It also helps local stations with content, planning and production 
of programs, broadcasting technology and techn iques, carries out scientific research and 
appl ies advances in broadcasting technology, and works out and implements plans of 
international cooperation in broadcasting. 
VOV has a total staff of about 1400, 300 of whom are reporters. It is organ ised into 
the following Departments and Divisions: 
- Editorial Secretariat 
- Department of Current Affairs 
- Department of Economy, Science and Technology 
- Department of Culture and Society 
- Department of Literature and Arts 
- Department of Music 
- Department of Ethnic Languages 
- Overseas Service 
- Department of Local Broadcasting 
- Department of Broadcasting Technology 
- Audio Centre 
- Department of Personnel and Train ing 
- Department of Finance and Accounting 
- Department of International Relations 
- Inspectorate 
- Admin istration 
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- Local and overseas representative offices 
A Brief History 
Voice of Vietnam's first transmission went to air at 1 1 .30 am on 7 September 1945, 
only  five days after Vietnam declared national independence from the French. The 
program featured President Ho Ch i Minh's Declaration of Independence to the world, a 
news bulletin and some commentaries. It was broadcast in five languages: Vietnamese, 
Engl ish, French, Mandarin and Esperanto. 
Every broadcast began with the announcement, 'This is the Voice of Vietnam, 
broadcast ing from Hanoi, capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ' followed by a 
choir singing the song 'Smashing Fascism ' .  
Under French domination, Vietnam was erased from the world map as a country. 
There were only the geograph ical names of Annam, Tonkin, Cochin-China, Laos and 
Cambodia for the five parts of French Indochina. The name 'Voice of Vietnam ' was 
chosen as a confirmation of an independent country. Under French rule, the French 
language was the compulsory medium of education; Vietnamese was treated as a 
foreign language. So Voice of Vietnam asserts that Vietnam is a single country which 
has a language and a 'voice ' in the international arena. 
Vietnam won independence from Japanese fascists and Vietnam joined the All ies in 
the anti-fascist struggle. Since its foundation, VOV's signal tune 'Smash ing fascism ' is 
sti l l unchanged, al though the country is now actively engaged in peaceful national 
construct ion. The signal tune 'Smashing fascism ' is still there because it h ighl ights the 
h istorical background of the time the Radio was founded, and that fighting fascism is 
sti l l  an important task for Vietnam and the whole of mankind. 
The Voice of Vietnam now broadcasts simultaneously in five channels on the 
Domestic Service and eleven languages on the Overseas Service. The Domestic Service 
consists of the fol lowing channels: 
Channel 1: News, current affai rs, econom ic and music programs on medium and 
short waves with a daily a irtime of 18  hours. 
Channel 2: Cul tural, social ,  educational , l i terature, arts and music programs on both 
medium and short waves with a dai ly airtime of 18 hours. 
Channel 3: in service of ethnic minority people, broadcast in five ethnic m inority 
languages: H'Mong, Khmer, Ede, Giarai and Bana. Meanwhile, 20 provincial rad io 
stations broadcast in 20 ethnic languages. 
Channel 4: General programs broadcast one hour a day from Ho Chi Minh City on 
Medium wave. 
Channel 5: Music programs broadcast round the clock plus bul letins in Vietnamese, 
Engl ish, French and Russian and foreign language and Vietnamese language teaching. 
VOV's Overseas Service broadcasts in eleven foreign languages: Engl ish, French, 
Russian, Span ish, Japanese, Mandarin, Cantonese, Indonesian, Thai ,  Lao, and Khmer 
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and in Vietnamese for overseas Vietnamese. The total dai ly a irt ime of the Overseas 
Service is thirteen hours. 
For foreigners l iving in Hanoi and adjacent areas, Overseas Service programs are 
also broadcast on medium wave and in the future wi l l  be broadcast on FM. The 
Overseas Service broadcasts can be heard virtuall y  throughout the world and i t  has so 
far received feedback from about 70 countries. Engl ish and Japanese programs often 
receive the b iggest share of l isteners ' letters. In the first half of 1994, the Overseas 
Services received about 1600 l isteners ' letters from around the world, who account for 
only a t iny proportion of those who actual ly l isten to the transm ission. 1 
Globalisation and Competition 
Global isation poses problems for VOV in the form of increased competition. Since 
its foundation over 50 years ago, especial ly  in the wars against foreign aggression 
lasting three decades, VOV has closely l inked itself with the nation 's history and 
destiny. Yet in the new stage of development, VOV is facing challenges in various 
internal aspects, especial ly personnel, technology and program formats: 
A majority of staff at VOV are now in the over-40 age group. They often lack 
foreign language efficiency and are slow to adapt to technological changes.The bulk of 
VOV's technology is analog and a mixture of equipment from various sources: China, 
Russia, Hungary, USA, France and Japan.Radio formats which were extremely effective 
during the two wars against foreign aggression now appear outdated in the new trend 
towards market-oriented global isation. 
External ly, growing competition from other media inside and outside the country is 
the main challenge facing VOV. 
In Vietnam, the state only exercises direct management over public broadcasting 
and television systems. All other forms of mass media belong to mass organisations, 
social organ isations and professional associations. It is not only large organisations l ike 
the Trade Union, Women's Union and Youth Union that have newspapers and radio and 
television programs, but a l l  of the social, economic and professional organisations have 
the right to issue thei r  own newspapers as wel l .  
Television is a young medium in Vietnam. I t  emerged 25 years later than rad io and 
init ial ly used the facil ities of VOV. Vietnam Television has grown v igorously and is 
becoming one of the main communications media in the country. Now television 
programs are broadcast on four channels and through satel l ite. There are several relay 
stations throughout the country. 
The first Vietnamese newspaper came off the press in 1865 and since then the 
Vietnamese print medium has made rapid development and has never thrived as much 
as now. At present in  Vietnam there are over 400 regular publ ications, including 
dail ies, weekl ies, b i-weekl ies and monthl ies c irculating more than 360 mi l l ion copies. 
Review of VOV's Overseas Service's foreign listeners' letters in 1 996. 
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Most local ities have their own newspapers. Recently, the number of publ ications in 
foreign languages such as Engl ish, French and Ch inese has increased markedly, a trend 
which contributes greatly not only to the information market in the country but also 
signals the possibi l ity of entry into international markets. 
Fore ign satel l ite and wire services are another area of competit ion for VOV. 
Vietnam 's media receives information from such giant news providers as CNN, 
Reuters, BBC, and AFP. Accord ing to Errol Hodge, ' International satel l ite television 
will no double supplant it as the principal means of international mass communication ' 
(Radio Wars: Truth, Propaga11da, a11d the Struggle for Radio A ustralia. 1 995 :265). 
Global isation as a result of satel l i te and the Internet is making commun ications media 
virtual ly free from space, time and place, 'Previous communications technologies made 
the news more global .  Now the new media also make i t  more loca l ' .  
However, radio sti l l  possesses a strong foothold in Vietnam for several reasons: 
Vietnam is a predominantly agricu ltural country, with over 80 per cent of the population 
l iving in the countryside. Television transmissions reach mostly urban areas, whereas 
rad io can reach as many as 80 per cent of the total population, even in the most remote 
areas. Radio has been and cont inues to be the most popular means of information for 
the masses. VOV remains more popular than television and newspapers because it is 
faster, cheaper and easier to access. 
Even in the urban areas, radio is the dominant medium in the daytime and on ly 
gives way to televis ion from the late afternoon, when people get baclc frnm work and 
need more visual information and entertainment. 
Like some 40 years ago in Austral ia when television was introduced, people 
thought the advent of television m ight mean the end of the radio era. In fact, radio 
continues to grow, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it is now developing faster 
than ever. In Austral ia, ABC's Rad io National and SBS Radio are always h igh in 
profi le and enjoy substantial aud ience share. It is the same with VOV, which enjoys far 
more popu larity than the other media. 
Throughout most of Asia and the Pacific, radio remains the principal broadcast 
medium, and in some places, it is more important than newspapers. Rad io's advantages 
are obvious. It is far less expensive than television to instal l  and operate; it requires 
· fewer wel l -trained personnel ; and rad io rece ivers are within the means of vast numbers 
of people who cannot afford the much more costly TV sets. Rad io is also particularly 
suited to the communication needs of nations and territories and over vast areas, those 
composed of many scattered islands and those where ,the moum�nrm� �rra i'l  is a 
formidable obstacle to the development of television. Furthermore, rad io is better able 
2 E. Hume, ' How New Technologies are Changing the News', in Tabloids, Talk Radio 
t11 d the Future of news- Technology 's Impact on Joumalism (Washington D.C. : The 
Annenburg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern 
University, 1 995), 26. 
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than any other medium to overcome the barriers imposed by often extensive i l l i teracy 
and by the region's multitude of languages and cultures.3 
This general isation certainly appl ies to Vietnam at the present level of 
development. Different forms of media in Vietnam compete to cover news events. On 
the other hand, they commit  themselves together to maintain and promote traditional 
-=�1'-tu.te �d thev ioin. hands in the struggle against corruption, injustice and social evils. 
The Vietnamese government has acknowledged that many �ases of corruption have 
been discovered and brought to trial by the media. 
The impact of global isation on VOV's performance is seen mainly in the rigours of 
a mult i-channel environment. Founded over 50 years ago, Voice of Vietnam joined a 
trad ition of public service broadcasting which has played a crucial h istorical role in 
many countries since World War Two. Public service broadcasting has a proud h istory 
of quality service and non-commercialism: 
It is a fundamental principle then that public broadcasting must motivate the 
viewers as cit izens possessing duties as wel l as rights, rather than as individual 
consumers possessing wallets and credit cards.4 
Yet, along with the fast development of new technology and especial ly the 
emergence of the multi-channel environment, public broadcasting is facing fierce 
competition in terms of audience share and pol it ical impact. In Western countries there 
has been-growing criticism from the community and the commercial sector that national 
broadcasters are departing from their original rat ionale to engage in biased reporting. 
Publ ic service broadcasting has been requested to re-examine i ts purpose, nature and 
mission, even its legitimacy, in the new situation where the market is referred to as the 
only criterion for broadcast ing choices. In Austral ia, public broadcasting institutions 
l ike the ABC and SBS are seen by some as 'unjustifiable luxuries' because they have no 
direct l inks with the market. 
To retain its h igh-quality serv ice and historical cred ibil i ty VOV, l i ke publ ic 
broadcasters elsewhere, has to consider the issues of financing and technological 
change. 
Public broadcasters operate mostly with government funding and partly with their 
self-generat ing revenue from independent sources. Reduction in  government funding to 
publ ic broadcasters, which is happening in most countries, poses serious problems to 
these institutions; they have to reshape their own financing models to survive. Voice of 
Vietnam is not strictly a publ ic service institution l ike the ABC or the BBC but i t  has in 
many ways performed a s imi lar  role as a Western style public broadcaster. VOV differs 
3 John Merri ll, 'Broadcasting', in Global Joumalism : A Sutvey of the World's Mass 
Media (New York: Longman, 1 983), 1 46-47. 
4 Michael Tracey, 'Our Better Angels: The Condition of Public Service Broadcasting', 
Media In/ onnation A ustralia 66 (1 992): 1 9. 
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from the BBC type of public service broadcasting system in terms of ideology, funding 
and monopoly status, but its functions which involve non-commercial, universal and 
educational characteristics share key elements of basic pub l ic broadcasting principles. 
Regard ing the financing model, Vietnam is not yet in the same boat as Western public 
service broadcasters. Voice of Vietnam continues to get government funding and 
backing, especial ly in the process of modern ising their broadcasting technology. A 
large amount of money is being spent on VOV's development plan from now to beyond 
2000. 
Most national broadcasters are committed to non-commercial advertisements, such 
as one hears on the ABC or the BBC. In countries l ike Vietnam, where there is no 
competition from commercial media, advertising is nonetheless al lowed, not only as a 
means of generating revenue but also to promote manufacturers ' products to the 
aud ience. As a public broadcaster such funding is necessary for VOV to maintain the 
quality and special isation of its rad io products, whi le keeping pace with innovation and 
the h ighest standards. 
Technological advances such as submarine cable networks and integrated satel l ite 
systems capable of transmitting large quantities of information have virtual l y  tu rned the 
world into an 'Electronic Global Vi l lage ' .  Take cable service as an example. 
The wired consumer can get his customised news al l  day, at any time of day, 
updated regularly by his provider. He will no longer watch, hear, or read video, audio, 
or text 'by appointment', when the news purveyor decides to send it out. It will be 
stored, in d igital form, for the customer to cal l up when and how he wants.5 
Al though Voice of Vietnam Radio wi l l  survive wel l  into the next century as a 
rel iable source of information in the region, a number of factors wi l l  have negative 
impact on its performance, especial ly for the Overseas Service. 
Shortwave broadcasting is no longer a un ique means of information dissem ination. 
Sate l l ite service can now bring global news on either AM or FM. Radio Austral ia has 
to cut down on some of its language services such as French, Thai and Cantonese 
because these transmissions are losing aud ience on thei r  shortwave service. 
The common practice at the Overseas Service of using pre-recorded programs is a 
slow method of providing information to the aud ience in the region and the rest of the 
world. 
There is a growing number of international broadcasters in the region that are 
strong competitors for VOV because they not only have greater transmission strength 
but provide longer hours of service. 
5 Hume, op. cit., 25. 
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Future Prospects 
Since its foundation, Voice of Vietnam has contributed greatly to the success of two 
wars against foreign aggression and the post-war national reconstruction. In the new era 
of information, it is much harder for a publ ic service to maintain a n iche in the market. 
The audience, having free access to information, basical ly  can tune in to whatever 
source i t  l ikes. The question is, what should VOV produce in terms of content and 
formats to retain its aud ience size? The fol lowing problems still remain:  
There is a lack of d iversity in both news and features· or documentaries. The news 
bulletin is normal ly too serious or has a h igh percentage of so-cal led 'protocol news ' .  
Writing style is s t i l l  formal and more appropriate for readers than l isteners. There 
are few interview grabs in a bul letin, which makes it rather 'dry '  and less convincing. 
Despite major changes in the domestic service with regard to news format and 
presentation, external service bul letins st i l l  remain rigid. 
Unl ike Radio Austral ia, which has an extensive network of news correspondents 
throughout the Pacific to give first-hand coverage of events in the region, VOV's 
Overseas Serv ice has only a tiny number of fore ign correspondents. This l im its VOV's 
perspective on regional events. 
Reforms 
VOV gives top priority to reforms in program content and formats, advanced 
technology, and organ isational restructuring. 
Voice of Vietnam, l ike other broadcasters, wi l l  be drawn into the global trend of 
advanced media technology. Digital isation and satel l ite broadcasting wil l  greatly affect 
professional practice. The news values are sti l l  there, but the methods of making news 
are to be changed to enable faster and more l ively program delivery. The crucial factor 
for a broadcaster to survive is determined primari ly  by its program content which is 
handled mostly by journal ists rather than technology. Technological change acts only 
as a catalyst for h igh standards of programs. It is the journal ists that decide the identity 
of each station by offering 'someth ing exclusive ' .  To gain a foothold in the media 
market VOV will have to both upgrade technology and also restructure its organ isation 
to encourage staff participation. 
News and Cun-ent Affairs, which was first broadcast on 7 September 1945 when 
the radio went to air for the first time, is seen as the spearhead of VOV's advance. 
Since 1 July 1994, some news and music programs have been broadcast l ive and h ighly  
appreciated for their short, sharp information and harmonious combination of 
information and entertainment. To have quick access to information, VOV has set up a 
computerised news centre connected with such wire services as Reuters, AFP, Kyodo 
and AP. Efficient young staff have been employed to carry out news processing. Some 
of these have been sent overseas for intensive courses on l ive broadcast ing, news 
processing and advanced broadcasting technology. 
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Information technology has been widely applied i n  Editorial and i n  Sound and 
Transmission qual i ty control . There is partial instal lation of the Basys computerised 
newsroom system, the most popu lar technology in Western media organ isations, and the 
D-cart d igital editing system imported from Austral ia's ABC. Other faci l ities include 
modern telephone interview booths, l ive stud ios, Outside Broadcast Vans and 
professional reporters ' recorders. VOV is aim ing for on-l ine information access 
through the Internet and hopes to establ ish a VOV homepage simi lar to those of other 
media organ isations. 
Drastic changes are taking place in the organ isation of the workplace in publ ic 
serv ice broadcasting. National broadcasters tend to employ a lot of personnel . 
Technological change has had far-reaching impact on organ isation. The introduction of 
digital technology and l im ited or decl ining budgets means a dramatic reduct ion in the 
workforce. Take Austral ia's ABC for example, where the government's 77 mi l l ion 
dol lar budget cuts wil l  mean that about 900 people lose their jobs in the next two years. 
To survive fierce competition from other media, especial ly television, on the 
information super h ighway and to keep up with technological advances and retain its 
leading role among other Vietnamese media, VOV and the whole broadcasting industry 
in Vietnam wil l  have to pursue comprehensive reforms in the next century. So far VOV 
has been joining overseas training institutions to run several in-house training courses, 
and has sent i ts most efficient staff to overseas train ing and broadcast institutions to 
learn advanced journalism ski l ls and new broadcast ing technology. Some of the 
overseas train ing institutions include Austral ia's ABC, the BBC, Thomson Foundation, 
Radio Netherlands, Radio France International, Germany's Deutsche Welle and the 
Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (AIBD). Some of VOV's staff are 
attending MA journal ism courses at un iversit ies in Austral ia. VOV also sends senior 
editorial and techn ical staff on study tours to advanced broadcast ing facil ities in the 
region and Western countries, to work out the most appropriate model for VOV, and 
recruits new young staff with both academic qual ifications and language skil ls . 
Development Plan for 1995-2000 
With a v iew to developing the rad io broadcast ing service to better serve home and 
foreign l isteners and overseas Vietnamese, the Vietnamese government has approved 
the Development Plan for the Broadcast ing Industry of Vietnam in the 1 995-2000 
period and beyond 2000, aiming at enrich ing and diversifying programs of h igh qual ity. 
The plan also intends to achieve one rad io set per fami ly in the near future, and includes 
six major projects to develop Vietnam's broadcast ing industry in the 1 995-2000 period. 
They are: 
1 .  Work out a master plan for VOV's Domestic and Overseas Serv ices ' programs, 
and coord inate transm issions of central and local stat ions. 
2. Apply new technology in radio production with advanced radio formats in both 
metropol itan and provincial stations as wel l  as Central .  
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3. Plan a unified network of transmission on a national scale.  
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4. Increase broadcasting faci l ities to provide further information access at the 
grass-roots level .  
5 .  Conduct research on organ isation and admin istration of radio stations at 
different levels as wel l  as management models. 
6. Work out a plan .for science and technology research and train ing, and 
retrain ing of techn ical and ed itorial staff, to catch up with advanced 
broadcasting techniques. 
Conclusion 
Voice of Vietnam, founded in 1945, has closely associated itself with the nation 's 
history of resistance to fore ign aggression and national reconstruct ion. In the present 
context of market economy · and global isation, VOV is undergoing qual itative and 
quantitative changes to survive into the 21st century aga inst growing competition from 
other media, especial ly  satel l ite television. VOV is carrying out c�mprehensive reforms 
in content and formats, striving for digital technology, streaml in ing its organ isational 
structure, training and retraining its personnel ; all to achieve better service whi le  
retain ing i ts past glory as a national broadcaster. Voice of Vietnam has been and wi l l  
continue to be the most effective news med ium in Vietnam in the future to contribute to 
the process of renovation in the country. 
FIVE 
MAKING LIVE RADIO IN VIETNAM 
Ngo Phuong Dung 
Upgrading Provincial Radio Stations 
In 1 993, the SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) 
signed its first agreement with the Ministry of Culture and Information to support 
Vietnam's cultural and media sector for the period 1 July 1 993 to 31  December 1 995 . 
The overall objectives of the cultural support were: to contribute to the reform process 
and to the development of democracy in Vietnam, and to enhance national identity. 
Within its framework for support to the cultural and media sector, priority was 
given to the upgrading of provincial radio stations. After screening of the local radio 
stations in the country and with the support from Ministry of Cul ture and Information, 
Hanoi Radio and TV station in the North, Thua Thien Hue Radio station in the Central 
district and later Can Tho Radio and TV station in the South were selected for the pilot 
phase of the project. The Swedish Broadcasting Corporation in Malm' (Sveriges Radi' 
Malmohus/P 4, riks) was assigned by SIDA to be the consultants for implementation of 
the project. 
The overall objective was to support the development of radio broadcasts that 
answered the needs of society, based on existing traditions and the changes of modern 
Vietnam, and to also contribute to the development of the society by interaction with 
listeners. 
The immediate objectives were: To provide training in order to improve staff skills, 
demonstrate alternative methods of radio production, provide inspiration, and be a 
catalyst for different professional activities in Vietnamese radio broadcasting. Also, to 
change the format and working methods of today by introducing live broadcasts and so 
put the station in a position for participating in renewal, that is, doi moi, (?]  and 
encourage the improvement of the radio services in accordance with the overall 
objectives. Lastly, to present the project results at workshops and other types of 
discussions with broadcasters from other provincial radio stations. 
In general the training has fol lowed the outl ine below, even if it has been 
implemented and accomplished flexibly and there are differences between the 
participating stations: 
Firstly, the radio stations were assessed to find out the quality and quantity of 
present equipment, the management situation, the organisation and financial situation, 
the educational level and skills of journlllists and technicians, and of course the standard 
of programs put on the air. 
Secondly, for each station training that involved all staff was accomplished in two 
phases: Basic train ing. This involved an introductory one-week familiarisation and a 
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three to five-week train ing course at the radio station aimed at starting l ive broadcasts, 
for techn icians and journalists who were prov ided with l ight rad io equipment. Trainees 
learned basic skil ls, such as interview methods, edit ing, l ive presentation, and 
operational techniques. 
After basic training they built up an organisation, ' Across the Day' , to run daily l ive 
programs with a m ix  of news, current affairs, features, and music. As a third step, they 
in i t iated and sustained specific dai ly programs. 
Fol low-up efforts were aimed at maintain ing and developing the l ive programs and 
staff skil ls, with a two-week train ing course for technicians and journal ists at the rad io 
station, and a radio workshop for broadcasters at the end of the pi lot project. 
The final train ing model developed during the project period for assisting one 
provincial rad io station consists of four stages conducted over a period of approximately 
eight to ten months: One week of introductory train ing, three weeks of basic train ing, 
two weeks of follow-up training, and fina l ly a workshop for local broadcasters in the 
region. 
Journal ists and techn icians tra ined together. For instance, both journal ists and 
techn icians participated in the journal ism lectures, and at train ing in the use of portable 
tape recorders, edit ing and making items. This reduced the gap between the two groups, 
and helped them to understand how the other works. 
The first step in the training was to assemble new equipment for upgrad ing a 
control room and studio, so that the technicians cou ld ga in knowledge of the equipment 
to run and maintain it. As soon as the new control room and studio were equ ipped and 
put into operation, the train ing concentrated on basic skil ls, 'Across the Day' - how to 
organ ise and run a new l ive program, how to start and maintain l ive programs, and 
create a blueprint for developing a New Rad io Model .  
The implementation of  the training scheme proceeded with variations accord ing to 
each provincial station, as detai led below. 
Thua Thien Hue Radio 
Thua Thien Hue Radio has a long broadcasting trad ition as a French radio station, a 
U.S. rad io station and, since the l iberat ion, as a Vietnamese rad io stat ion. Today the 
station is one of the few provincial stations without a TV sect ion. 
Thua Thien Hue Rad io was the first rad io station selected for this pilot project. It 
took considerable training, and explanation of proper organ isation, team work and 
delegation of responsibil ity before the station began to prepare for the project. The staff 
made many train ing programs which were not aired immediately, only broadcast 
through a wire to a rad io set in the editor's office. The daily programs of 10 to 15 
minutes, 30 minutes and final ly 60 minutes contained the basic e lements of modern 
rad io-making. Everybody from the driver to the director was encouraged to make a 15-
minute l ive program about some piece of music, which helped people understand what 
is involved in l ive broadcasting, as wel l as understand each others '  duty. 
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Features were niade in the field, using professional portable cassettes and tape 
recorders, includ ing numerous interviews and voice reports based on 'Vox pop' (voice 
of the people and close to l ife). Guests were invited to the stud io and l ive music 
presented by local artists was also introduced. 
Since the train ing program, the content of rad io programs has not changed as much 
as work methods, al though as the motto 'close to l ife ' is fol lowed more 'ord inary' 
people are put on the air, and story items cover issues that involve a broader spectrum of 
the population than before. After almost five weeks of basic train ing, a 60-m inute dai ly 
program was final ly  put on the air using the training format. A daily team of a 
producer, a techn ician, studio reporters and reporter was responsible for the program. 
As a means to maintain the new working methods, the station was given the task of 
arranging a training course for journal ists and techn icians from nine d istrict rad io 
stations in the same province. Two or three local broadcasters from each d istrict were 
trained at the provincial rad io station in Hue, and each d istrict received a professional 
portable cassette tape recorder with microphone. News of the success of the first 
training course spread widely among local rad io stations. 
The train ing opened up opportunities for continued close cooperation between 
d istrict and provincial rad io. The d istricts can not begin l ive broadcasts yet, but the ir 
programs are more l ively and they have come to cooperate closely with provincial rad io. 
The latest d istrict news is sent via telephone l ines every hour to Hue Rad io. 
After the completion of basic train ing, fol low-up training and the final workshop at 
the beginning of 1 995, Hue Rad io was broadcast ing l ive two of its three and half daily 
hours on the air. 
Hanoi Radio and TV Station 
The same model used for Hue Radio station was applied to Hanoi Rad io and TV 
station. Journal ists in Hanoi Rad io and TV are experienced. Besides applying the basic 
methods of vox pop and real-time information to rad io, these ski l ls are also used in 
te levision production. It takes much effort for Hanoi Rad io and TV station to compete 
with the many kinds of media in the capital .  Th is competition is why its radio programs 
are not drawing the attent ion of many l isteners yet. 
Can Tho Radio and TV Station 
The Can Tho Radio and TV station broadcasts between eight to ten hours per day, 
in the morn ing, afternoon and even ing. As with other local stations, it relays VOV 
programs for a couple of hours per day. Before the start of train ing at the station, there 
was a determ ination to begin l ive broadcasts with or without Swed ish assistance, and 
Can Tho actual ly started to broadcast l ive 10 minutes per day. The same model as for 
Hanoi and Hue Radio stations was appl ied for Can Tho Radio when the project started 
there. Reporters and techn icians from Hanoi and Hue Radio Station were inv ited to the 
introductory workshop and acted as assistant trainers for Swedish experts. For the fi rst 
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time in the project, Can Tho station personnel were introduced to and trained in the use 
of d igital editing equ ipment. 
As in Hue, the Can Tho Radio and TV station arranged training courses for d istrict 
radio stations in the province. Reporters and technicians from the provincial station 
visited seven d istrict rad io stations, acting as trainers. The training opened up 
opportun ities for cooperat ion between the provincial radio and the d istrict rad io stations. 
Can Tho Radio and TV station thus has been a good example for the eleven prov inces in 
the Mekong delta. 
The train ing ended with a workshop for all n ineteen provincial radio stations in the 
south, the pilot rad io stations and officials from Voice of Vietnam, the Min istry of 
Culture and Information, and the Min istry of Planning and Investment. Can Tho Radio 
and TV station was now broadcasting l ive three t imes a day; in the early morning, at 
noon and in the early evening, a total of three and a half hours of its n ine hours on the 
air. 
Results of the Pilot Phase 
The two-year pi lot phase of the Swed ish-Vietnamese project 'Support to Provincial 
Radio in Vietnam ' ended in December 1995 . Live rad io programs are now being 
broadcast s ix days a week from the three participating provincial rad io stations. The 
staff and d irectors of these stations are enthusiastic about the new working methods in 
journal ism, management procedures, and technical improvements. The project is wel l 
known among other journal ists and there have been a number of articles about it in the 
press. 
The project has been fortunate in at least two respects. First, the tim ing has been 
right. The project has fitted wel l into the present Vietnamese renovation pol icy, 
launched in 1986, towards a more open and participatory society. Undoubtedly there is 
a demand from the publ ic, from journal ists, editors and rad io staff, for reforms in the 
media sector - a process that first started in the print media. One main argument for this 
'doi moi journal ism ' is that a market economy needs a wel l - informed publ ic to work 
wel l .  Judging from the existing wide range of economic and other special ised 
magazines, this point has been understood by Vietnamese decision-makers. 
Second, the project was lucky in its selection of project managers. Managers and 
staff from the three rad io stations are very enthusiastic, eager to learn and to change 
ways of making radio. The project has already had some positive effects during its pi lot 
phase. Apart from ach ieving its objective of in itiating l ive broadcasts with more 
interesting rad io programs and news, it has also involved ordinary people in program­
making and stimulated journal ists to become more ambitious and hardworking. 
Programs are more interest ing for l isteners in both content and form, deal ing with 
subjects of concern to an aud ience largely  consisting of farmers in these provinces. 
Interviews with ordinary people are frequent, something that never happened before. 
Another interesting innovation in broadcasting was prov iding information on dai ly 
market prices for a variety of crops and commod it ies. 
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The pilot phase was deemed successful .  It received a lot of favourable public 
attention and aroused considerable interest among the 53 provincial radio and TV 
stations in Vietnam. SIDA thus decided to continue to support and broaden the project 
to other local rad io stations in the country, for the th ree years 1 996- 1998. 
However, in order to obtain better project results, there are several aspects which 
need to be improved. 
When the pilot project started, the project document was mainly prepared by 
Swed ish experts. The main driving force in the project was also the Swed ish team. 
Now, however, the pi lot phase is over, and before the project enters a normal and more 
stable phase a more sustainable organ isation must be formed. The responsibil ity, the 
'ownersh ip'  of the project has to be transferred to a competent Vietnamese counterpart . 
The organ isation of the project has to be decentral ised, with a continued focus on the 
provincial station level , and without adm in istrative red tape. 
For better control of the second phase of the project, a Management Board was 
formed, with representatives from concerned departments within Voice of Vietnam. 
The project document was worked out by the Management Board of the project at the 
Voice of Vietnam. At present the rad io sector in Vietnam is undergoing a learning 
process in the production of l ive broadcasts. With the experience gained during the 
implementation of the pilot phase of the project, 'Upgrading the prov incial rad io 
stations in Vietnam ' ,  it is expected that the Voice of Vietnam, with its network 
throughout the country, can continue to apply this model to other local stat ions without 
any external support later on. 
It is hoped that, with the changes in organ isation, the rad io project will run wel l ,  
and that SIDA's contribution in the process of doi moi in Vietnam in general and in the 
course of changing the way of making l ive rad io program in particular, will be of help 
for Vietnam. 
In May 1 998, Swedish Radio and Voice of Vietnam signed an agreement on 
bilateral cooperation, which serves to supplement the current US$3 mi l l ion project 
funded by SIDA to support local rad io in l ive broadcast ing until 1 999. 
SIX 
INSTANT NOODLE PROPAGANDA: 
VIETNAM TELEVISION IN THE LATE 1990s 
Jan Forrester 
In 1 973, when I first came to Hanoi, capital of what was sti l l  the Democratic 
Republ ic of Vietnam, international phone cal ls were an exotic experience. Routed 
through Moscow, they often disappeared into infin ity. The system could deliver a 
telegram, including an encoded cablegram, qu ickly and without fai l .  Real-t ime 
conversations were problematic, however, for a government obsessed with control l ing 
information. 
With the spectacular col lapse of Communist regimes in the former Soviet Un ion 
and Eastern Europe, Vietnam was exposed to a new set of international real ities. Since 
opening its doors to market forces in 1989, Vietnam has ridden the bumpy and 
sometimes winding road of doi moi, or renovat ion. The magn itude of economic and 
social changes is huge. Smuggled goods now flow across the country 's borders and 
undercut the prices of legally imported products. Clothing comes from Thailand, apples 
and appl iances from China and hard drugs from Myanmar and Laos. Tourists now 
comb the country in a way un imaginable a decade ago. Information is traversing 
borders via modern telecommun ications, the Internet, international short-wave rad io and 
satel l ite television. 
In opening its doors to market forces and the ambiguous blessings of global isation 
Vietnam is also confronting powerful international forces of information technology, 
consumer culture and mass media - the latter a commodity to be bought and sold and 
not the more recognisable tool of propaganda and nation-bu i ld ing. 
Vietnamese authorities respond to economic or social challenges in a number of 
establ ished ways: by observing what happens in China, a 1000-year old habit of 
necessity; through long d iscussions to ensure decisions by consensus which often 
produce no clear d irection; and by reacting to a crisis. The col lapse of communism in 
Europe and the Soviet Union was one such crisis. Satel l ites in the sky showering 
unwanted cultural and pol itical ' products ' over Vietnam was another - cyberspace 's 
equivalent of the old imperial ist gunboat in  the harbour, demanding access to local 
markets. Satel l ite television has confronted the bel ief of many Asian governments that 
they sti l l  have control of the media agenda in their own countries, or more explicit ly the 
information and cultural agendas. 
This is particularly true in Vietnam where all mass media, television, press and 
radio, support an information flow from the top down and from the centre out. It is st i l l  
essential ly the same system used during what Vietnamese call the American war: 
through an efficient information network the most junior cadre behind the l i nes in 
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southern Vietnam was wel l- informed about Communist Party pol icy, war strategy, and 
what was required of her or him. 
With in Vietnam 's Commun ist Party the generation wh ich fought the American war 
and, in many cases, the French and the Chinese as wel l ,  sti l l  controls Vietnam 's 
pol itical, admin istrative, information and cultural institutions as wel l  as mass 
organ isations. A siege mental ity sti l l  motivates many of these old guards of the 
revolution, who see themselves as protectors against ' peacefu l evolution ' ,  an alleged 
American-led campaign promoting democratic values but aimed at defeating social ism 
forever. They were in the forefront of the country's wars of national l iberation within 
the last half-century in wh ich mi l l ions of Vietnamese died. In the transition from 
social ism to a market economy they see pol i t ical and economic stab il ity as paramount to 
Vietnam's ordered development. They see themselves as guard ians of that stabi l ity. 
Fears are expressed, particu larly by the older generation, of cultural invasion and a rapid 
prol iferation of Western pol it ical and social values. It is not a m inor issue. The 
Commun ist Party Central Committee 's mid- 1998 Plenum was devoted to formulating a 
pol icy to combat this perceived invasion . 
It is endlessly fascinating to view the real ities of modern, changing Vietnam 
superimposed on the template of old, revolut ionary socialism on any one of Vietnam 
Television 's channels. This state-run organ isation st i l l  operates as an information or 
propaganda arm of the Party and Government. Yet it is also a revenue-generating 
commercial entity. Private market research, a relatively new phenomenon in Vietnam, 
ind icates aud iences want less propaganda and more fi lms, entertainment and sport. 
Authorities recogn ise this. The chal lenge is how to del iver a mix  of programming 
wh ich serves both major stakeholders - the Party and Government on the one hand, and 
audiences on the other. 
This description of how Vietnam's state-run television has responded, on-screen as 
wel l as off-screen, to Vietnam's h istoric change of d i rection after the fal l  of 
Commun ism in Europe and the massive challenge of global television, is formed largely 
from my own observations of the television industry in Vietnam over a period of 5 
years. Television has emerged as the most important mass media at a crit ical time when 
the government needs to intensify efforts to explain and justify changing government 
pol icies to its 77 mi l l ion people. 
Vietnamese Television in the Late 1990s - From Local to International 
Television is the dom inant mass media in Vietnam. Market research companies 
report 95 per cent of households in Hanoi and 89 per cent in Ho Chi Minh City, the 
former Saigon possess television sets. Few figures ex ist for rural areas where at least 70 
per cent of the population l ive. There the government provides financial assistance to 
enable people at commune-level throughout the country to gain access to television sets. 
Vietnam Television (VTV) is state-owned and run,  with headquarters in Hanoi .  It 
was only in the m id-1990s that Hanoi secured administrative control over provincial 
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stations, formerly under their local People 's  Committees, and a national network has 
developed. VfV Central in Hanoi possesses four channels: 
VTV 1 is a mix of general programs, including news, culture, science, entertainment 
and sport. 
VTV 2 is the science and education channel. 
VTV 3 broadcasts cultural , sports and entertainment programs. 
VfV 4 broadcasts international ly. It is primari ly aimed at Vietnamese communities in 
Europe, the Asian region and Austral ia. The capital also has a local station, Hanoi 
TV. There are three regional stations, (Da Nang and Hue in central Vietnam and 
Can Tho in the southern Mekong del ta), and there are local stations in each of the 
country 's 61  provinces. 
Accord ing to its Master Plan, VTV hopes to reach 80 per cent of Vietnam 's 
households by the year 2000, including remote mountainous border regions and 
offshore islands. About 20 mi l l ion people, nearly one-th ird of Vietnam 's population, 
l ive in the country 's mountainous regions. Most are from ethn ic minority groups, some 
of whom have, in the past, shown tendencies towards independence from lowland 
French-colonial or Vietnamese authority. They remain the poorest of Vietnam 's poor: 
most are i l l i terate and many do not speak Vietnamese. The Party and Government see 
the use of media as important in consol idating loyalty to Vietnam among groups who 
have language and cultural l inks outside its borders and across the region. 
Wh ile expand ing domestic d istribution of programs is the main task, international 
transmission of Vietnamese programming is also assuming a greater pol it ical urgency. 
After years of isolation Vietnam has joined the sate l l i te game. Programs are carried 
with in the Asian region on Measat 1. Thaicom 3 carries programming to a larger area 
bounded by Africa and Western Europe, Russia, China and Austral ia . A major aim is 
to reach Vietnamese commun ities in Europe, North America, the Asian region and 
Austral ia. Vietnam Television is trying to secure cable access for free re-broadcast of 
its channel VTV4 in regions of the United States where Vietnamese-Americans are 
concentrated. It is also trying to secu�e re-broadcast of programs through SBS in 
Austral ia .  Neither of these deals wi l l  be pol i t ical ly  easy to achieve given the antipathy 
of local emigre groups toward the Hanoi government. 
Both Vietnam Television and Rad io the Voice of Vietnam have transm itters on the 
Spratly Islands, wh ich the Vietnamese cal l Truong Sa, extending broadcast services to 
Vietnamese mi l i tary personnel stationed there. Sovere ignty over the potential ly oi l-rich 
Spratlys is contested by China and several ASEAN nations, including Vietnam. 
How Do We Run This Show? Party and Government and the Role of Television 
Vietnam Television does not operate with in a legislative framework normal in 
Western countries, or even neighbouring states l ike Malaysia or Singapore. It is tasked 
through broad ' policy' statements made at Communist Party Congresses, sections of the 
Constitution, decrees issued by the Party, and ongoing d i rectives from Party and 
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Government. Essential l y  these statements define the socio-pol i t ical and admin istrative 
roles required of Vietnam Television, which include national management of television 
throughout the country. In practice the Communist Party determines the overa l l  
strategic role and d i rection of Vietnam Television, (as i t  does a l l  media), including 
VTV's relations with international organ isations and fore ign television companies. 
Like most other heads of state media, the Director-General of Vietnam Television, 
with a rank equ ivalent to a jun ior min ister, has served t ime with the Commission for 
Cul ture and Ideology of the Communist Party's Central Committee. The Commission 
is a med ia watchdog and exercises d irect, continuing editorial control over press, 
television and rad io through regular meetings with senior media officials. These 
meetings d ictate the media's emphasis and approach to major items on the 
government's domestic and international agenda. Vietnam Television 's current 
Director-General,  Mr Ho Anh Dzung, reports admin istrat ively to the Office of the 
Government (which is the department under the Prime Min ister). VTV receives annual 
funding al located by the National Assembly through the Ministry of Finance. 
There has been discussion over the l ast few years about the formation of a media 
super-min istry combin ing television, radio and press. VTV, Radio the Voice of 
Vietnam and the Vietnam News Agency were spl i t  from the Ministry of Culture and 
Information in 1993 to form separate organ isations. This arrangement has a l lowed all 
three media arms to pursue their organ isational strategies in the new era of doi moi. 
Since editorial supervision is al ready exercised d i rectl y by the Party th rough the 
Commission for Culture and Ideology, the major advantage of amalgamation at this 
time would be increased Government control over the commercial operations of media 
or, to put it more bluntly, advertising revenue. 
Central Government control over provincial stations has been at issue s ince the 
early 1990s. In the spirit of the move to a market economy, some provincial stations 
were preparing to negotiate d irect deals with Western program providers who were 
offering free programming to cash-strapped TV stations in the hope of developing long­
term business relations. This meant that the importation of Western programs could be 
final ised outside the administrative control and ideological filter of Vietnam Television 
(and Party officials) in Hanoi .  VTV officials in Hanoi successfu l ly  lobbied the then 
Prime Min ister, Mr Vo Van Kiel, to restore authority to the centre. 
However, Hanoi has found i t  much harder to bring telev ision executives in Ho Chi 
Minh City to heel over the issue of management and programming autonomy. For what 
can only be described as pol it ical reasons, Ho Chi Minh City Television, i n  Vietnam's 
largest city, is not classified as a regional station; i t  has a lower provincial status. Prior 
to a senior management change, engineered by VTV headquarters in 1 997, there was a 
h istory of tension, and at least one spectacular d isagreement, between Ho Chi Minh 
Television and Hanoi .  Within the context of the complex relationship  between north 
and south after 1975, this imbroglio ind icated to Hanoi how control over even· domestic 
media has changed. 
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Tensions came to a head in 1994, when VTV headquarters in Hanoi agreed to 
national l y  network a Japanese series, 'Osh in ' ,  on Sunday nights. The series was funded 
by a group of multi-national Japanese companies through a local l y-based advert ising 
agency. This was free programming for VTV from an important source. Vietnam 
Television executives were keen to build firm relationships with the Japanese 
government and business sector. In Laos the Japanese government had funded the 
construction of national television studios and the Vietnamese hoped to conclude a 
similar, larger deal for Hanoi .  'Osh in '  was the first deal VTV executives had negotiated 
involving a foreign series and national advertising of such magn itude. It looked simple: 
Vietnam has only one time zone and Ho Chi Minh City is the country 's largest single 
advertising market. 
The management of Ho Chi Minh City Television, backed by the People 's 
Committee of the city, refused to broadcast the series through its station. They objected 
to Hanoi 's  dicta! on a simul taneous network broadcast, criticised the large number of 
clustered advertisements considered disruptive to viewers' enjoyment of the program, 
and took exception to Hanoi accents in the local ly-dubbed version. The Japanese 
companies had also provided Vietnam Television in Hanoi with equipment to dub the 
program in  multiple voices, as opposed to the normal practice of using a single voice for 
al l  characters. 
The Director-General of Vietnam Television flew to Ho Chi Minh City to resolve 
the situation, yet could not persuade Ho Chi Minh City Television officials to change 
their position. In the end a simultaneous broadcast occurred in Ho Chi Minh City 
because VTV headquarters qu ickly establ ished a new channel, by erecting a new 
antennae in the city and feeding the program by satel l ite from Hanoi. As th ings turned 
out, 'Osh in '  became a very popular soapie and spawned a new word in Vietnamese : 
Oshin is now a slang word for maid. 
Politics and the Top Job at Vietnam Television 
The current Director General of VTV, Mr Ho Anh Dzung, was appointed to the 
position in January 1994. In 1997 he narrowly missed selection to the Party Central 
Committee in the final round. Fol lowing this he was invited to stand for election to the 
National Assembly and secured a seat in the 1997 elections. These moves constitute Mr 
Dzung gaining the required status with in the Party to underpin his position as head of 
national television. 
His predecessor was Mr Pham Khac Lam, whose demise had been rumoured in 
Hanoi during 1 993. It came swiftly  in early January 1 994. Mr Lam had an open, 
engaging personal style, which appealed to many foreigners. During 1993 he had 
separate d iscussions in Hanoi with US businessman Rupert Murdoch and Austral ian 
media entrepreneur Kerry Packer. Kerry Packer's company, Publishing and 
Broadcasting Limited, is involved in a business co-operation contract with the Ministry 
of Planning and Investment to produce an Engl ish-language business weekly, the 
Vietnam Investment Review. 
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Mr Packer reportedly proposed to VTV executives the establ ishment of a horse­
racing satel l ite TV channel, with betting agencies on the ground throughout east Asia. 
It was a monumental pol it ical blunder in a country where gambl ing is seen as a major 
'social evi l '  and official ly banned. Mr Packer's foray into Vietnam has repercussions 
years later: Vietnam Television officials still verbal ise their suspicions of any television 
company or station with l inks to Mr Packer's Channel 9 network, its affil iates or any 
television company in which Channel 9 has shareholdings (such as the Austral ian 
Televis ion Network, Channel 7). 
Rupert Murdoch 's dom inant role in international satel l ite television programming 
caused the Vietnamese, among others, some anxiety. After a long isolation imposed by 
the American economic embargo, Vietnamese were in the early stages of learn ing to 
deal with the real ities of their open-door pol icy. Earl ier in 1 993, Mr Murdoch had made 
his famous statement that authoritarian governments could not withstand the force of 
modern telecommunications technology. To welcome Murdoch in Hanoi so soon after 
that statement was h igh-risk pol itics and Mr Lam paid the price by losing his job. 
By contrast, the current Director General ,  Mr Dzung, has succeeded in securing a 
$US 300-400 mil l ion dol lar soft loan from the Japanese government, which final ly 
agreed to bui ld and equip the new stud io complex for Vietnam Television. Mr Murdoch 
has mended his fences with the Vietnamese to the extent that several of his Star TV 
channels are included in VTV's Multi-channel Microwave Distribution System 
(MMDS), and his execut ives have secured some free-to-air television deals with VTV. 
Gone Global 
Vietnam Television is now operating with in a world vastly different from that of 
1 987, when, as a mere department with in Voice of Vietnam radio, i t  was separated from 
that organ isation. In the last decade entertainment options have expanded greatly, for 
urban Vietnamese in particular. Foreign videos, which were i l legal to import only a few 
years ago, are now avai lable in profusion at corner video rental shops. Pirate videos of 
recent Hol lywood film releases are becoming the norm. A pirate copy of 1 998 
Academy Award winner Titanic was on sale in Vietnam 's ci t ies with in days of its 
cinema release in north America. 
Film preferences have become one way of defin ing class among Vietnamese : the 
' lower class ' watches Chinese ' instant noodle '  or kung fu video films from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, while the so-called educated class watches Japanese, mainland Chinese or 
Western dramas on video or television. Karaoke has gripped Vietnam firmly  by the 
throat and, whi le the broadcast of overseas Vietnamese singers, primari ly  from the 
USA, are not perm itted on Vietnam Television, most back-street karaoke bars play them 
extensively. The Internet was introduced to Vietnam in late 1997 after authorities 
created firewalls, particularly  against information posted by overseas Vietnamese. 
With in a snort t ime subscription appl ications were running wel l  ahead of the official 
ceiling on numbers of Internet accounts. Internet cafes have been establ ished. in Hanoi 
and, as in other countries, computer-l iterate young Vietnamese are opening 'group '  
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accounts. These same young Vietnamese are not perm itted access to Internet accounts 
establ ished in their offices: the hierarchy of access to information is control led by 
trusted Party members, especial ly in media organ isations. 
Simi lar controls fai led to stop the entry of sate l l ite television into Vietnam, 
however. In 1993, sate l l ite television d ishes began to sprout on rooftops in Hanoi and 
Ho Chi Minh City, despite official attempts to l im it them to Party officials, hotels and 
expatriates. The issu ing of l icences for sate l l ite d ishes formal ly  rests with the Min istry 
of Cul ture and Information but i l l egal insta l lation expanded despite interm ittent 
attempts to contain it, includ ing old-fash ioned rooftop survei l lance by local peoples' 
committees. City apartment dwel lers often combine resources to pay for smal l ,  cheap 
Taiwanese or Chinese d ishes, or invest in the more expensive rotatable types. 
Vietnamese Responses 
The government's strategic response to the chal lenge of satel l ite television has been 
a calculated ' l iberal isation ' of foreign broadcasts to permit, indeed assist, their re latively 
cheap entry so as to control d istribution .  Vietnam Television establ ished i t s  Mult i  
channel Microwave Distribution System (MMDS) service in Hanoi,  in September, 
1 996. A service is also operating in Ho Chi Minh City, and there are plans to extend 
MMDS to other major centres, such as Haiphong and Dalal. 
At first glance it is not a cheap system given average local incomes: $US200 for 
instal lation and month ly  fees of $US12  in Hanoi and $US30 in Ho Ch i Minh City. Like 
access to sate l l ite TV, current MMDS access is officia l ly l im ited to Party officials, 
hotels and expatriates. However, i t  is relatively easy to instal l an antennae, costing 
around $US80, at the end of a long bamboo pole .  This is increasingly what urban 
Vietnamese are doing. But that route to a cheap MMDS service may end soon. 
Vietnam Television plans to encode the MMDS signals in 1998, and charge for the 
decoder. 
The Hanoi MMDS service currently broadcasts nine channels. This includes CNN 
(for which Vietnam Television pays $US25,000 per year), the French TV5, OPT, 
Discovery, NBC, MTV, TNT (wh ich includes hugely popular cartoon programs), Star 
Sports and Vietnam Television channel '\ TVl .  Ho Chi Minh City currently broadcasts 
12 channels. 
The Vietnamese government has made a decis ion not to censor programs selected 
for broadcast through the MMDS service. To do so on a p iecemeal basis would involve 
huge resources. The government wi l l  s imply find it easier to exclude pol itica l ly  
problematic channels should any programming offend. 
Financing the Future 
As mentioned earl ier, Vietnam Television does not operate within a legislative 
framework common to Western countries. The National Assembly al locates an annual 
budget which is d isbursed quarterly by the Min istry of Finance. However, due to 
l iquid ity problems within Vietnam 's finance system, the Min istry of Finance can never 
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guarantee VTV will receive the entire quarterly amount due. This is not a problem 
un ique to television, but i t  ensures that long-term program planning is d ifficult .  
Advertising is currently the only other major source of recurrent funding. 
Accord ing to VTV sources, 1997 revenue col lected by television stations nationwide 
was approximately US$25 mi l l ion. Vietnam Television in Hanoi col lected 
approx imately $US12  m i l l ion and retained only about ten per cent, or $US1 .2 mi l l ion, 
which was ploughed back into program production. The remainder went to the State 's 
consol idated revenue coffers. Whi le advertising revenue has increased over the last 
three years, television rates in Vietnam are sti l l  among the lowest in the world accord ing 
to local market researchers. Currently a 60-second spot at prime time costs US$4,000, 
which is more than double the rate in late 1996. A more jud icious pricing pol icy over 
the last several years could have earned television considerably  more revenue. 
Finance for capital development, local production and program supply are 
continu ing issues. Television producers would l ike healthy injections of finance from 
international co-productions as wel l  as guaranteed foreign program supply. However, at 
a time when Vietnam Television is expanding across the country and market research is 
ind icating a demand for more fi lms, enterta inment and sport, the supply of free or cheap 
fore ign programs from Western companies has shrunk. 
One example of how this situat ion developed involved Austral ian entrepreneur Mr 
Kerry Packer. His company offered an in itial free supply of Austral ian programs to the 
local station, Hanoi Television. The programs proved popular. However, when the 
Vietnam lnvestme11t Review publ icised its 1994 Memorandum of Understanding with 
Hanoi Television, i t  alerted Vietnam Televis ion executives to yet another local TV deal 
which was happen ing outside their control - and the control of nationwide telev ision 
management entrusted to VTV by the Party. The Prime Min ister was successfu l ly  
lobbied by VTV executives and Party officials to  restore control of  al l  television 
stations, including business deals with foreign program providers, to the Director­
General of Vietnam Television. The Vietnam /11vestme11t Review deal lapsed when the 
Eighth Communist Party Congress in 1997 subsequently defined the electronic media as 
a segment of the economy which was not open to foreign investment. In the legal 
uncertainty wh ich surrounded this pronouncement the Vietnam fllvestmellt Review was 
unwill ing to commit  further funds to developing business in Vietnam. 
It is estimated that around 65 per cent of fi lms rented from video stores (and shown 
on Vietnamese Television) are from China (including Hong Kong) and Taiwan. Many 
of these fi lms, as wel l  as those from the West, are pirated. Just a few years ago Vietnam 
Television effectively pirated most of its foreign programs d irectl y from sate l l ite 
television. However, a December 1997 copyright agreement signed between the US 
and Vietnam has had the effect of drastical ly slashing the number of American 
programs available to VTV: fees charged for many recently-produced programs are wel l  
beyond VTV's budget. Movie theatres have been h i t  even more heavi ly. Local movie 
production has not expanded to fi l l  this gap. Vietnamese-produced fi lms account for 
less than 20 per cent of total fi lms currently shown on television and through video. 
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Programming 
As iti other State organisations, staff members at Vietnam Television have second 
or third jobs, often carried out during office hours. It is a widespread but official ly­
tolerated practice because of the low salaries paid to television managers and staff. The 
effects on operational efficiency are considerable.  
TV editorial pol icy is also directly affected by on-the-job commercial activities, 
specifical ly  journal ists charging for news coverage. Those who understand the system 
can ini tiate a news item on prime-time Vietnamese-, French- or Engl ish language News 
programs. Whilst a 60-second prime-time national advertising spot costs US$4,000, 
similar length national news coverage costs around US$ 40-50. This informal fee is 
shared between one journal ist and one or two crew. A journal ist 's month ly base salary 
is around US$100. 
In a standard news bul letin, domestic news which is important to the Party and 
Government still assumes prominence, fol lowed by international news cul led from 
overseas networks, followed by paid-for local news items. In this State-owned 
commercial entity news editorial values are thus influenced by a d isarmingly 
straightforward commercial ism as wel l  as the information needs of the Party and 
Government. 
In other programming areas there have been noticeable improvements in techn ical 
production, and more creative camera-work and soph isticated editing in entertainment 
productions. Intrigu ingly, this has mainly occurred in onstage productions of western 
jazz or classical music; the approach to Vietnamese popular and classical music retains 
a romantic engagement with outside locales. 
The Party and Government sti l l  requ i re the production of state-sanctioned 
' trad itional ' and modern cultural performances, reflecting a static view of the role of the 
performing arts. Traditional dramas are often moral tales designed to inform the 
present, whi le young Vietnamese observe that modern dramas, particularly those 
produced in Hanoi, are only  just beginning to detach themselves from a preoccupation 
with the American war and its aftermath. Educational programs on the screen merely 
repl icate the classroom, complete with b : . 1ckboard, chalk and an adul t  authority figure: 
there is l ittle understanding of the role  of television in modern approaches to learning. 
By contrast, there have been considerable  attempts to l iven up the presentation and 
production style of young people 's  entertainment programs. One can sense, in a basic 
and very tentative way, the influence of MTV production values at work in these 
programs. Television programs involving young, demonstrative audiences are very 
recent in Vietnam. A qu iz show, where universit ies and schools across the country 
compete with one another, was an almost instant success with aud iences when 
introduced in  1 996. 
Quiz topics remain ideological ly driven, however, conforming to the old model of 
top-down indoctrination. In one quiz show competing universities were asked to 
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perform skits on the dangers of social evils. In another they were required to discuss 
Vietnam 's pol icy on industrial isation and modern isation. Several men in black in the 
front row - authority figures not bouncers - remind us this show is under control .  
However, it is a giant step away from the trad it ional decorum of young people's and 
chi ldren 's programs of just  a few years ago. It is also testament to the Party 's belated 
efforts to respond to the entertainment needs of Vietnam 's young population. 
Television Staff 
Although production styles are changing, management methods at Vietnam 
Television are sti l l  infl uenced, as is the entire state sector, by the old Stal in ist style of 
top-down control layered on top of a French-colonial bureaucratic system, and a much 
older h ierarch ical Confucian regime. Decisions are made at the top and staff informed. 
Changes demanded are often peremptory and at short notice. In rea l i ty this method of 
management is weak and often counter-productive. Attempts to institute piecemeal 
changes at departmental level fai l ;  individual and col lective passive resistance to 
management has been a common staff react ion. 
The results can be seen on TV screens: news presenters memorise their scripts, 
hav ing refused to use autocue. This is possible because of the remarkable ed itorial 
caution at work in Vietnam's electron ic media : l ike most programs the 'News '  is pre­
recorded hours before broadcast. Such resistance often serves a particu lar area or group 
of workers, such as techn ical staff or producers, to maintain what they perceive to be 
the ir superior position in the production hierarchy. 
As in many national broadcast organ isations where the techn ical department is 
trad itional ly powerful ,  a major chunk of television 's budget has been al located to 
expand ing techn ical infrastructure in order to extend television transmission: new 
technology at the expense of greater investment in the real future of broadcasting, the 
staff. Such an investment would requ ire a change in emphasis away from fixation on 
technology toward human resource development. It probably  requires noth ing less than 
a major institutional reform of the organ isation. Initial steps should include an overhaul 
of staffing pol icies, including recru itment, pay scales which include incentives, a 
train ing program wh ich ties the introduction of new technology to more efficient work 
pract ices, a greater focus on aud ience by all staff, long-term resource planning, and a 
system of forward production planning. Many of these issues have been under 
discussion with in the organ isation for some years. 
In add it ion to a variety of foreign programming through MMDS, and part ly in 
response to it, local free-to-air television has increased broadcast hours and introduced a 
variety of new programs. VTV executives have used the introduction of MMDS as a 
means to precipitate a change in production values within their own program staff. 
Television executives are now more l ikely to h i re younger staff who are university­
educated, rather than people with Party connect ions. The graduates are better able to 
deal with and reflect the complexit ies of a rapidly-changing society. 
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Nonetheless, in the near future it is difficult to envisage a state media which is not 
co-opted by the existing pol it ical system. Within this system many individuals do push 
to open up d iscussion on a range of 'sensitive ' issues, through drama, features or current 
affai rs .  These people risk a comfortable ex istence, even their careers, in  resisting self­
censorship or pol i t ical pressure to portray sign ificant problems in Vietnamese society, 
only to be regarded by many officials as promoting ' negat ivism ' .  
Research 
Fal l ing costs in technology and the fact that Vietnam produces relatively cheap 
programs and has access to cheap or free foreign fi lms, has al lowed VTV to keep pace 
with shifting aud ience demand, especially the demand for fi lms, sport and 
entertainment. However, there is l i tt le research on television in Vietnam.  Market 
research companies, driven by the needs of advertisers, provide the only ongoing local 
analysis of viewers ' habits and preferences. Local research institutions and fore ign non­
government organ isations have carried out sporadic research on aspects of social 
marketing. However there is no sustained, independent study of television as a cultural, 
social or pol itical i nstitution in Vietnam. 
While the State had a tight monopoly over media there was no reason to actively 
research aud ience preferences and habits. Until the m id-1990s, few officials in the 
Party, Government or Vietnam Television considered aud ience research important. A 
research uni t  within the Min istry of Information and Cul ture wrote (and probably sti l l  
writes) lengthy d issertations on what people slzould be interested in watch ing on 
television. Satel l ite television changed that. 
One event i l lustrated the shift in audience expectations in a striking way. In 1 994, 
Vietnam Television broadcast the World Cup l ive via satel l ite for the first t ime. During 
the contest North Korea's leader, Kim II Sung, d ied. The t im ing of his death was most 
unfortunate for footbal l -crazy Vietnamese. It happened during the quarter-finals. With 
the most populous country in mainland South-east Asia del ivered to advertisers on a 
platter, and i l legal betting rings expanding as the Cup progressed, Vietnam Television 
broadcast a long eulogy. The phones at VTV rang hot with irate viewers, a 
commonplace response in other parts of '.he world,  but unprecedented in Vietnam. 
Culture and Television 
Cultural programming on local television, including drama, perform ing, folk and 
visual arts, is often not much more than state-promoted, static versions of ' trad it ional ' 
culture. Culture, l i ke ideology and information, remains the servant of the bureaucrats. 
Vietnam has had almost twenty years without a major confl ict, has instituted the 
econom ic pol icy of doi moi, and opened up the possibi l ity of economic and social 
choices for many Vietnamese. Yet this open door pol icy has not extended to the arts, 
except in tentative, short bursts. The control over culture exerted by the Party and 
Government is exercised through state-funded cultural  organ isations, most of which are 
suffering serious crises of direction . 
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In the recent past, and in the face of what they saw as a foreign cultural invasion 
precipitated by the open-door pol icy, Vietnamese officials have burnt offending books, 
shut down karaoke bars, ordered the Vietnamisation of foreign-language signage on 
shops and businesses, and roundly denounced foreign 'social evi ls' ,  all to l ittle effect. 
Televis ion has been thoroughly co-opted in this defeatist response. Nonetheless, many 
ord inary urban Vietnamese also feel anx iety at what they see as a foreign cul tural 
onslaught through tabloid newspapers, videos, sate l l ite television and now the Internet. 
Preserving and renewing national cul tures in an age of global television and the 
international commoditisation of culture is a complex business. The Party and 
Government are not yet wi l l ing to risk a cul tural doi moi. 
Old cul tural practices are resurfacing There has been a noticeable revival of local 
vi l lage festivals, wh ich often honour legendary local historical figures or deities. The 
Buddh ist pilgrimage season, which fol lows Vietnamese New Year, is now witness to 
massive crowds v isit ing major temples and shrines offering prayers for good fortune. 
There is a resurgence of soothsayers and shamanistic practice - both official l y  frowned 
upon by the Party. Such practices can be shrugged off as folk practices, but they run 
deep and long in Vietnamese history. 
In the performing, l i terary and visual arts however, loosening the Party 's reins of 
control would be fundamenta l ly  dangerous to many stalwarts. In the current stalemate 
young Vietnamese performers, writers and artists are frustrated in their efforts to 
explore new creative directions and contemporary themes in an ever more complex 
society. The effects of this cultural stasis continue to permeate cultural  and media 
institutions a l ike. 
Conclusions: The Same Old Noodles? 
The screws on Vietnam's economy may have loosened after 1 989, yet despite a 
h ighly calculated ' l iberal isation ' of access to foreign satel l ite television, control of 
domestic information remains tight, as does control over Hanoi-based foreign med ia. 
For domestic audiences the sweetener is a greater injection of films into the television 
d iet. But TV is running wel l  behind what the video market can offer. 
State media, including television, exists foremost to serve the pol it ical 
establ ishment. Journal ists, script-writers and producers are used in the ideological 
struggle against aspects of ' negativism' ,  such as corruption and social evils. Many in 
the rul ing establ ishment understand that the old methods of domestic propaganda wi l l  
not work in future :  more soph ist icated methods of producing information, culture, 
drama, entertainment and ch i ldren 's programs are needed, not just in technique and 
style, but also in substance. Changes have begun, and this has produced expectations 
for faster change, especia l ly  among young Vietnamese in urban areas who have access 
to MMDS, sate l l ite TV and the Internet. For Party trad itional ists any changes must 
include adherence to basic social ist tenets; they are looking for ways to adapt without 
yielding any ground. 
. 
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In balancing i ts foreign relationsh ips to ensure ul t imate independence from just one 
or two major sources, VTV has secured capital finance as wel l  as program supply and 
training from a range of foreign sources. The future supply of programming will be 
more costly than i t  has been. The in i t ial goodwi l l  shown by program providers, who 
suppl ied free material in the hope of future business cooperation, has all but dried up, 
due to changes in Vietnamese pol icy regard ing foreign investment in the electronic 
media. In the future Vietnam Television will have to chase programming deals from a 
range of sources and pay copyright fees l i ke everyone else. 
With in Vietnam Television there have been considerable changes in production 
values, as the organisation responds to the information and cul tural role assigned to it in 
the post-doi moi period, and to the chal lenge to old production values posed by satel l ite 
television. These days fewer people refer to the evening news as 'newspapers on 
television ' ,  a term once used to describe the wooden del ivery of text l ifted straight from 
the Vietnam News Agency, although some provincial stations sti l l  flash newspapers 
c l ippings on-screen and read excerpts mindlessly. Whi le seeking a range of industry 
relationsh ips, Vietnam wi l l  continue to watch how television develops in China, the 
country which is both its ancient cultural source and perpetual pol it ical quandary. Most 
Vietnamese are acutely aware of the ir inescapable geopol i t ical destiny on the southern 
flank of China, the ' northern invader' of legend, or, as even young Vietnamese say, ' the 
problem without a solution ' .  
Considerable money and effort is being spent extending domestic programming by 
sate l l i te across Vietnam and beyond its borders to the immediate region, to Vietnamese 
communities in the former eastern bloc, and to emigre communit ies in France, the 
United States and Austral ia. In push ing its televis ion programming across the world the 
Vietnamese government is looking squarely at the future. And, in unforeseen ways 
internat ional isation of the electron ic media and generational change may alter soc ial 
dynamics with in  Vietnam and Vietnamese communit ies overseas. As television 
pictures of Vietnamese society are beamed across the globe by sate l l ite, the Commun ist 
Party del iberates the uniqueness of Vietnamese culture and its survival in  the global 
cultural marketplace. The i rony is understood by some in Vietnam Television, if not by 
Party officials charged with enforcing , ;tabi l i ty '  am idst the country 's socio-economic 
transformation. 
SEVEN 
THE CHANGING FACE OF VIETNAMESE CINEMA 
DURING TEN YEARS OF RENOVATION 1986-1996 
Ngo Phuong Lan 
(Translated from Vietnamese by Pham Thu Thuy) 
The beginning of Vietnamese fi lm-making dates half a century later than that of the 
international film industry in 1895. In 1953 a national fil m  studio was establ ished, and 
1959 saw production of the first motion picture in the Democratic Republ ic of Vietnam. 
In the eyes of the world, Vietnamese cinema remains relative ly unknown. Many 
overseas cinema-goers often think of Vietnamese fi lms mere ly as propaganda, the main 
objective of which is to depict the war in that country. Indeed, al l  the pictures wh ich 
have won international recognit ion at major fi lm festivals over the years only deal with 
the war. These include: Chi Tu Hau (Fourth Older Sister Hau) in 196 1 ;  Vi Tuye11 1 7  
Ngay va Dem (The Seventeenth Paral le l ,  Day and Night) in 1973; M e  Va11g Nha 
(Mother is not at Home) in 1980; and Cw1h Do11g How1g (The Uncult ivated Field) in 
1979. For decades, the term 'war cinema' was an accurate description of the fi lm 
industry in Vietnam. Vietnamese cinema followed close ly the Vietnamese people's 
long and fierce struggle to preserve national independence and to un ify the country. 
Motion pictures were considered not only artistic creations, but also revolutionary 
instruments to foster patriotism and national pride, and to boost morale. 
But the war ended more than twenty years ago. The return of peace, together with a 
host of complex social and fami ly problems during the post-war era, provide abundant 
material for the making of a vibrant Vietnamese cinema. Today, i t  is no longer relevant 
nor appropriate to d iscuss Vietnamese motion pictures in terms of 'war films'  and 
' propaganda ' .  
Since the Sixth Congress of  the Vietnamese Communist Party (late 1986), the 
period of renovation has generated many changes in society. Literary and artistic fields 
were invigorated by a fresh wind - the wind of creative freedom, truth and honesty in 
examining pressing social issues. Leading the movement of renovation was the press, 
followed by l i terature and theatre. Changes in cinema seem to have been a l ittle slower. 
We all know that fi lm-making is both an intricate art form as wel l  as a commercial 
venture. Producing a fi lm requires not only the col lective creative energy and artistic 
labour of many people, but also a lot of investment capita l ,  equ ipment and technology. 
Th is un ique feature of fi lm-making may be an important  reason why film-makers often 
do not have the freedom and power to control the entire production process that a news 
reporter, a writer, a songwriter, a painter or even a playwright can exercise with their 
own work . . Ten years of renovation, however, is t ime enough to create a new look for 
the Vietnamese film industry. If we compare the film industry in Vietnam· to a ship 
(which was also the image used at the l l th Vietnamese National Fi lm Festival held in 
92 Ngo Phuong Lan 
Hanoi toward the end of November 1996), then for the past ten years, this ship has 
many a time rocked and pitched in  the waves, forcing itself to weather the storms and 
remain steady. And the losses and gains of this film-making sh ip during the past ten 
years have left their mark on the industry. 
The film Co Cai Tren Song (The Girl on the River), made in 1977 and directed by 
Dang Nhat Minh, can be considered to mark the beginn ing of the new and revital ised 
c inema. The central character, a prostitute l iving on the Perfumed River in Hue, is an 
historical eye witness. This woman was once wil l ing to risk her own l ife to save a 
revolutionary cadre, whom she idol ised, and also assumed that his love was reserved for 
her. She could not know that she would be his saviour and protector only when war was 
raging around them. Later, in times of peace, she became a victim of his ingrati tude and 
betrayal .  In those circumstances, she would have been unable to l ift herself out of pain 
and despair had it not been for the support of her old school mate, previously drafted to 
fight for the former southern regime and more recently undergoing re-education. 
Ironical l y, the person who u ltimately exposes the truth is a news reporter who is also the 
ungrateful cadre 's  wife. 
When the film was first screened i t  created a debate, because for decades people 
had been accustomed to seeing a b!ack and white depiction of the war: we are the good 
guys and the enemy are the bad guys; we win and the enemy loses. This is not to deny 
that in the Vietnam war, the just cause (chinh nghia) was on the side of the Vietnamese 
people,  who were only defending their country and their independence. However, 
sometimes human beings cannot be forced to confine their feel ings and emotions within 
the parameters of impersonal h istory. That is one of l ife 's b ig paradoxes. Prior to 
renovation, it was very difficul t  to depict such irony on film .  In this movie, the way in 
which the news reporter uncovers the truth, and her husband 's remorse - though belated 
- clearly reflect the atmosphere of change and renewal in Vietnamese society. 
In the 1980s, several other pictures also succeeded in enrich ing the national fi lm 
industry with their innovative, daring viewpoint. The comedy Thi Tran Yen Tinh (A 
Quiet Little Town), fi lmed in 1986 by director Le Due Tien, pokes fun at the 
widespread problems of bureaucracy, formal ism, irresponsibi l ity and toadyism with in 
the administrative system. In Ganh X ;?C Rong (An Itinerant Circus), via an old tale 
handed down oral l y  from generation to generation, d i rector Viet Linh seems to be 
warning that those who l ive by cheating and defrauding others wi l l  inevitably meet an 
unhappy ending. Also released in 1989, Tuong Ve H1111 (The General Retires}, adapted 
from the story by Nguyen Huy Thiep, and directed by Nguyen Khac Loi, sounds the 
alarm on the deterioration of moral ity and social values while depicting the lonel iness 
and isolation of a man who has spent nearly al l h is l ife on the battlefield trying to settle 
back into an ordinary civil ian existence. 
At different levels, each renovation fi lm has generated both h igh praise and 
criticism. That is not d ifficul t  to understand, considering that for decades people have 
been accustomed to thinking, l istening and speaking only in a one-sided manner. The 
emergence of many different viewpoints is also an indication of a more open and l iberal 
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atmosphere in the film industry, which is a prerequisite for the making of pictures of a 
d iverse nature. These films should carry bold messages, depicting l ife from many 
different angles and perspectives, including the negative, and at the same time they 
should also represent efforts to explore new modes of artistic expression. 
Changes in Film Production 
The pol icy of renovation in Vietnam is not only confined to the areas of l iterature 
and the arts. It is in essence an attempt to transform society by replacing the state 
subsidy system with a market economy. The transformation of the Vietnamese film 
industry a lso follows th is  path. 
Before 1989, the production, d istribution and release of motion pictures in Vietnam 
were all subsid ised by the state, which also 'supported ' financial l y  all those who worked 
in the fi lm industry. Now the industry has been cut adrift. The state has drastical ly  
reduced i ts  funding, continuing only smal l subsid ies for specific films. As a resul t, 
state-owned fi lm stud ios and companies (these are the Vietnamese Motion Picture 
Company (Hang Phim Truyen Viet Nam), the Central Company of Scientific and 
Documentary Films (Hang Phim Tai Lieu va Khoa Hoe Trung Uong), the Animation 
Fi lm Studio (Hang Phim Hoat Hinh) in Hanoi, and the Giai Phong Studio (Hang Phim 
Giai Phong) in Ho Chi Minh City] have al l  started to look for their own funding as wel l 
as financial support for al l  staff and artists. On the other hand, the state no longer holds 
a monopoly in film production. Beside the state-owned film studios, during the period 
from 1990 to 1992, the Ministry of Culture and Information issued l icences to nearly 
forty different fi lm companies set up by various mass organisations and agencies not 
directly under its authority. The vast majority of these compan ies exist in name only, 
having very l ittle capital, material resources or equipment. Money for film  production 
comes mainly from private individuals. However, because the law in Vietnam does not 
yet al low private individuals to produce motion pictures, these people must operate 
under the names of the companies that a lready possess a l icence for fi lm production. 
Consequently, from a situation in which Vietnam only had one official film  industry, 
endorsed and directed by the state throughout the subsidy period, now a commercial 
fi lm industry funded by private ind ividuals also exists. 
These commercial fi lms are largely produced in Ho Chi Minh City. Apart from 
being a form of popular entertainment, they are obviously also profit-oriented. The vast 
majority of these pictures are influenced by low-budget, B-grade movies made in 
America, Hong Kong and Taiwan, with a l l  the usual car chases, kung fu fighting, and 
forbidden love against the background of romantic scenery or spectacular affluence. A 
particularly bizarre situation has developed, perhaps seen only in Vietnam, in which 
most of these movies are filmed on video and then shown commercial ly  in local cinema 
theatres just l ike cel lu loid films. 
From 1990 to 1994 commercial fi lms were a novelty and extremely popular among 
the masses. Many film producers on ly spent around 10 thousand US dol lars on each 
video film, which would then gross hundreds of thousands of US dollars at the box 
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office. Not a few people have come to regard fi lms as mere commodi ties to be traded 
for profit aod 'fame' .  As a result ,  there seems to be a tendency to amateurise (nghiep d11 
hoa) the art of fi lm-making. Anyone with enough money can now become a film 
producer, even a script-writer, a d i rector or an actor. On the other hand, there have been 
qui te a few professional and establ ished film-makers who also tried to c l imb on the 
bandwagon, producing films purely for their commercial potential . The result is the 
emergence of a series of products which could hardly qual ify as films - products of an 
inferior quality which are hasti ly put together and therefore often dubbed ' instant 
noodles' .  Newspapers and film critics have condemned this tendency toward 
amateurisation and commercial isation in the fi lm industry. In real ity, cinema-goers 
themselves also seem to have had enough of these substandard novel ties and are slowly 
shying away from them. Cinema theatres showing these films are slowly losing their 
audience. Fol lowing a series of box-office flops, many producers have seen their entire 
capital disappear. 
After some years of setting the fi lm industry adrift in  the market economy, 
administrators in the industry have begun to see clearly the dominance of commercial 
and entertainment movies in comparison to the few serious films of h igh artistic value. 
They have detected an imbalance in fi lm production that occurs when state funding 
trickles down to only a handful of fi lms each year. This is the main reason why the 
Vietnamese fi lm industry has had to contend with seemingly insurmountable d ifficulties 
when left to fend for i tself in the market economy. Industry administrators also 
understood that fi lm-making can never be considered a purely commercial production, 
because a motion picture is first and foremost an artistic creation that has a large impact 
on society. 
As a result ,  beginning in 1 994, the State decided to re- institute subsid ies for the 
production of motion pictures. The State once again invested in the making of 
documentaries and animated fi lms. The majority of cel lu loid feature films have also 
been reassured of State subsidies. This has helped to create the right environment for 
fi lm-makers to practice their craft, producing pictures of real artistic value and social 
relevance. 
In real ity, Vietnam still suffers from poverty, and within the fi lm industry this 
translates into u tterly outdated filming equipment and poorly-equ ipped cinemas. This 
greatly affects the success of each fi lm as wel l  as the development of the fi lm industry 
as a whole,  not to mention the capacity of cinema-goers to enjoy the show. Take sound, 
for example. Members of the aud ience (especial ly  fore igners) are often very annoyed at 
the artificial qual ity of the sound and d ialogue in our films. They are used to watch ing 
movies with real sound (wh ich is recorded during fi lming, including the d ialogue), 
whereas 100 per cent of the sound in Vietnamese movies is added after filming. The 
d ialogue is also dubbed afterwards. Moreover, i t  is difficult for anyone to imagine that, 
at the time of writing, 100 per cent of movie theatres in Vietnam are st i l l  using obsolete 
monophonic sound systems. As a result of outdated technology and equipment, there is 
not much difference between watching a cel luloid fi lm and a video film.  That is the 
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reason why it has been possible to show video fil ms at movie theatres. In recent years, 
the majority of cinema-goers have opted for a cheaper and more convenient form of 
entertainment: renting a video to enjoy at home. The result is an unprecedented slump 
in business for movie theatres: about 80 per cent of these theatres have been forced to 
switch to other l ines of business to survive. Consequently, we are faced with the 
dilemma of how to bring pictures to the audience as intended since the birth of motion 
pictures: showing movies at the cinema. 
Important Issues in Film-making 
The outstand ing characteristic of those films that have enjoyed success during 
renovation is their reflection of real ity and sensitive portrayal of the h idden aspects of 
human feel ings, emotions and aspirations. 
If we compare the war films produced during the previous period and those made 
during renovation, we can detect definite changes. Previously, audiences only saw 
stereotypical heroes ful l  of self-sacrifice, honour and righteousness. Nowadays, when 
recreating the war, film-makers tend to portray their characters first and foremost as 
ordinary human beings who have weaknesses and shortcomings, who make m istakes 
that sometimes cost them their l ives, and who also cherish a dream, a desire to l ive in 
peace and happiness. 
The issues raised in these new films are very d iverse and involve problems 
originating from real l ife, which is becoming more hectic and compl icated everyday. In 
two of his most recent films, Dang Nhat Minh, considered by many the best d irector in 
Vietnam today, has skilful ly and convincingly depicted the process by which 
Vietnamese society shifted from the state subsidy system to market economy, with a l l  
i ts  advantages and disadvantages. Tro Ve (The Return), released in 1 994, describes the 
two faces of the market economy during i ts early stages: material prosperity and 
spiritual steril ity. Unl ike the urban background of Tro Ve, the 1 996 film Thuong Nho 
Do11g Que (Our Beloved Countryside) is a serene picture of the rural countryside, and 
yet, underneath al l that beauty and peace, there is a pervasive melancholy, a profound 
sympathy for the people who produce the food to feed the entire society, yet who are 
also the most disadvantaged in the 'whi rlwind of the market economy ' .  Despite their 
grindingly hard l ives, the women in the film sti l l  dream of and search for happiness, and 
peasant farmers still th ink of their home vi l lage no matter where they are. The two 
films mentioned above have greatly impressed overseas audiences, helping them to 
catch a small glimpse of Vietnam, as wel l  as inspiring them to find out more about a 
Vietnam that is not only open but also holds many secrets and surprises. 
A number of young directors have also succeeded in presenting unique and daring 
points of view in their works. The films Canh Bae (The Gamble) in 1991,  and Hay Tha 
Thu Cho Em (Please Forgive Me) in 1 992, both by director Luu Trong Ninh, explore 
the col l ision between the war-tom past and modem existence, between traditional 
values and the selfish, individualisiic way of l ife. Lively dialogues and a· fast pace 
closely resembling the rhythm of modem l ife add to the fil ms' appeal .  
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In his fi lms Luoi Dao (The Blade) in 1995, and A i  Xuoi Van Ly (Journey Ten 
Thousand Leagues From Home) in 1996, director Le Hoang reassesses the war from 
many different perspectives and recreates the horror of war in order to emphasise his 
argument: if only people had learned to love each other from the beginning then 
everything would have been so simple. The subject of war is also explored, albeit in a 
more general fashion, in the 1996 film  Bui Hong (Gone, Gone, Forever Gone), by 
director Ho Quang Minh. The d ivision of country and fami ly, the tragedy of war, 
national reunification and fami ly  reunion, a l l  of these are interwoven to create depth of 
characterisation. 
Vietnam is a country with a special h istorical and social background. It has gone 
through constant changes, alternating between war and peace. As a result, the country's 
h istory offers an abundant, fascinating source of material for film-making. The open­
door pol icy, as wel l  as an orientation to renovate l iterature and the arts, and to promote 
creative freedom, wi l l  in the near future create conditions to allow film-makers to 
explore social issues in a real istic, unconventional, and dynamic fashion. Those 
Vietnamese films wi l l  surely attract the attention and acclaim of overseas audiences. 
EIGHT 
LAW, THE PRESS AND POLICE MURDER IN VIETNAM: THE 
VIETNAMESE PRESS AND THE TRIAL OF NGUYEN TUNG DUONG 
Mark Sidel 
A sign ificant theme of this volume and the conference that preceded it is the 
increasing but high ly  controlled flexibil ity of the Vietnamese press in  reporting issues of 
social interest. Neither ful l  autonomy nor complete censorship correctly characterises 
the Vietnamese media today; instead, the social and pol itical thermostat is always in 
shift, and editors and reporters must respond to changing external and internal ised 
signals on the reporting and publishing they can do. 1 
My modest goal here is to look at one instance - albeit a famous instance - in 
which different elements of the Vietnamese written media sought to respond to a variety 
of confl icting signals from reporters, editors, audiences, and the various sectors of the 
po l itical ,  security and legal apparatus in covering a wel l-known murder case in Hanoi. 
In this case, at least for some of the Vietnamese newspapers d iscussed here, ed itorial 
l ife existed in a complex and sh ifting state betwixt autonomy and censorship, a state in 
which the h ighly complex informal pol it ics of response to state, security and legal 
officials and to the publ ic (rather than slavish response to intensive external guidance 
from the state) played a major role in press coverage. 
Some of the commentary on the Vietnamese press and media published outside 
Vietnam in the doi moi era includes Palmos, The Vietnam Press: The unrealised 
ambition (Edith Cowan University, Perth, 1995); Nguyen Xuan Tho, Presse und Medien 
in Vietnam (Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur ostwissenschaftliche und intemationale 
Studien, Koln, 1992); Hiebert, 'New directions - Press takes bolder stand on 
corruption ', Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 February 1992, 21-22; Heng, The 'Viet 
puzzle: Media, Market and Marxists', The Straits Times, 29 November 1 993, 25; and 
Pham Thinh, 'Vietnamese media find a new role', /PI Report, July/August 1995, 37-38; 
and Templer, Wind and Shadows (1998). See also Ho Anh Thai, 'What's doi moi done 
for literature and the press, Viet Nam News?', 8 December 1996, 4-5. For an 
interesting text-cum-study of the various types of print journal ism allowed in doi moi 
Vietnam, see Due Dung and Truong dai hoe tuyen giao, Khoa bao chi (ed), Ky bao chi 
(Hanoi, Nha xuat ban Thong tin, 1992). 
The exceptionally strong central control of the Vietnamese media in the pre-doi moi era 
is described in Asia Watch Committee and Committee to Protect Journalists, Still 
Confined: Journalists in 're-education ' camps and prisons in Vietnam (1 987). For 
discussion of the continuing harsh treatment of journalists and commentators who 
publish without Party permission, see, among other sources, Asia Watch, Tire Case of 
Dow1 Viet Hoat and Freedom Fornm: Detelltion for dissent in Vietllam (3 January 
1993). 
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One way in which some Vietnamese media have sought to convert the pol i tics of 
direct external guidance into a pol itics of response to multiple, sometimes confl icting 
internal and external signals is through special isation, and the creation of flexible 
spheres for more autonomous reporting - primarily of social, economic, cultural and 
legal affairs. In doing so they have accepted the retention of strict Party and 
government l im its on the reporting of pol itical events, both at the central and local 
levels, and on the activities of Vietnam's smal l group of d issidents. By impl icitl y 
bargaining away from such reporting on pol itical and d issident matters - sometimes by 
reducing pol it ical coverage considerably - a series of national and local newspapers 
have, in effect, been granted greater autonomy to report - sometimes in controversial or 
lurid deta i l  - on a wide variety of other social, l egal and other topics. 
Thus a number of newspapers have both impl icitly been granted and have reached 
out to seize more autonomy in reporting on crime and corruption, including arbitrary 
action and corrupt behaviour by the pol ice and other authorities. The increased 
reporting on legal issues - including certain violations of law by pol ice and other 
authorities - has advantages both for the press and for a Party and government seeking 
to legitim ise a carefu l ly  controlled strengthening of legal frameworks. And so, in a 
number of cases the Vietnamese press, usual ly portrayed as subservient to and heavi ly 
controlled by the Party apparatus, has taken the lead in exposing criminal behaviour by 
police and other authorities, forcing legal and pol it ical institutions into punishing 
wrongdoers. And in a number of such cases the press has exposed and re-exposed 
wrongdoers in a more energetic manner than legal, Party or government authorities 
might have foreseen or wished, uti l ising some new-found autonomy to bolster their 
claims to represent public opinion, and at times putting heavy pressure on courts and 
prosecutors to resolve cases in accordance with the newspapers' v iews of events. All 
this fl ies in  the face of a western perception that the Vietnamese newspaper media is 
entirely control led by the Party and state. 
A Death at Tet 
Nguyen Viet Phuong was a young Vietnamese man who was born and d ied amidst 
violence in  a city many regard as one of Asia's most peacefu l .  At Tel 1 993 he was 21 ,  
born during the Christmas bombing of  1972, on  a day when American B-52s swept over 
Hanoi. His paternal great-grandfather, grandfather and maternal grandfather had been 
recognised by the state as martyrs in the resistance to the French. Phuong was a child of 
Hanoi, growing up in Ba Dinh district close to the centre of the city. He went to 
primary and m iddle school at d istrict schools and graduated from the Phan Dinh Phung 
Middle School in 1991 .  Like many Hanoi youth, he did not go on to col lege. In his 
case, the local press reported later, that was because 'his fami ly was poor, h is mother 
was chronicall y  i l l .  '2 
2 Huong Huyen, 'Ve vu ban nguoi o cau Chuong Duong', Phu nu Thu do (hereafter 
PNTD), 20 April - 5 May, 1993. 
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So l ike thousands of other Hanoi youth, l i terate but poorly trained, he went off to a 
tenuous kind oi work in Hanoi's new market economy. In October 1992 Phuong was 
hired as a temporary employee, ' to work on a contract, ' in the northern office of a 
Japanese, Hong Kong and Vietnamese joint venture company. ' He worked on 
transport, banking, del ivery, col lecting funds, paying for goods'  - largely unskil led 
service work, but a l ucky job for a relative few in the new market economy. He was 
fortunate to be in an office and out on the streets, and not in a factory.3 
We know far less about Nguyen Tung Duong, who was executed in 1 996 as a result 
of his encounter on the Chuong Duong Bridge in Hanoi with Nguyen Viet Phuong al 
Tel 1993. Duong was a pol ice l ieutenant (tnmg uy), 35 years old in 1 993, a nearly two­
decade veteran of Hanoi pol ice work serving in the Hoan Kiem d istrict of the Hanoi 
traffic pol ice (giao thong ca11h sat). He was married and had two sons. 
Nguyen Viet Phuong's work for his company often took him over the Chuong 
Duong Bridge from central Hanoi toward the suburban, industrial, fast growing Gia 
Lam District. On January 29, 1993, at the end of the annual Tet hol iday and the 
beginn ing of the new year, Phuong's superior received 50,000,000 dong in cash (about 
US$5,000 at the early 1993 rate of exchange) in payment for goods. Often such cash is 
forwarded to Ho Chi Minh City for purchases or investment rather than being placed in 
Hanoi banks. Phuong and his boss put the money in a smal l  black satchel so that it  
could be taken over to the far end of Gia Lam Bridge for onward del ivery to Ho Chi 
Minh City via a transport plane from Gia Lam Airport. At about 7:00 pm on January 29 
Phuong set out along Hang Dieu Street, riding his motorcycle, the cash in the satchel, 
his two thighs pressing the satchel against the motorcycle to keep it safe. As Phuong set 
off his boss cal led out to him, 'Come back quickly for the end of Tel, lad. '4 
Traffic on the bridge was very l ight that n ight, and the weather was piercingly cold. 
At about 7:30pm Phuong turned onto Chuong Duong Bridge, heading east toward Gia 
Lam. Several moments l ater two other young men riding their motorcycles over the 
bridge in the same direction approached the bridge's [watchtower] and heard three cries 
of ' robber, robber, robber! ' They looked over and saw two men standing by 
motorcycles, one leaning over the bridge rai l ing onto the automobile roadway from the 
motorcycle path. He said 'Friend ... robber. ' The other young man was reaching into 
the satchel. The first young man said 'Save me, robber. ' 
The two observers tried to help Phuong, the young messenger, who was now 
bleeding heavi ly. One of them asked the other man, pol ice officer Duong, if he had 
fired his weapon. The answer was no, then yes. Phuong was taken off to the 
emergency room of the Viet-Due (Vietnamese-German) hospital in  central Hanoi. He 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
1 00 Marie Sidel 
died on the wal to the emergency room, and his father and boss found his body there 
later that night. . 
Even after two years, three court hearings, at least three formal investigat ions and a 
Supreme Court review, the events on the Chuong Duong Bridge that n ight remain 
blurred .  The pol ice officer, Duong, maintained almost unti l  he d ied that he had merely 
stopped Phuong for the common traffic violation of operating a motorcycle in an 
automobi le lane. He said Phuong had objected, the two had exchanged words, then 
scuffled, then Phuong had reached for Duong's gun and the gun had gone off as it was 
in  Phuong's hand. 
The witnesses, forensic special ists and Phuong's fami ly would spel l  out a 
confl icting narrative - that Duong knew Phuong from his many trips across the bridge, 
knew that he carried money and goods, waved him down for a traffic v iolation in order 
to rob him, attempted that robbery, and shot Phuong when Phuong resisted. The 
confl ict over those versions of the facts would electrify Hanoi for the next two years, 
propel two newspapers into a national spotl ight for demanding punishment for the 
pol ice officer, bring thousands of Hanoians onto the streets and some into violent 
clashes with pol ice, and result in Vietnam's first publicly adm itted execution in over ten 
years. 
The case immediately came under the jurisdiction of pol ice investigators attached 
to the Hanoi Public Security Bureau. On May 3 the pol ice investigation group released 
a report saying that Duong had waved down Phuong on the bridge 'whi le carrying out 
his traffic control duties, ' that Phuong had refused to stop, but had sped up and moved 
into the automobi le lane. Then, according to the investigators, Duong again demanded 
that Phuong stop, when he did they quarrel led on the bridge, that Duong's gun went off 
as they scuffled about, Phuong was hi t  by two bul lets and d ied on the road to the 
6 emergency room.  
The pol ice investigators transferred the case fi le  to  the Hanoi People's Procuracy 
with the recommendation that Duong be charged with a violation of Article 103 of the 
Criminal Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam , which applies to acts 'endangering 
a person's l ife or health while on c-fficial duty' and carries a pun ishment of 
imprisonment of between one and five years, or three to fifteen years ' in serious 
circumstances. ' 7 
5 Huong Huyen, 'Ve vu ban nguoi o cau Chuong Duong', PNTD, 20 April-5 May 1 993; 
'Ve vu ban nguoi o cau Chuong Duong', PNTD, April 20-May 5 1 993; 'Vu an cau 
Chuong Duong', Dai Doan ket (hereafter DDK), 5-1 1 June 1 993, 1 ;  'Can truy to ten 
Duong ve toi giet nguoi ' ,  DDK, 1 9-25 June 1 993, 1 .  
6 'Ve vu ban nguoi o cau Chuong Duong', PNTD, 20 April-5 May 1 993. 
7 Article 1 03 of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Selection of 
fundamental laws and regulation of Vietnam (Hanoi, The Gioi, 1 995, second edition). 
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'Why did death come to this youth, who regularly carried bundles or money across 
the bridge?' - The Newspapers Enter the Fray 
These events were first reported in two newspapers based in Hanoi, Phu nu Thu do 
(Women of the Capital) and Dai Doan ket (Great Unity) in May and June 1993. Each 
assigned a team of reporters to investigate Phuong's death. But it  was the release of the 
pol ice investigation report and the pol ice recommendation that Duong be charged only 
with the lesser offence of causing a death while on official duty - denying the robbery 
elements of the situation, and rejecting a murder trial - that sparked Dai Doan ket and 
Pim 11u Thu do into taking up the case as a cause celebre, devoting resources to 
investigations by reporters, and publishing extensively on the matter. 
It was no accident that Pliu mt Thu do and Dai Doan ket were active in  reporting 
the story. Dai Doan ket is the newspaper of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, the Party­
led umbrel la organisation of intel lectuals, scientists, rel igious and cultural figures, a 
group accustomed to l ively debate and to pushing the government on social issues. Phu 
1111 Th11 do was widely read by women in and around Hanoi, and had made its mark by 
report ing more forthrightly than other period icals on corruption, mistreatment of women 
and the ways in which women were not ful ly  sharing in the new prosperity of the 
market economy.8 
From the beginning, both newspapers knew the power of their words and the issues 
at stake. As Phu nu Thu do wrote in early May of 1993, 'Nguyen Tung Duong is 
presently in custody, publ ic opin ion awaits how he wil l  be tried. We hope that Duong 
must be tried on a correct charge even though the criminal is a pol ice officer, in  order to 
set an example and so the people can trust the law. '9 
Dai Doa11 ket and Ph11 1111 Tli11 do took up the case vigorously at the end of May 
and the beginning of June, shortly after the pol ice investigation report and 
recommendation were made public. Dai Doan ket began by confirming the stories of 
the two witnesses on the bridge, and added the perspectives of Phuong's father and his 
boss, who had searched for him on the n ight of his death. Pol ice officers on the bridge 
and at the Hoan Kiem d istrict station denied to Phuong's boss and his father that any 
untoward accidents or other events had taken place. Only when the father and employer 
went to the Viet-Due Hospital did they learn that Phuong had been brought in seriously 
wounded and had d ied in the emergency room. 10 
8 For a foreign report on Plru 1111 T/ru do and its sister publication in Ho Chi Minh City, 
see, Pham Hong Nga, Women'.f Magazines Break New Ground in Vietnam, Agence 
France Press (Hanoi), 23 April 1 995. 
9 'Ve vu ban nguoi o cau Chuong Duong', PNTD, April 20-May 5, 1 993. The first 
newspaper reference to the � may have been in an item. headed 'sending_ a message' 
(nhan tin) in PNTD, 5 April 1 993. 
1 0  'Vu a n  cau Chuong Duong', DDK, 5-1 1 June 1 993, 1 .  
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Dai Doa11 ket also swiftly criticised the pol ice investigation report, claiming that 
Phuong had been shot not during a quarrel but with his arms raised, and relying on its 
own interpretation of physical evidence, the position of the two men, the position of the 
motorcycles and the firing of a second shot. And the newspaper directly chal lenged the 
lesser charge filed by the Hanoi pol ice. 
'There are publ ic security officials who have told  us that Phuong was shot and 
kil led certainly because he resisted. But does it make sense that tens of thousands of 
people cross the bridge every day, and no one else is shot. only  Phuong? The reasons 
may be correct, but they are not sufficient. The inquiry must be more complete, and 
perhaps i t  must be 'Why did death come to this youth, who regularly carried bundles of 
money across the bridge? ' 1 1  
'You should accept some money' 
Dai DoQll ket and Phuong's family upped the stakes considerably in mid-June, when 
Dai DoQll ket front-paged a letter from Phuong's father reviewing the physical evidence 
and raising a number of critical questions about pol ice procedure and the investigation. 
Phuong's father also recounted a conversation with one of the investigators in which the 
pol ice official indicates, only  fifteen days into the case, that Duong would be sentenced 
to two years in prison for the death, and that a suspended sentence was unl ikely. 
But the more serious allegations were to come. According to Phuong's father, 
'Mr. Yet [the procurator] also said : 'I think you should accept some money and 
you should not waste your energies with any more requests. We have come to a 
conclusion and whatever level this goes to it wil l  stop with that conclusion. In any 
case your son is stil l dead. I will ask Duong's family to come in. '  And as expected, 
Duong's family members came in to bargain and said to me that if I write a paper 
suggesting that prosecution be foregone and requestin� that Duong be [released],  
then the Duong family would give me 30 mi l l ion dong. ' 2 
Phuong's father then laid down the gauntlet for the legal and pol it ical authorities. 
He requested formal reinvestigation of the case, and that if the facts were as he and 
others bel ieved them to be Duong be tried for murder under Article 101 of the Criminal 
Code, not the lesser Article 103 charge the pol ice investigators had recommended. 1 3  
1 1  Ibid. 
1 2  'Can truy t o  ten Duong ve toi giet nguoi' ,  DDK, 1 9-25 June 1 993, 1 .  
1 3  Ibid. In the same issue, Dai Doan ket published a long letter from a retired Army 
lieutenant colonel also demanding reinvestigation and appropriate prosecution of the 
case, vigorously raising the question of prosecution under the full murder statute, 
Article 101  of the Criminal Code, and demanding that the Supreme People's Procuracy 
and Supreme People's Court intervene directly in the case. 'Y kien ban doc ve vu an 
cau Chuong Duong - Can dieu Ira, ket luan dung toi danh, som dua vu an Nguyen Tung 
Duong ra xet xu ' ,  DDK, 1 9-25 June 1 993, 6. 
Law, the Press w1d Police Murder in Vie11am 1 03 
The summer of 1993 saw a barrage of reports in Dai DoQll ket and P/111 nu Thu do 
criticising the actions of the pol ice investigators and procuracy officials, delving into the 
physical evidence of the case, and making demands that Duong be tried for murder a 
commonplace event. Some were written by newspaper correspondents. But many 
others - often writing in sign ificant detail and in legal terms - were signed by citizens 
from backgrounds as varied and locations as far flung as a h igh school student in 
Hanoi, 14 a judge or staff member at the Central Mil i tary Court (quoting from a 1984 
Council of Ministers decision on use of firearms by pol ice),1 5 a Hanoi mother, 16 a 
representative of a group of retired cadres, 1 7 a reprint of a formal complaint by a Hanoi 
storeowner with knowledge of the case charging that the Hanoi prosecutor had tried to 
intim idate him, 18 a group of readers from Nha Trang in Khanh Hoa �rovince, 19 'more 
than two thousand women ' from Vong La vil lage outside Hanoi, 0 and additional 
articles by journal ists from Dai Dow1 ket and Phu 1111 Thu do. 21 
Under the continuing barrage of the press, public opinion, and perhaps, pol it ical 
decisions, the Supreme People's Procuracy took over investigation of the case in August 
1 993. 22 Nguyen Viet Phuong's body was exhumed at this point and transferred to the · 
1 4  Viet tiep ve  vu  ban nguoi tren cau Chuong Duong: Y kien ban doc - 'Gia nhu anh Viet 
Phuong noi duoc', PNTD, 5-20 July 1 993, 1 ,  2. 
1 5  Viet tiep ve v u  ban nguoi tren cau Chuong Duong: Y kien ban doc - 'Toi co y giet 
nguoi', PNTD, 5-20 July 1 993, 2. 
1 6  Viet tiep ve  vu  ban nguoi tren cau Chuong Duong: Y kien ban doc - 'Phai khan truong 
du Nguyen Tung Duong ra xet xu', PNTD, 5-20 July 1 993, 2. 
1 7  Tro lai v u  an cau Chuong Duong; 'Phai khan truong x u  v u  a n  nay de giu k y  cuong phep 
nuoc', DDK, 1 7-23 July 1 993, 6. 
1 8  Tro lai v u  an cau Chuong Duong; 'To cao hanh dong cua Ong Duong Ngoc Yet, pho 
phong cua Vien kiem sat nhan dan HN' (Hanoi), DDK, 1 7-23 July 1 993, 1 ,  6. 
1 9  Tro lai vu an cau Chuong Duong; Ban doc Nha Trang: 'Phai xet x u  ten Duong ve hanh 
vi giet nguoi voi muc dich cuop cua moi that cong bang', DDK, 24-30 July 1 993, 1, 6. 
20 Tro lai vu an cau Chuong Duong; 'Sung cuop co hay sung cuop tien??, DDK, 24-30 
July 1 993, 6. The language of the letter and the identification of the signing group 
might lead a reader to think that the letter had been drafted at a local (or other) level of 
the Women's Union. 
21 See, e.g., 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong dieu kho tin', DDK (monthly), 20 July-20 August 
1 993, 1 2, 1 0. 
22 Decision no. 30/KSDT-TA (Kiem sat Dieu tra) of 1 4  August 1 993 removed the case 
from Hanoi's jurisdiction and transferred it to the Investigations Directorate within the 
Supreme People's Procuracy. The Decision is referred to in Dan hoi - Pho Vien truong 
truong thuc Vien kiem sat nhan dan toi cao Nguyen Van Thin tra loi :  Ve 'vu an cau 
Chuong Duong,' DDK, 27 November-3 December 1 993, 1 ,  6. 
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Procuracy for further examination.23 Sharp criticism of police and prosecutorial 
handl ing of the case, and continued demands that Puong be tried for murder, continued 
unabated in the newspapers throughout the fal l  and winter of 1 993 and early 1994. In 
conformity with the emerging pattern of widely s�read anger (and newspaper strategy), 
writers included a Dai Doan ket editorial team, 4 Phuong's former boss at the joint 
venture company, with a testimonial to Phuong's character,25 and a famous actor and 
director,26 as wel l  as a beatific article on the original witnesses to Phuong's death.27 
'Which crime Nguyen Tung Duong committed is now the crux of the matter ••• ' 
By now the din was so intense that it was difficult to deny that Duong was guilty of 
something, and it was too late to sweep the matter under the rug or to pay off Viet 
Phuong's family.  A report from a Supreme People's Procuracy meeting in August 1993 
put the matter bluntly. 
' [T)he participants a l l  agreed that Duong must shoulder the entire responsibi l ity for 
the death of Nguyen Viet Phuong. That Duong committed a crime - this no one denied. 
But what offence in the Criminal Code did Duong commit? Our nation is currently 
building itself into a state ruled by law, and thus if we wish to indict accused A for 
crime X, there must be sufficient evidence scientific evidence. The issue of which 
crime Nguyen Tung Duong committed is now the crux of the matter, and the 
investigation organs under the Supreme People's Procuracy wil l  have to answer that 
before public opinion . . . .  •28 
The key issue remained whether Duong's stop and quarrel with Viet Phuong was 
part of 'an official duty' under Article 103 of the Criminal Code (a lesser crime carrying 
lesser punishment), or whether it was part of a robbery attempt and thus outside any 
official duties. If i t  was outside the scope of his duties, it was general ly  agreed that the 
shooting and death that occurred incident to the non-official stop and the robbery were 
prosecutable as homicide under Article 101 of the Criminal Code.29 
23 To phong vien Bao Dai doan ket, 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong - thu pham se duoc truy to 
theo toi danh nao?' DDK, 1 5-21 January 1 994, 1 .  
24 Nhom phong vien kinh te xa hoi - Bao Dai Doan ket, 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong dieu 
kho tin ', DDK (month ly), 20 July-20 August 1 993, 1 2, 1 0. 
25 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong dang duoc lam sang to; Cuoc dieu Ira keo dai, vi chua tin 
nhan chung', PNTD, 5-20 September 1 993, 1, 2. 
26 Dao Mong Long, 'An tu hinh duoi chan cau Chuong Duong', DDK (monthly), 20 
August-20 September 1 993, 6. 
27 Quoc Khanh, 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong se ra sao neu khong co su xuat hien cac nhan 
chung giau long nhan hau va dung cam?', DDK, 1 8-24 September 1 993, 6. 
28 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong dang duoc lam sang to', PNTD, 5-20 September 1 993, 1 .  
29 Hop bao ve vu an cau Chuong Duong Hai van de noi corn: 'Thu tuc lien hanh dieu tra 
vu an, xac dinh toi danh', DDK, 7-1 3  August 1 993, 6. 
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As the end of 1993 drew near, it appeared that the Procuracy was nearing a decision 
in its re-investigation of the case, and a Dai Doa11 ket report supported the Procuracy's 
decision to transfer Duong from Hoa Lo Prison in central Hanoi, where he had been 
under the control of local Hanoi authorities, to another detention facil ity under the 
control of the Hanoi mi l i tary region. 30 The report concluded on an optimistic note. 
'We hope that with their serious and objective work the Investigations Directorate 
. . .  wil l shortly uncover the truth in this compl icated case, establ ishing a basis for 
Nguyen Tung Duong to be tried in the courts on the correct charge for that which he 
brought about, ensurin�}he strict and clear character of the law, and the consol idation of 
the trust of the people. ' 
The national prosecutorial team responded with a concil iatory statement in l ate 
November, perhaps reflecting the somewhat more civil relationsh ip that Dai Doa11 ket 
seemed to have with national prosecutors than with the Hanoi pol ice investigators and 
procuracy. The Deputy Procurator-General in charge of the case asked for patience and 
for time while the Investigations Directorate came to conclusions on a 'very 
compl icated ' case in which 'only the accused and the victim were on the scene when the 
events occurred and the victim d ied on the way to the hospital ' and 'Witnesses arrived 
after the events occurred. •32 
By January 1994, as the Procuracy neared a decision on a charge against Duong 
and prepared to move into the ind ictment (tmy to) and trial (xet xu) stages of the case, 
the newspapers became active again. The pressure on the Supreme People's Procuracy 
to amend the charge to murder was intense, and in January 1994 Dai Doa/I ket published 
what it called a 'draft '  (ban) of the conclusions of the investigation. The draft report 
recommended elevating the charge from 'endangering a person's l ife or health while on 
official duty' (Article 103 of the Crim inal Code) to murder (Article 101). The factual 
question remained whether Duong's scuffle with Viet Phuong leading to Phuong's death 
was within the scope of official duties. But Duong, of course, was not cooperating with 
that process of al tering the charges - he continued to maintain that he had fought with 
30 Order no. 97/DT (Dieu tra) of 16 August 1 993 issued by the Supreme People's 
Procuracy, described in Nhom phong vien Bao Dai Docu1 ket, 'Ket thuc dieu tra vu an 
cau Chuong Duong' - 'Vien KSND (Kiem sat nhan dan) toi cao de nghi truy to Nguyen 
Tung Duong theo toi danh giet nguoi, ' DDK, 26 February-4 March 1 994, 1 ,6. 
3 1  D.D.K., 'Nhung thong t i n  moi nhat ve  vu  an  cau Chuong Duong', DDK, 20-26 
November 1 993, 6. 
32 Dan hoi - ' Pho Vien truong tmong thuc Vien kiem sat nhan dan toi cao Nguyen Van 
Thin Ira loi : Ve vu an cau Chuong Duong,' DDK, 27 November-3 December 1 993, l ,  
6. 
1 06 Marie Side/ 
Viet Phuong, his gun had gone off Viet Phuong, and that he knew noth ing of the purse 
containing 50 mi l l ion dong that Phuong was carrying.33 
'Official duties' or 'motivated by abasing purposes'? 
By now the public d iscussion, which may have mirrored and influenced internal 
discussion in legal and pol it ical institutions, had turned to a parsing of the murder 
statute that Duong looked increasingly l ikely to face. Dai Doan ket pointed out that one 
sub-section of the murder statute, murder ' motivated by abasing purposes with a view to 
committing or conceal ing another offence '34 carried the possibil ity of l ife imprisonment 
or the death sentence, whereas two other potential murder sub-sections stipulated 
imprisonment for between five and twenty years.35 Duong's refusal to acknowledge 
that he had been attempting to rob Viet Phuong, and the difficu lty in showing robbery as 
the purpose (the other offense Duong m ight have been trying to conceal that cou ld lead 
to the h igher murder count), began to make it more l ikely that Duong m ight be charged 
with a lesser homicide count than a charge that might bring a long prison sentence, l ife 
imprisonment or death. But Dai Doa11 ket continued to bel ieve that robbery had been 
the motivation for Duong's stop, and i t  continued to push for the more serious murder 
charge.36 
On January 28, 1994, a year short of a day after Duong kil led Phuong, the 
Investigations Directorate of the Supreme People's Procuracy subm itted its report on the 
investigation of the events on the bridge. Based on a re-examination of physical 
evidence by its own investigators and a senior mi l itary pathologist,37 the witnesses' 
statements and Duong's own changing statements and admissions, the Investigations 
Directorate concluded that Duong should be indicted for murder under Article 101 of 
the Criminal Code. The report ' refuted ' Duong's claim that Phuong had been reach ing 
for his gun, they had struggled, and the gun had gone off. 
'Public opinion ••• awaits the indictment •••• ' 
But in a move crucial to the development of the case, the Investigations Directorate 
d id not decide whether Duong was attempting to rob Viet Phuong, leaving open the 
possibil ity of the lesser charge and lesser sentence that was later to infuriate cit izens 
throughout Hanoi .  After rev iewing the summary of evidence itself, including once 
again Phuong's shout of ' robber, robber, save me! ' Dai Doa11 ket 's conclusion was clear: 
33 To phong vien Bao Dai doan ket, 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong - thu pham se duoc troy to 
theo toi danh nao?' DDK, 1 5-21 January 1 994, 1 .  
34 Article 1 01 (1 )(a) of the Criminal Code. 
35 Article t o l ( l )(b) and (l )(c) of the Criminal Code. 
36 To phong vien Bao Dai doan ket, 'Vu an cau Chuong Duong - thu pham se duoc truy to 
theo toi danh nao?' DDK, 1 5-21 January 1 994, 1 .  
37 'Xung quanh vu an cau Chuong Duong - Tro chuyen voi nguoi giam dinh phap y nan 
nhan ' ,  DDK, 1 9-25 March 1 994, 1, 6. 
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'Just ice wil l only  occur if Nguyen Tung Duong must be indicted under section (1), sub­
section (a) of Article 101 of the Crim inal Code (motivated by abasing purposes with a 
view to committing or conceal ing another offense). Public opinion now awaits the 
indictment of the procuracy and investigation institutions. '38 
The decision on which murder charge to use, however, reverted to the Hanoi 
prosecutorial authorities after the investigation report from the national procuracy was 
complete. And in February 1994 Hanoi local prosecutors once again infuriated public 
opinion by ind icting Duong not on the 'abasing purposes . . .  conceal ing another offence' 
murder charge, but on the lesser murder charge contained in Article 101(2) of the 
Crim inal Code that provided for imprisonment upon conviction of between five and 
twenty years, rather than a longer sentence, l ife imprisonment, or death .39 
'He was killed because he spoke the truth: robber, robber •••• ' 
The publ ic and media reaction was immediate. Now openly organised by the 
Women's Union, a group of women in Phuc Xa vi l lage outside Hanoi wrote angrily to 
Phu 1111 Thu do, which front-paged their comments. ' (I]f the lad Phuong had not been 
carrying a purse of money on his motorcycle then perhaps the lad would not have been 
kil led. He was ki l led because he spoke the truth: robber, robber. . .  and Duong had to 
shoot him Phuong so that he would not l ive on to say the truth, that Duong was a 
robber . . .  '40 Phuong's family spoke up harshly as wel l ,  also in Phu nu Thu do, 
denouncing the decision of the Hanoi prosecutor to indict Duong on the lesser murder 41 charge. 
The trial was set for May 12 and 13, and eagerly anticipated throughout Hanoi. In 
the days before court convened Dai Doan ket and other newspapers appl ied heavy, 
sarcastic pressure on the court to answer remaining questions about the purse and 
Duong's motivations and actions on the bridge. 'Duong h imself admitted and the 
witnesses also confirmed that after Duong shot Phuong, the money purse (found its 
38 Nhom phong vien Bao DDK, ' Ket thuc dieu tra vu an cau Chuong Duong' - 'Vien 
KSND (Kiem sat nhan dan) toi cao de nghi truy to Nguyen Tung Duong theo toi danh 
giet nguoi, ' DDK, 26 February-4 March 1 994, 1 ,6. The investigation report and 
conclusions are also reviewed in To phong vien Bao Phu nu Thu do, 'Vu an cau 
Chuong Duong - Khai bao khong !rung thuc la tinh tiet tang an nang', PNTD, 23-30 
March, 1 1 94, 1 ,  5, which also launches a blistering attack on Duong's changing 
statements and veracity. 
39 Article 101 (2) reads: If the offence is committed in circumstances other than those set 
in paragraph 1 of this article, or there are no extenuating circumstances, the offender 
shall be subject to a term of imprisonment of between five and twenty years. 
40 'Y kien ban doc - Ve vu can cau Chuong Duong', PNTD, 1 3-20, April 1 994 .. 1 .  
4 1  'Nhan vu an cau Chuong Duong sap xu - Loi khan cau cua gia dinh nan nhan Nguyen 
Viet Phuong' ,  PNTD, 1 1-1 8 May 1 994. 
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way] from Phuong's motorcycle to Duong's motorcycle. A chance phenomenon, or an 
inevitabl� one?'42 
'Halfway down the road, the burden snaps' 
The trial was held on May 1 2, 13  and 14, 1994 before a judicial panel of two judges 
and three lay people's assessors, closely watched by Viet Phuong's fami ly, Duong's 
fami ly, pol ice coll eagues of Duong's, journal ists, h igher court and procuracy officials 
and spectators - all within the courtroom - and more than a thousand crowded outside 
on Hai Ba Truog Street in central Hanoi .43 ' It may be, ' Phu 1111 T/111 do noted with 
perhaps a hint of sympathy ' that never in the history of the Hanoi Court has there 
occurred a trial of this scale. '44 
The prosecutors made clear that they wanted Duong to be imprisoned for the 
longest possible sentence, twenty years, on the lesser murder charge. On the th ird day 
of the trial, faced with an sti l l  unclear record and sharply confl icting statements by the 
participants, the chief trial judge issued a formal decision returning the case file to the 
Hanoi People's Procuracy 'for supplemental investigation to clarify the motive and 
purposes of Nguyen Tung Duong in committing the murder. ' 
Newspaper reactions were ambivalent - Phu nu Thu do applauded the general view 
that Duong had indeed committed some form of murder, the new evidence presented, 
and the professional behaviour of the participants, but called it ' unfortunate ' that the 
investigation sti l l  had to go on sixteen months after Phuong had died.45 Dai Doa11 ket 
also applauded the fact that there was ' no contrary view' to the assertion that Duong had 
committed some form of murder. But Dai DoOll ket also took a much darker, more 
conspiratorial view of the decision to proceed with the trial with the record so unclear. 
'Public opinion has been ful l  of doubts (thac mac), and questions have been asked : 
Why, when it fel t  that the file contained so many unclear points, did the Hanoi Court 
stil l  put the case up for trial? Why didn't (the Court] return the file  to the Procuracy for 
tru ly  thorough preparation before beginning the trial? . . .  Real l y  difficult  to understand ! ' 
42 P.V., Tin moi nhat ve vu an 'cau Chuong Duong' - 'Chuan bi xet xu Nguyen Tung 
Duong', DDK, 1 4-20 May 1 994, 1 .  
43 Huong Huyen, 'Phien toa xu vu an cau Chuong Duong chua ket thuc', PNTD, 1 8-25 
May 1 994, 1 ,  2. 
44 Viet tiep vu an cau Chuong Duong - ' Mot ban giam dinh phap y day tinh thuyet phuc', 
PNTD, 25 May-1 June 1 994, 1, 2. 
45 Huong Huyen, 'Phien toa xu vu an cau Chuong Duong chua ket thuc', PNTD, 1 8-25 
May 1 994, 1 ,  2. 
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'Halfway down the road, the burden snaps ' (Nua duo11g dut ganh) was the sardonic 
headl ine to the Dai Doan ket coverage, a commentary on a weak court under intense 
pressure from more powerful forces within its wal ls and outside its bui ld ing.46 
'There will only be one truth, there will only be one truth' 
In the days fol lowing the re-transfer of the case to the procuracy for additional 
investigation, Phu 11u Thu do and Dai Doan ket kept up pressure for a trial and 
conviction. Each sought to publ icise the detailed findings of the mi l itary forensic team, 
which it viewed as insufficiently incorporated in the prosecutor's arguments.47 Dai 
Doan ket again denounced the errors and biases in the original investigation, tying those 
mistakes to the shortcomings in the current trial, 48 and it provided a forum for one of the 
trial judges to explain the decision to send the case back for re-investigation.49 Phu nu 
Tim do exhaustively reviewed the whereabouts and control of the purse containing 50 
mi l l ion dong, concluding (in contradiction to Duong's earl ier denials), that Duong had 
in fact accompanied Phuong to the hospital and that the purse had disappeared during 
that trip.50 And in a particularly harsh commentary, Phu nu Thu do asked why some of 
the witnesses' statements in court had been different from some of their earl ier 
statements. 'There will only be one truth, '  a wrathful Phu nu Thit do warned and 
repeated, and called upon the court and prosecutors to caution the witnesses -
particularly Duong's witnesses - to be reply truthfu l ly  in court.5 1 
In August Phu nu Thu do and other newspapers publ ished the results of the re­
investigation by the prosecutors. The Procuracy again stated that the evidence was not 
sufficiently clear to determine whether Duong had been attempting to rob Phuong, in 
effect pushing the decision back to the Hanoi court. Phu m1 Thu do publ ished a number 
46 P.V., ' Phien toa xet xu vu an Nguyen Tung Duong, Nua duong dut ganh', DDK, 21-27 
May 1 994, 1 ,  6. 
47 Viet tiep vu an cau Chuong Duong - ' Mot ban giam dinh phap y day tinh thuyet phuc', 
PNTD, 25 May-1 June 1 994, 1, 2; Quoc Khanh, 'Tai phien toa xet xu Nguyen Tung 
Duong - Bao cong thoi may', DDK, 28 May-3 June 1 994, 6. 
48 Viet tiep Vu an cau Chuong Duong - 'Qua nhieu sai sot trong khau dieu tra ban dau', 
PNTD, 1-1 June 1 994, 1 ,  2. 
49 Pho Chanh an TAND (Toa an nhan dan) T.P. (Thanh pho) Ha Noi Ira Joi Bao Dai Doan 
ket - 'Vi sao phien toa xet xu Nguyen Tung Duong lai nua duong dut ganh, '  DDK, 28 
May-3 June 1 994, 1, 6. 
50 Viet tiep vu an cau Chuong Duong, 'Tui tien 50 trieu chung cu quan trong', PNTD, 22-
29 June 1 994, 1 ,  2. 
5 1  Huong Huyen, Ve vu a n  cau Chuong Duong - 'Trach nhiem cua nhan chung', PNTD, 
8-1 5 June 1 994, 1 ,  2. 
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of angry letters on the delay and the investigators' report.52 Its own response was 
righteous. fury: 
'Over a long time, the 'Chuong Duong bridge case ' has become a thermometer, 
measuring the trust of the people in the objectivity, and the spirit of just ice and 
enl ightenment of the institut ions defending the law . . . .  The fundamental issue is not 
whether to judge heavi ly  or leniently, but that we do not know which crime was 
committed, and that i t  has not been investigated clearly. And thus when the institutions 
of law are unable to indicate what pol ice officer Nguyen Tung Duong's motivations 
were when he committed murder, then that is a debt that society has a right to 
demand. '53 
'Central institutions ••• contributed many views' 
By this point, pressure was becoming intense on the Hanoi local prosecutors to 
amend its original indictment to increase the severity of the charge (and potential 
punishment) against Duong. After resisting that for months, the situation suddenly 
changes in late September of 1993. Dai Doa11 ket explained why: 
'We have learned that after the file was transferred to the Hanoi Procuracy [after re­
investigation at the central level ] ,  and before the ind ictment was released, Central 
institutions responsible for protection of law contributed many views. And on 
September 15, 1994, the Hanoi People's Procuracy is-sued ind ictment no. 636, 
charging Nguyen Tung Duong under Article 101 ,  sect ion (1), sub-section (g) of the 
Criminal Code (murder const ituting a case of hool igan ism). In this way no robbery 
indictment is included, but under this framework of punishment the accused may be 
forced to bear the h ighest level under the Crim inal Code. '54 
'Justice for the living and justice for the dead' 
With the logjam broken, and Duong now charged with a crime that could bring a 
higher sentence, the trial proceeded more smoothly and the court had more confidence 
in the decision to be rendered. But, apparently fearful of backsl id ing, the newspapers 
did not let up the pressure. In the week before Duong's trial reconvened on October 19, 
Dai Doan ket reviewed the evidence for robbery and murder and headed its coverage 
'There must be justice for the l iving and just ice for the dead ! '55 
52 Tieng noi ban doc vu an cau Chuong Duong - 'Phai chang dan da xu roi?', PNTD, 31 
August-7 September 1 994, 1, 3.  
53 To P.V., 'Ket qua dieu tra bo sung vu an cau Chuong Duong', PNTD, m -1 7  August 
1 994, 1 ,  7. 
54 Q.K., 'Tin moi nhat ve vu an cau Chuong Duong - Nguyen Tung Duong bi truy to theo 
khoan 1 cua toi giet nguoi ' ,  DDK, 1-7 October 1 994, 1 .  
55 ' Phien toa xet xu Nguyen Tung Duong (vu an tai cau Chuong Duong) se dien ra trong 
ba ngay 1 9-21-1 0-1 994 - Y kien cua mot so ban doc trong gioi luat gia: 'Chung toi rat 
quan tarn vu an nay vi vu an xay ra tai thu do - trung tarn cua ea Nuoc ... • - Can cong 
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On October 1 9, 1 994, Nguyen Tung Duong's trial reconvened.56 Once again the 
courtroom was packed, and more than 10,000 l istened outside.57 Again the prosecutors, 
Duong's lawyer and the lawyer for Phuong's family spoke, and Duong was re­
questioned. On October 20, during interrogation by the judges, according to news 
reports, Duong said that the gun had been in his hand (rather than Phuong's) when i t  
went off, and that it had gone off by accident. That account was chal lenged in great 
detai l  by the chief mi l i tary forensic s�ecial ist, cal led in by the Supreme People's 
Procuracy to work special ly  on the case. 8 After extensive argument by the prosecutors 
and lawyers for Duong and for Phuong's family, Duong was convicted of murder 
'motivated by abasing purposes with a view to committing or conceal ing another 
offence, ' the robbery of Nguyen Viet Phuong, and sentenced to death. ' The judgement 
of the coult was not due to public opinion . . . .  ' 
Whether by design or legal analysis, the court convicted Duong of the precise 
charge - and mandated the precise sentence - that Dai Doan ket, Pim 1111 Thu do and 
other newspapers had demanded. The President of the Hanoi People's Court tried to end 
the matter with a clear statement: 'Nguyen Tung Duong committed murder in order to 
appropriate the assets of the victim; he committed the crime with a clear motive and 
purpose, determined to carry that out to the end. '59 
But beyond the legal analysis there were strong defensive elements in the 
judgement as wel l .  While admitting the compl ications of the case and the great interest 
it had aroused, the court vigorously denied that public opinion or the press had played 
any role in its decision. 
'The Hanoi Court tried the case of Nguyen Tung Duong under conditions in which 
publ ic opinion in society on the case was very complex; that fact served all the more to 
make the Court abide by the law seriously and strictly. The judgement of the Court was 
not due to public opinion, but had to follow the law, to guarantee (ky cuong) and 
bang cho nguoi dang song va cong bang cho nguoi da khuat ! ' ,  DDK, 1 5-21 October 
1 994, 1 ,  6. 
56 Huong Huyen, ' Khai mac phien toa so tham xu tiep vu an cau Chuong Duong', PNTD, 
1 9-26 October 1 994, 1 ,  2. 
57 Manh Hung, TAND (Toa an nhan dan) 'pho tuyen phat Nguyen Tung Duong: Tu 
hinh ! ' ,  Ha Noi moi, 22 October 1 994. 
58 Ngoc Giao, Ha Noi: 'Xet xu lai vu an cau Chuong Duong,' Thanh nien, 23 October 
1 994, 1 .  
59 Tien Chuoc, ' Nguyen Tung Duong giet nguoi de chiem doat tai san, y da pham toi co 
dong co, muc dich ro rang .. . ' ,  Lao dong, 27 October 1 994, l, 2. 
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national customs, to defend justice for society and justice for each person before the 
law . . .  '60 
The newspapers that had taken up the Duong case greeted the sentence with 
triumph, ful l  of praise for the judges.61  P/111 1111 Thu do even front paged a story bold 
bannered 'When the death sentence against Nguyen Tung Duong wi l l  be carried out. •62 
Domestic press coverage dramatical ly  expanded into mainstream outlets such as Lao 
dong (Labor), the trade union newspaper, other local Hanoi newspapers,63 and a number 
of newspapers directly run by the Party. 
'And what if Nguyen Tung Duong's two sons lost their father? ' - The Battle is 
Joined 
For the first time, now, the pol ice officer Nguyen Tung Duong began to have his 
media defenders as wel l ,  newspapers that had been largely si lent for the entire long 
legal process. Pol ice and Ministry of Interior newspapers such as A n  11i11h Thu do 
(Capital Security) now ran long stories, virtual l y  al l  disagreeing with the verd ict and 
sentence.64 A n  11i11h Thu do used the same methods to defend Duong as Dai Doa11 ket 
60 ' Phan quyet cua toa an khong vi du luan ma phai theo luat phap' (Trich ban an so 
701/HS-TA xet xu tu hinh Nguyen Tung Duong), DDK, 2-9 November 1 994, 1 ,  5. 
6 1  See, e.g., Huong Huyen, 'Vu  an  cau Chuong Duong - Toa so  tham Ha  Noi xu :  Nguyen 
Tung Duong tu hinh cong ly sang to nuc long dan', PNTD, 26 October-2 November 
1 994, 1 ,  2, 4; 'Nguyen Tung Duong linh an tu hinh! - Mot ban an hop long dan, nghiem 
phep nuoc', Dai Doan ket, 29 October-4 November 1 994, 1, 6. Portions of the formal 
court opinion were published as 'Phan quyet eua toa an khong vi du Juan ma phai theo 
luat phap' (Trieh ban an so 701 /HS-TA xet xu tu hinh Nguyen Tung Duong), DDK, 2-
9 November 1 994, 1 ,  5.  
62 PNTD, 'Viet theo yeu eau ban doc - Bao gio se thue thi ban an xu tu hinh Nguyen Tung 
Duong', PNTD, 2-9 November 1 994, 1 .  
63 See, e.g., Manh Hung, TAND (Toa an nhan dan) 'pho tuyen phat Nguyen Tung Duong: 
Tu hinh ! ' ,  Ha Noi moi, 22 October 1 994; Nguyen Ha Lam, 'Phien toa mong doi. . .  -
Ghi chep xung quanh phien toa xu Nguyen Tung Duong', Nguoi Ha Noi, 30 October 
1 994, 1 ,  4, 5 .  
64 Y kien hai vi dai dien Vien kiem sat va Toa an nhan dan Ha Noi, A n  ninh Tlru dQ 
(hereafter A NTD), 23 October 1 994, 6; To phong v ien noi ehinh, 'Xet xu vu an eau 
Chuong Duong', A NTD, 23 October 1 994, 6, 7; Dao Hong Due, 'Sau phien toa xu vu 
an cau Chuong Duong', A NTD, 30 October 1 994, 6; Anh Quang. 'Nhieu nguoi dong y 
voi toi ', A NTD, 30 October 1 994, 6; Ho Si Tao, 'Noi dau cua nguoi me', A NTD, 30 
October 1 994, 6, 8; 'Sau ban an ve vu an cau Chuong Duong' - Do Thanh Thuy, 'Chau 
khong muon co nhieu dua tre mat bo me', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, (6); Nguyen Thi 
Due, 'Nhung nguoi me nghi ve noi dau cua hai nguoi me', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6; 
Nguyen Binh Minh, 'Hay xu dung toi' ,  A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6; Le Xuan Quang, 
' Neu nhu hai dua con cua Nguyen Tung Duong mat cha', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6; 
'Chi Trung, Dung de noi an ban day vo chung ta', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6. 
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and Phu 11u Thu do had uti l ised to express popular anger toward Duong and the Hanoi 
prosecutors. It publ ished letters and short articles by a Hanoi h igh school student,65 a 
Hanoi mother writing on behalf of a group of mothers in her neighbourhood,66 a doctor 
at Hanoi's Thang Long Hospital, also writing on behalf of a group of his col leagues,67 a 
retired cadre in Hanoi's Kim Lien District,68 a female artist, writin� on behalf of other 
performers at the Youth Drama Troupe,69 and a soldier's wife,7 all criticising the 
severity of the sentence or the specific crime for wh ich Duong had been judged. 
With the conviction of Nguyen Tung Duong a battle now went on in the 
newspapers that seemed more directed at the appeal process than at celebration, 
coverage sti l l  dominated by Dai Doan ket and Phu 11u Thu do but now joined by A n  
ni11h Thu do and other security newspapers angry at the verd ict and sentence. During 
the two month period between Duong's conviction on October 21, 1994 and his appeal 
hearing in mid-December, Dai Doa11 ket and Phu 1111 Thu do continued to run articles on 
the case, defending the verd ict and sentence, setting the stage for a rejection of Duong's 
appeal,7 1  reporting directly and by name on which officials had delayed investigation 
and judgement for nearly two years,72 and now directly warning the legal authorities of 
their own power and that of publ ic opinion. 
The intensity of the press battle was d ictated by the appeal schedule. Under the 
Criminal Procedure Code, Duong had a l imited period from the date of his sentence to 
appeal .  So the window for 'public opinion ' - whether Dai Doan ket and Phu nu Thu 
do's public opinion, or A n  11i11h Thu do's public opinion - to make itself fel t  was short 
65 Sau ban an ve vu an cau Chuong Duong - Do Thanh Thuy, 'Chau khong muon co nhieu 
dua Ire mat bo me', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6. 
66 Nguyen Thi Due, 'Nhung nguoi me nghi ve noi dau cua hai nguoi me', A NTD, 4 
November 1 994, 6. 
67 Nguyen Binh Minh, 'Hay xu dung toi ', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6. 
68 Le Xuan Quang, 'Neu nhu hai dua con cua Nguyen Tung Duong mat cha', A NTD, 4 
November 1 994, 6. Mr. Quang's commentary emphasized the question that heads this 
section. 
69 Chi Trung, 'Dung de noi an han day vo chung ta', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6. 
70 Nguyen Thi Tinh, 'Ban an can duoc xem xet lai', A NTD, 4 November 1 994, 6. 
7 1  See, e.g., Anh Ly, Nhan phien toa xet x u  Nguyen Tung Duong - 'Toi danh v a  cao trang 
trong vu an cau Chuong Duong', DDK, 22-28 October 1 994, 1 ,  6; Tieng noi cua Ong 
Nguyen Van Lat, bo de nan nhan tai phien toa - 'Phap luat phai nghiem de moi nguoi 
dan luong thien duoc song yen on, de moi gia dinh tranh duoc tham hoa' DDK, 29 
October-4 November 1 994, 6; Tran Ngoc Binh, Viet theo yeu cau ban doc - ' Muc an tu 
hinh Nguyen Tung Duong co nang hay khong? ' PNTD, 9-1 6 November 1 99�, 1 ,  2. 
72 Vu Tien, 'Ai da lam cho vu an cau Chuong Duong duong keo dai gan 2 nam', PNTD, 
9-1 6  November 1 994, 1 ,  2. 
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i ndeed. And with the widespread perception that public opinion and the press had 
indeed inOuenced the first trial, neither side was taking any chances. 
Duong indeed appealed the judgement and sentence, and the Hanoi People's Court 
scheduled the appel late hearing in the case for December 13-15,  1994. Thousands 
gathered outside the stately French colonial courthouse housing the Supreme Court as 
the appel late hearing began underway, and the tribunal's proceedings were broadcast 
over loudspeakers. On December 13 clashes broke out between angry members of the 
crowd concerned that the appel late tribunal would weaken the final verdict, and pol ice 
guarding the courthouse. Rocks were thrown by people in the crowd, and ' pol ice were 
seen charging the crowd of several thousand using batons and shields that give off blue 
sparks and electric shocks,'73 although it was unclear who had attacked whom first.74 
On December 15 ,  1 994 the Supreme Court appellate tribunal approved the verd ict 
of the Hanoi court, noting that the case had 'caus[ed] bad pol itical and social 
consequences. '  75 Once again the judgement was covered in the domestic press, both by 
Dai Doan ket and Phu nu Thu do and also by other national newspapers that had not 
earl ier given priority to the Duong case.76 Triumph was once again the theme of the 
73 Police clash with crowd outside Hanoi trial, Agence France Press (Hanoi), 1 4  
December, 1 994, available o n  Lexis. 
74 For foreign news reports on the scene at the Hanoi courthouse on December 1 3, 14 and 
1 5, 1 994 and the appellate tribunal's decision, see Greg Torode, Crowds rally against 
officer facing death, South Chi11a Momi11g Post, 1 4  December 1 994, 1 4; Incidents lors 
du proces en appel d'un policier condamne pour meurtre, Agence France Press (Hanoi), 
14 December 1 994; Court upholds death penalty on Hanoi policeman, Agence France 
Press (Hanoi), 1 5  December 1 994; Vietnam policeman sentenced to death for murder, 
Kyodo News Service/Japan Economic Newswire (Hanoi), 1 5  December 1 994; Vietnam 
court confirms death sentence on policeman, Reuters World Service (Hanoi), 1 5  
December 1 994; Le tribunal d e  Hanoi confirme l a  peine d e  mort infligee a un policier, 
Agence France Press (Hanoi), 1 5 December 1 994; Greg Torode, Crowds applaud death 
sentence on policeman, South Chi11a Momillg Post, 1 6  December 1 994, 1 4; Tim 
Larimer, Policemen's trial trigger.; unhearci-<>f Hanoi street protest, The Housto11 
Chronicle, 1 7  December 1 994, 27; Vietnam: Courts of public opinion, The Economist, 
24 December-6 January, 1 995, 31 . 
Vietnamese domestic reports in Engl ish include Death sentence for killer policeman, 
Vietnam Investment Review, 10 December 1 994 (digested from an Agence France 
Press report); and Supreme People's Court upholds pol iceman's death sentence, 
BBCSWB, 5 January 1 995, FE/21 93/B (text of a Voice of Vietnam radio report). 
75 Traffic policeman executed for killing, Vietnam lllvestment Review, (x) March 1 995. 
76 Coverage includes Huong Huyen, Toa phuc tham TANDTC (Toa an nhan dan toi cao) 
'xet xu vu an cau Chuong Duong xu y an Nguyen Tung Duong tu hinh', PNTD, 1 4-21 
December 1 994, 1 ,  2; Nguyen Tien Dam, Nhan toa phuc tham Toa an nhan dan toi cao 
mo phien toa xet xu phuc tham vu an Nguyen Tung Duong - 'Cong luan voi cuoc dau 
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Dai Doa11 ket and Phu nu Thu do coverage; Pim 1111 Thu do termed the rul ing 'welcomed 
by the peo.ple as a verdict on the correct person, for the correct crime, and correct under 
the law. '7 But the coverage was neither as prominent nor as exultatory as after the 
October hearing, and more often now relegated to inside pages than beginning on the 
front page. 
Fol lowing the decision by the Supreme Court tribunal upholding the death sentence 
and the violence during that appellate hearing, press coverage dropped away qu ickly. 
But careful  efforts were underway to interpret the results in  official ways, to placate 
Hanoi and national pol ice forces very angry over the treatment of their l ieutenant and 
their forces - and their inabi l i ty to control the resul t  of the case - and to make peace 
between the legal institutions that had been brought into direct contact during the Duong 
matter. 
Dai Doan ket, for example, was ful ly  cooperative in that effort. A senior national 
prosecutor explained in the newspaper in late December 1994 that the Nguyen Tung 
Duong case was an example of the positive role of public opinion in cooperation with 
the stale in the struggle against crime.78 Nor was the incident indicative of a general 
problem of pol ice corruption, stated the president of the appel late tribunal in the Duong 
case under a front-paged banner headl ine in Dai Do(Jll ket the next week. 'The Nguyen 
Tung Duong phenomenon was particular, and it cannot dim the �real feats of arms and 
sacrifices of the people's public security over the past fifty years. ' 9 
Few articles appeared in the period before and after Tel, in January and February 
1995, when Duong's formal appeal for clemency was lodged with President Le Due 
Anh under the provisions of Vietnam's Criminal Procedure Law, and the Office of the 
tranh chong toi pham ', DDK, 17-23 December 1 994, 1, 6; Ong Do Cao Thang, Pho 
Chanh toa phuc tham TANDTC (foa an nhan dan toi cao) tai Ha Noi, Chu toa phien toa 
xet xu vu an Nguyen Tung Duong tra loi phong van cua Bao Dai Doan ket - 'Hien 
tuong Nguyen Tung Duong chi la ea biet, khong the lam lu mo chien cong va su hy sinh 
Ion lao cua cong an nhan dan trong gan 50 nam qua', DDK, 24-30 December 1 994, 1 ,  
6. 
77 'Chu tich Nuoc khong chap nhan don xin an giam toi chet cua bi cao Nguyen Tung 
Duong', PNTD, 1-7 March 1995, 1. 
78 Nguyen Tien Dam, Nhan toa phuc tham Toa an nhan dan toi cao mo phien toa xet xu 
phuc tham vu an Nguyen Tung Duong - 'Cong luan voi cuoc dau tranh chong toi 
pham', DDK, 17-23 December 1 994, 1, 6; 
79 Ong Do Cao Thang, Pho Chanh toa phuc tham TANDTC (foa an nhan dan toi cao) tai 
Ha Noi, Chu toa phien toa xet xu vu an Nguyen Tung Duong tra loi phong van cua Bao 
Dai Doan ket - 'Hien tuong Nguyen Tung Duong chi la ea biet, khong the .lam lu mo 
chien cong va su hy sinh Ion lao cua cong an nhan dan trong gan 50 nam qua', DDK, 
24-30 December 1 994, 1 ,  6. 
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President requested opinions on the clemency petition from the President of the 
Supreme Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuracy. 
President Le Due Anh issued a formal decision rejecting Nguyen Tung Duong's 
appeal for clemency (don xin OJI giam) on February 27, 1995, following a 
recommendation by the President of the Supreme Court and the Procurator-General that 
the clemency not be granted.80 On the same day, the Chief Judge of the Hanoi People's 
Court issued a decision to enforce the appel late court's judgement, in accordance with 
the Criminal Procedure Code, and establ ishing an judgement execution committee for 
the case. That committee included the Chief Judge of the Hanoi People's Court, the 
Chief of the Enforcement Division of the Hanoi People's Procuracy, the Deputy 
Commander of the Hanoi Police, and ' representatives of some related institutions. '8 
Under the terms of that enforcement decision, and after detai led preparations were 
undertaken, the judgement execution committee met at 3:00 am on the morning of 
March 5, 1 995 at Cau Nga, the execution ground for Hanoi located in adjacent Ha Tay 
province, to carry out the sentence. Dai Doan ket, Phu nu Thu do and other media 
reported the execution, in what Amnesty International later called ·�t)he first official 
confirmation of a death sentence having been carried out since 1 985. '8 
After hundreds of column inches on the case over two years, Dai Doan ket finished 
its coverage in  sparse terms: ' In accordance with the convict's wishes, Nguyen Tung 
Duong met with his family (11guoi th011 tro11g gia di11h) before the sentence was carried 
out. The sentence of death against Nguyen Tung Duong was carried out swiftly and in 
80 'Chu tich Nuoc khong chap nhan don xin an giam toi chet cua bi cau Nguyen Tung 
Duong' ,  PNTD, 1 -7 March 1 995, 1 ;  P.V., 'Ban an tu hinh doi voi Nguyen Tung Duong 
da duoc thi hanh' ,  DDK, 1 1-1 7 March 1 995, 1 .  The decision was Quyet dinh no. 
333/CTN (Chu tich nuoc), dated February 27, 1 995. 
81  'Ban an tu hinh doi voi  Nguyen Tung Duong da duoc thi  hanh', DDK, 1 1-1 7 March 
1 995, 1 .  
82 ' Ban an tu hinh doi voi Nguyen Tung Duong da duoc thi hanh', DDK, 1 1-1 7 March 
1 995, 1 ;  Bui Cong Ly, Sang 5-3, ' tai phap truong Cau Nga, Ban an tu hinh Nguyen 
Tung Duong da duoc thi hanh', Ha Noi moi, 7 March 1 995. Other reports on the 
execution included Traffic policeman executed for killing, Vietnam lnvestme11t Review, 
(x) March 1 995. 
Foreign reports included Hanoi traffic policeman executed after controversial case, 
Agence France Presse (Hanoi), 6 March 1 995; Vietnamese policeman executed for 
murder, Reuters World Service (Hanoi), 7 March 1 995; Policeman executed by firing 
squard for widely pubicized murder, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hanoi), 8 November 
1 995; Vietnam policeman executed, The Washington Post, 8 March 1 995, A25. 
Amnesty lnternational's report on the execution may be found at Amnesty International, 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Death Penalty (1 996). A news dispatch on that 
report is Amnesty concerned over Vietnam death penalty, Reuters North American 
Wire (Hanoi), 21 February 1 996. 
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an orderly fash ion (11/im1/i go11), in accordance with law, and was completed at 4:30 on 
the morn ing of March 5,  1995. '83 
But Ha Noi moi (New Hanoi), a newspaper not earl ier associated with extensive 
coverage of the Duong case and one close to the Hanoi city leadership, provided a much 
more detai led report on the execution, and probably  the most detailed coverage ever 
publicly issued on an execution in Vietnam. While the Dai Doan ket and other reports 
read l ike brief wire services d igests of an official government release, the Ha Noi moi 
reporter, Bui Cong Ly, wrote in terms that m ight have impl ied presence at the event 
itself. 
'On the morning of March 5, at the Hanoi prison, Nguyen Tung Duong was 
escorted from his cell to the judgement execution committee to complete final 
procedural formalities. The judgement execution committee included representatives of 
three institutions: municipal court, procuracy and publ ic security. Those participating 
as witnesses and supervisors of the final procedural formal ities also. included 
representatives of other institutions: the Hanoi prison, criminal istics technicians, 
arch ival personnel to identify the prisoner, central forensic special ists, and local 
government personnel on location at the prison. 
Then the techn icians from the arch ival institution identified the prisoner, by taking 
fingerprints of Nguyen Tung Duong on the spot; those were examined by the 
criminal ist ics technical experts and a comparison was done on the spot, under a 
magnifying glass, between the fingerprints taken there and the fingerprints in Nguyen 
Tung Duong's archived file. It was then announced that the results confirmed that the 
person against whom sentence was to be carried out today was Nguyen Tung Duong. 
Before the judgement execution committee, Nguyen Tung Duong was directly read 
the decision of the President rejecting the appeal for clemency from the death sentence 
and the decision of the President of the municipal People's Court on carrying out the 
judgement. Then he signed the record of proceedings, and met with family members 
(11guoi tlim1 tro11g gia di11h), before going to the execution ground. 
83 'Ban an tu hinh doi voi Nguyen Tung Duong da duoc thi hanh ', DDK, 1 1-1 7 March 
1 995, 1 .  Other domestic reports include Hanoi judge reports execution of convicted 
policeman, Voice of Vietnam radio, 6 March 1 995, translated in BBCSWB, 8 March 
1 995, FE/2246/B; Traffic policeman executed for killing, Viet11Cun Investment Review, 
(x) March 1 995; and Ten cases that caused the greatest (whispers) in 1 994, DDK, 25 
February-3 March 1 995, 1 .  Foreign reports include Hanoi traffic policeman executed 
after controversial case, Agence France Press (Hanoi), 6 March 1 995; Vietnamese 
policeman executed for murder, Reuters World Service, 7 March 1 995; Vietnam 
policeman executed, Tl1e W asliington Post, 8 March 1 995, A25; Policeman executed by 
firing squad for widely publicized murder, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) (Hanoi), 8 
March 1 995; all available on Lexis. 
1 1 8 Mark Side/ 
At the Cau Nga execution ground, the execution committee issued the order to 
execute Nguyen Tung Duong. When the firing was completed (d11t /oat s1111g no), the 
forensic physicians carried out an examination of the convict's corpse, and then signed 
the report to confirm :  Nguyen Tung Duong was dead. 
The judgement was carried out in conformity with procedural formal ities, careful ly, 
accurately and safely. •84 
Newspaper coverage ceased almost completely after Duong's final appeal was 
denied and whi le President Le Due Anh considered his clemency petition. One 
exception was an acerbic, sly, truculent summary in a Dai Doan ket wrap-up article on 
'Ten cases that caused the worst reaction (tai tieng) in  1994, '  publ ished just before 
Duong's execution. Dai Doan ket defiantly gave the people and the press some credit 
for justice in the case of Nguyen Tung Duong. 
'The case of Nguyen Tung Duong committing murder on the Chuong Duong 
Bridge has caused an uproar in public opinion within society and in the newspapers 
throughout the past two years. It caused the worst react ions about the Hanoi traffic 
pol ice during 1 994. The case took three hearings and took very extensive labour and 
time. Many people have said that if this case had occurred in a different place, where 
the people's standards of intel lect and culture (dan tn) had not yet been famil iar with 
l aw, and without the unusual ly  active efforts of the press, the case also would have been 
concluded at the first hearing. •85 
Not all agreed that the press had helped reach a just resul t. A staff member at the 
Institute of Strategic Studies under the Ministry of Defence strongly stated the contrary 
v iew, angri ly  endorsing acerbic comments on the role of the press in the Nguyen Tung 
Duong case made by a senior Hanoi judge. 
'I am in strong agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Pham Quang Liem, 
Deputy Chief Judge of the Criminal Tribunal of the Hanoi People's Court, when he 
answered journalists' questions in A n  11i11h Thu do: 'The purpose of every court hearing 
is to be accurate with respect to persons and to be accurate with respect to crime. Press 
institutions are not trial institutions. Debating the case of a defendant is not the function 
of newspapers and radio. We should not bring in freedom of the press in order to 
conduct psychological incitement' ut i l ising matters that are contrary to the truth. '86 
84 Bui Cong Ly, Sang 5-3, ' tai phap truong Cau Nga, Ban an tu hinh Nguyen Tung Duong 
da duoc thi hanh',  Ha Noi moi, 7 March 1 995. 
85 Ten cases that caused the greatest whispers in 1 994, DDK, 25 February-3 March 1 995, 
1 , 6. 
86 Y kien hai vi dai dien Vien kiem sat va Toa an nhan dan Ha Noi, A NTD, 23 October 
1 994, 6; Anh Quang, 'Nhieu nguoi dong y voi toi ' ,  A NTD, 30 October 1 994, 6. 
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And so newspaper coverage of the death of Nguyen Viet Phuong, and the trials and 
execution of Nguyen Tung Duong, ended about as abruptly as the deaths themselves 
occurred. 
What does the coverage of this case teach us? One lesson is that despite the wealth 
of coverage, we sti l l  know l i ttle about the internal processes and pressures under which 
Vietnamese editors and journal ists work when confronted with complex social issues in 
which there is intense public interest. In this case, for example, i t  is clear that Dai Doan 
Ket and Phu Nu Thu Do perceived that they were relatively free (until the end of the 
trial) to pursue the case. And it is reasonably clear that the security newspapers, 
including A n  11i11h Tim do, remained under publ ication restrictions until the final stages 
of the matter. 
Why are those pressures appl ied and signals commun icated in specific cases. How 
are they appl ied and communicated, both to newspapers and then within them? Both 
issues require further research . What is clear is that under certain circumstances 
Vietnamese newspapers do feel a certain flexibil ity to pursue the punishment of certain 
individuals in power - and,  at least in th is  case, they pursued that punishment 
vigorously. Complex cases l ike this certainly do not mean that the Vietnamese press is 
'free ' in any sense, for obviously it is not. But such cases introduce sign ificant 
complexity into the d iscussion, a complexity that bel ies and provides texture to the 
sometime perception that the Vietnamese press is completely d irected, control led and 
dominated in its daily, article-by-article work by the pol itical structure in which it seeks 
to work. 
The Vietnamese written press has been effectively strategic in choosing arenas for 
report ing in which the Party and state have, at least in formal terms, promised more 
autonomy than in the past. Law is a clear example of both the increased autonomy 
promised (though not always del ivered), and the ways in which the written media has 
sought to bootstrap onto those formal expressions of autonomy. When the Vietnamese 
press treats law as a somewhat separate sphere of social l ife and reports on it in more 
aggressive and autonomous ways than is possible with pol i tical spheres that have not 
been granted enhanced (albeit formal) autonomy, the arena itself becomes a shield for 
the press. Freedom of the press itself could not, at least under current circumstances, 
serve as nearly a powerful shield for press activity than reporting on law or analogous 
arenas of a now more separate social l ife in Vietnam. 
NINE 
UNDERSrANDING THE WORLD OUTSIDE: 
VIETNAMESE TRANSLATIONS 
OF FOREIGN SOCIAL SCIENCE PUBLICATIONS 
David Marr and Mark Sidel• 
Almost any afternoon or evening in Ho Chi Minh City or Hanoi, hundreds of people 
can be seen browsing the downtown bookstores and bookstal ls :  retired cadres rub shoulders 
with university students; western music plays in the background; and sales staff make no 
effort to push anyone to purchase. Book prices are quite h igh for the average consumer, the 
state having removed or severely reduced publish ing subsidies about seven years ago. 
Translations of foreign social science books are especial ly  expensive, yet they attract the 
attention of browsers because of their novelty, and sales are sufficient to clean out stocks of 
many titles within one or two years, and often with in months. 
At another level entirely, h igh-ranking members of the Communist Party and state 
apparatus also seek out translations of foreign social science works, in hopes of enhancing 
their capacity to make effective decisions in the challenging new cl imate of economic 
transformation, international integration, social dislocations and cultural uncertainty. At 
the Eighth Party Congress in mid-1996, a long book table was placed in the garden of the 
conference site at the National Assembly headquarters on Ba Dinh Square in Hanoi to 
attract delegates and members of the press during adjournments. At one point Party General 
Secretary Do Muoi emerged from the building and moved down the table, examining the 
choices available. Among them were Vietnamese novels, volumes on Vietnamese history 
and pol itics, d ictionaries and reference works, and translated books on market economics 
and pol itical economy. Do Muoi purchased a translation of a French study on Napoleon, 
explaining to Vietnamese and foreign reporters, 'He was the hero of his time. Let's see 
how he carried out aggression so that we can take precautions against aggressors . '  1 
The authors are grateful to Hoang Oanh Coll ins for assistance in preparation of the database 
of translations, and to Russell Heng and Ben Kerkvliet for comments on a draft manuscript. 
Mark Side) discussions with Hanoi-based foreign journalists, November 1 996 and January 
1 997. Seth Mydans quotes Do Muoi in the New York Times, 2 July 1 996, p. 4. Reuters 
correspondent Adrian Edwards also quotes Do Muoi in 'Vietnam sets seal on Party 
congress changes', Reuters, 1 July 1 996. The South China Morning Post of 2 July 1 996 
carries an Agence France-Presse photo of Do Muoi holding the Napoleon volume, 
captioned 'Source of inspiration . '  The book is Na-po-le-ong Bo-11a-pac, by E. Tac-Le 
(Hanoi : Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1 996). Third revised printing. 
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In Vietnam today, translations are by no means the most common way to acquire 
information about the world at large. Newspapers and weekly magazines contain a range 
of stories suppl ied by Vietnam News Agency or l ifted from foreign press services. 
Vietnam Television routinely incorporates foreign sate l l i te feeds into its news programs, 
and screens foreign documentaries and soap operas. Voice of Vietnam Radio tries to 
compete with the BBC and the Voice of America. A l imi ted number of foreign period icals 
are available for sale in the main cit ies. Videotaped foreign fi lms are read i ly accessible, 
even in remote towns. Overseas Vietnamese carry in publ ications and videotapes to give to 
their relatives, and offer colourfu l verbal accounts of l ife in America, France or Austral ia, 
which became part of local lore. Meanwh ile, assorted government agencies and research 
institutes provide Party and state officials with confidential summaries and assessments of 
the foreign media. 
Given this recent prol iferation of information about the world outside; i t  is natural that 
Vietnamese increasingly seek more in-depth analysis and exposition, hoping to make sense 
of an obviously compl icated global condition, and to apply whatever knowledge is gained 
to their own specific c ircumstances. Most older generation Vietnamese writers are not in a 
posit ion to satisfy this reader demand, having been trained in the former Soviet Union, 
spent most of their l ives in  a neo-Stal in ist domestic system, then been compel led since 
1 989 to survive in a buccaneer market economy. They publ ish numerous articles that reflect 
their own d ifficult transition, but they appear to lack the confidence or the motivation to 
research and write major analyt ical monographs. This intel lectual challenge is l ikely to be 
taken up by some among the new generation of Vietnamese currently undertaking degree 
programs in western universit ies. In the meantime, book translations offer readers the most 
food for thought. 
Several years ago the authors of this article began to col lect data on Vietnamese social 
science publ icat ions translated from fore ign languages, as part of our separate, repeated 
journeys down the shelves of bookstores and l ibraries in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Da 
Nang and Hue. This reflected our broader desire to understand something about how 
knowledge is acquired, circulated, reformulated and uti l ised in contemporary Vietnam. It 
also. �ed to a �racti�al database for a �roject to translate and publish a l imi ted number of add 1t 1onal social science monographs. Supported by the Ford Foundation, this project so 
2 Copies of the computer database of foreign works already translated and published in 
Vietnamese, which provides the basis for th is  article, can be obtained from either of  the 
authors. 
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far has resulted in translation and publication of two seminal works: Edward Said's 
Orienta/ism; and Femand Braudel 's Les stntctures du quotidien.3 
Up to early 1998, the authors had canvassed about 240 publ ished translations, 
excluding novels, computer science manuals, and the occasional textbook in engineering or 
the natural sciences. We did not attempt to track down all social science titles publ ished 
before 1993, nor can we claim to have located every translation produced after that date. 
Nonetheless, we bel ieve we have collected a sufficiently large sample to be able to say 
something meaningful and interesting about the state of social science information 
circulation in Vietnam during this period of rapid change and substantial conceptual 
challenges. 
Translations in Historical Context 
Until the first decades of the twentieth century, educated Vietnamese depended on 
classical Chinese to communicate in writing. Vietnamese translated to Chinese a range of 
texts imported from Cambodia, Siam, Laos and India, perhaps most importantly Buddh ist 
scriptures in Pal i and Sanskrit. However, not many of these translations appear to have 
survived into the modern era, nor have extant texts been the object of much scholarly  
scrutiny. From the seventeenth century, Portugese, Dutch and French texts also sparked 
interest among the Vietnamese l i terati ,  and presumably provoked the royal court to 
commission the occasional internal translation to Chinese, yet there was no sustained 
initiative to scrutin ize western learn ing in the manner of 'Dutch Stud ies' efforts in Japan. 
Although relying mostly on classical Chinese, Vietnamese also created over time a 
separate but related ideographic system to accord with the sounds and syntax of the ir own 
spoken language. Known as Nom , this un ique Vietnamese script was useful in the first 
instance for recording local songs proverbs, placenames, medicinals and the names of gods 
or spirits, but it eventual ly became the vehicle as well for composition of original poetry of 
major importance to the development of Vietnamese l iterature. Eventual ly a variety of 
Chinese texts were also translated into Nom , to facilitate the circulation of ideas among 
Vietnamese lacking a classical education, not unl ike the emergence in Europe of vernacular 
translations from Latin. These included medical treatises, children 's primers, mathematics 
manuals, and especially Buddhist, Taoist and Christian scriptures.4 
3 Orientalism appeared as Dong Phuong Hoe (Hanoi : National Pol itics Publishing House 
(hereafter NPPH], 1 998). Braudel 's history was published as Nhung Cau Troe Sinh Hoat 
Thuong N gay (Hanoi: The Gioi Publish ing House, 1 998). 
4 In a personal communication of 23 May 1 997, Dr. Li Tana reported the existence of two 
shelves containing such Nom translations from Chinese in the Social Science Information 
Library in Hanoi. 
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By the seventeenth century, Western Catholic missionaries had formulated a 
roman ized alphabet to aid in their own study of spoken Vietnamese, prepare sermons, and 
train Vietnamese auxil iaries. Eventual ly tracts and catechisms were composed which 
util ized this romanized alphabet, yet it was not unti l the 1860s, when the invading French 
carried with them a printing press, that circulation expanded to significant proportions. 
Two Vietnamese Cathol ics, Truong Vinh Ky (1837-98) and Huynh Tinh Cua (1834-1907), 
labored to raise the romanized script beyond its existing status as a rather crude vehicle for 
foreign rel igious and pol i tical propaganda, producing a number of secular translations and 
codifications from French and Latin. They labeled the romanized alphabet quoc ngu 
(national language), a term previously used by some to identify materials in Nom . 
Vietnamese national ists soon took up both the alphabet and the term with enthusiasm. By 
the 1920s, Vietnamese of al l  pol itical persuasions were translating and publ ishing hundreds 
of Chinese and French texts to quoc 11gu on every subject imaginable. The new Vietnamese 
intell igentsia considered translation an integral part of language development, engaging in 
l ively debates about word formation, grammatical innovations, l inks between written and 
spoken languages, and the best ways to communicate modem ideas to the publ ic at large. 
By the early 1940s, most intel lectuals were confident that an independent Vietnam could 
make its way in the world using q11oc 11gu and spoken Vietnamese, not French and certainly 
not Chinese.5 This language development became a real ity in North Vietnam by the late 
1950s, and in South Vietnam about one decade later, a remarkable achievement compared 
to most other post-colonial societies. 
As an eager member of the social ist bloc, North Vietnam accepted tutelage from the 
Soviet Union and China, to include extensive translations of the works of Marx, Engels, 
Len in, Stal in,  and Mao Tse-tung. In addition, Russian books on pol itical phi losophy, 
h istory, l iterature, l ingu istics, ethnology, economic organization, and international relations 
were translated to Vietnamese and uti l ized in North Vietnam 's un iversities and research 
institutes. During the 1960s, Ch ina printed large quantities of Maoist texts in Vietnamese 
and shipped them to Hanoi, a process that peaked with mi l l ions of copies of the Little Red 
Book, yet it seems that a substantial percentage of these publ ications remained stacked 
away in the back rooms of institutions and bookstores. 
In South Vietnam, meanwhile, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
sponsored translation and publ ication to Vietnamese of a l imited number of books in 
pol itical science, public administrat ion, economics, and education. Students returning from 
graduate train ing in the United States also compiled and printed translated compendiums of 
textbook extracts and lecture notes, for use in un iversity instruction in Saigon, Hue, Dalal 
and Can Tho. 
5 David G. Marr, Viet11amese Tradition 011 · Trial, 1 920-1 945 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1 98 1 ), 1 36-89. 
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Overall, the 1 960s and 1970s impact of Russian and Chinese translations in the North, 
and English translations in the South, was pale compared to French translations during the 
1920s and 1930s. This had more to do with the wide-eyed curiosity of the new 
intell igentsia in colonial Indochina during those decades, and the relatively favorable 
conditions for intellectual discourse, than it did with the content of the original books or the 
quality of translation, although these factors should not be discounted entirely. 
The period of ' renovation ' (doi moi) in Vietnam, beginning in 1986, has been another 
time of intellectual exploration and reaching out, although in conditions quite different 
from before. For the first five years or so, new booklength translations were rare, reflecting 
the difficulty of obtaining suitable publ ications from overseas, the continuing conservative 
tendencies of central publishing houses, and above all the chaotic financial circumstances 
faced by publ ishers, translators, editors and potential consumers al ike. Some lengthy 
translations were published by Party and state institutions for internal circulation only. 
It was newspapers and magazines, however, that spearheaded the exciting economic, 
cultural and quasi-pol itical discussions of the late 1980s, sometimes including translated 
articles from the foreign press. Russian publ ications and Russian television provided an 
important catalyst in this era of glasnost and perestroika; when Vietnam's censors began to 
block out materials of Russian origin in 1989-90, it was a sign that constraints were being 
reimposed on pol itical debate. Since then, certain topics have been excluded from 
publ ication, al though not necessarily from smal l-group encounters. 
By 1 992�93, it was less d ifficult to identify and obtain potential ly  interesting 
publ ications from the United States, France, Hong Kong or Singapore. Enterprising local 
publishing houses accepted translations that seemed to offer money-making opportun it ies, 
while the Communist Party leadership appears to have worked out a pol icy on what types 
of translations they wished to encourage. Central publishing houses were consol idated, 
restructured, and once again provided with state subsidies, al though not the open-ended 
budgets of neo-Stalinist times. Retail prices of books escalated sharply, yet the purchasing 
power of many potential book buyers also increased during this period, whether they were 
individuals, organizations, offices, or production units. The size of print runs dropped 
dramatically, reflecting the new importance of accountants in publishing houses, but not 
necessarily the number of people actually reading books d istributed. 
Original Language of Social Science Books Translated to Vietnamese 
Engl ish 1 18 (49.4%) Japanese 8 
French 51 (21 .3%) German 4 
Chinese 48 (20. 1 %) Swedish _1 
Russian 9 (3.8%) Total 239 
(3.3%) 
(1 .7%) 
(0.4%) 
The vast majority of Engl ish language titles translated to Vietnamese are publ ished in 
the United States, with another dozen or so from Great Britain, and a handful  from Japan, 
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Austral ia and Singapore. The significant number of French language tit les reflects residual 
cultural infl uence, the availabil ity of qual ified translators, and recent French government 
publ ishing subsid ies. The number of Chinese language tit les has been increasing in the past 
few years, mostly publ ished in the People's Republ ic, but also coming from Singapore and 
Taiwan. Russian language titles have decl ined precipitously since the late 1980s. Japanese 
language titles are l imited by the paucity of good translators, al though this is starting to 
change. Final ly, i t  is worth noting the complete absence of titles from the Khmer, Lao or 
Thai languages, even though an abundance of potential translators to Vietnamese are 
available. 
Foreig11 Books Tra11slated to Viet11amese: Discipli11es a11d Subject Matter 
Econom ics 84 (35.0%) Law (non-business) 1 1  
General 12  History 48 (20. 1 %) 
Banking, money, Vietnam (non-war) 5 
financial markets 1 1  Vietnam War 7 
Business entrepreneurship 13  China 1 7  
Import-export 5 Japan 7 
Marketing research Former Soviet b loc 6 
and strategies 5 Western 5 
Business law 3 Southeast Asia 1 
Accounting/auditing 4 Philosophy 10 
Labour 1 Personal improvement 7 
Tourism 1 Rel igion 3 
Mixed economies 4 Sociology 6 
Vietnamese economy 3 Psychology 1 
Asian developing economies 9 Anthropology 2 
Chinese economy 5 Linguistics 1 
Japanese economy 8 Social science methodology 2 
Management 10 Communication 2 
'Futurology' 1 2  Literature 2 
'Understanding America ' 7 Environment/ecology 1 
International relations/ Encyclopedias 1 
strategic studies 16 Other __2 
Pol it ical science 8 Total 239 
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Economics in Command 
Thirty-five percent of all books surveyed deal with economic topics, reflecting 
Communist Party pol icy priorities, but also popular Vietnamese assumptions about how 
one 'gets ahead' in contemporary society. Most of the general titles are American 
university textbooks on the market economy, following on from the m id- 1980s translation 
of Paul Samuelson, Eco11omics, acquired originally by then Foreign Minister Nguyen Co 
Thach on one of his visits to United Nations headquarters in New York. While Samuelson 
has been reprinted several times, and is sti l l  read i ly available in bookstores, in recent years 
he has been joined by translations of: Beggs, Fischer and Dornbusch, Eco11om ics; Robert 
Gordon, Microeco11omics; and Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics. Leonard Silk, 
Collfemporary Economics: P1i11ciples and Issues, is available in bi l ingual 
Engl ishNietnamese edition, a rarity these days, but recal l ing numerous bi l ingual 
FrenchNietnamese publ ications of the 1920s and 1930s. Each of these texts had first print­
runs of 2,000 copies, quite impressive if one looks at the retai l  price tags, which average 
55,000 dong (US$4.00), the equivalent of several days wages for a Hanoi office worker. 
The only general econom ics classic to be translated so far is Adam Smith, The W ea/th of 
Natio11s. 
A number of economics titles focus on particu lar facets of the market economy, for 
example banks, stock exchanges, futures markets, export-import operations, market ing 
research, advertising, accounting and commercial law. Other translations aim to prepare 
the reader for setting up and runn ing a smal l business, with tit les l ike Cam Nang de Kiwi 
Su Doanh Nghiep (Essentials for Beginning a Business),6 or 50 Tlmat Gi11 Klwch Hang 
(Fifty Techniques to Keep Customers).7 Most of these entrepreneurial primers contain a 
fair  amount of information and suggest ions unsu ited to current Vietnamese condit ions, yet 
additional titles continue to be translated and publ ished, complete with garish cover designs 
and rash promotional blurbs. Whereas most translat ions on econom ics topics are expected 
to succeed or fai l  by means of public purchases, a significant minority of titles that target 
smaller aud iences of government officials and consultants appear to be subsid ized by 
� . d . 8 1ore1gn or omesttc sources. 
6 Translation of The McGraw-Hill Guide to Stoning Your Own Business: A step-by-step 
blueprillt for the first time e11trepre11eur, by Stephen Harper (New York, 1 992). 
7 Translation of Fifty Powerful Ideas You COii Use to Keep Your Customers, by Paul Timm 
( 1 995). 
8 These include: Joseph Stigl itz, Economics of the Public Sector (2nd edition, 1 995), 
published as Kinh te hoe cong cong (Hanoi :  Science and Technology Publishing House and 
National Economics University, 1 995); Carolyn Hotchkiss, /11tematio11al aw for business, 
published as Luat quoc te va d0011h 11ghiep (Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House, 1 996); and 
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Certain econom ics special izations are ignored entire ly or barely represented . The 
absence of any general pol i t ical economy text in translation is almost surely due to 
Commun ist Party reluctance to subm it longstanding pol i tical assumptions to public 
scrut iny, even by impl ication. There is no translation in the fie ld of agricu ltural economics, 
even though at least seventy percent of Vietnamese still make their l iving from the land. 
Perhaps it is assumed that noth ing new and st imulating has emerged in this sub-discipl ine, 
or that fore ign preoccupations are largely irrelevant to Vietnamese agricultural cond itions. 
The existence of only one labor economics translation is puzzl ing, given Vietnam 's h igh 
rate of unemployment, unprecedented internal labor m igration, and the increasing number 
of strikes. 9 
Also notable is the paucity of translations of foreign studies of the Vietnamese 
economy. The few exceptions include a couple of works by a team at Harvard 's Institute 
for Internat ional Development, to an extended essay by a Japanese econom ist, Hisashi 
Ronald McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization : Fi11a11cial control i11 the 
transition to a market eco110111y, published by N PPH i n  1 995. The French government has 
subsidized Vietnamese translation and publication in  the economics area, including such 
volumes as Jean Lafay and Jacques Lecail lon, L 'eco110111ie mixte (published as Ki11h te lion 
hop by the World Publish ing House, in 1 993); D. Larue and A. Cai l lat, Economie 
d'ellfreprise (Kinh te doanh nghiep, Hanoi : Science and Technology Publishing House, 
1 992); Robert Lanquar, L 'economie du tourisme (Kinh te du lich, Hanoi :  World Publish ing 
House, 1 993); and Jean Marc Siroen, Le desordre mo11taire intemational (Su roi loan ve tie11 
te quoc te, Hanoi: Education Publ ish ing House, 1 993). A key volume on Chinese economic 
reform, edited by the Chinese economic reform theorist and official Ma Hong, has been 
published as well :  Kinh te thi trnong xa hoi chu nghia (The social ist market economy), 
publ ished by the N PPH in  1 995. 
9 That publication is Sung Sang Park, Tang Trnong va P11at Trien: Tong San Pl1om Vat Chat 
va Chien Luoc ve Lao Dong (Growth and Development: General Material Production and a 
Strategy regarding Labor) (Hanoi : Central Institute of Economic Management, 1 992). 
Originally publ ished by St. Mart in 's  Press, in  1 977. 
1 0  Borje Ljunggren, editor, Nhw1g Thach Thuc tren Con Duong Cai Cach o D011g Duong 
(Challenges on the Road to Reform in Indochina) (Hanoi, 1 994). The original Engl ish title 
is Challenge of Refonn i11 Indochina. This was followed by Dwight Perkins, David Dapice 
and Jonathan Haughton, editors, Viet Nam Cai Cach theo Huong Rong Bay (Vietnam 
Reforms in the Manner of the Flying Tigers) (Hanoi, 1 995 and 1 996). As of late 1 997, the 
English edition of this Tigers collection had yet to be publ ished. 
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Nakatomi ,  1 1  and the ambitious description and analysis by Adam Fforde and Stefan de 
Vylder, t i tled From Plm1 to Market: The Economic Tw1sition in Vietnam , discussed further 
below. 
As m ight be expected, Vietnamese have been eager to read about the advanced 
Japanese economy and other less advanced but rapidly developing Asian economies. The 
Political Economy of Japan, a six volume study edited by Yasusuke Murakami and Hugh 
Patrick, is gradual ly being translated and published. Books lauding Japan 's ' economic 
mi racle '  predominate, written by Americans as wel l as by Japanese. By contrast, translated 
titles on developing Asian economies are more diverse in interpretation, ranging from the 
1 985 upbeat volume by Mohamed Ariff and Hal Hi l l ,  Export-oriented /nd11strialization: the 
A SEA N Experience, to the 1993 book by Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, Dragons 
i11 Distress: Asia 's Miracle Eco11omy i11 Crisis, which focuses on environmental 
degradation, social d islocations, employee condi t ions, and fragile domestic markets. Only 
one of these translations focuses on a single dragon economy; in this case Taiwan. 1 2  Given 
the recent economic meltdown in Asia, one can imagine Vietnamese cadres now busily 
searching for learned explanat ions to translate and d istribute. 
In the past three years the National Pol i t ics Publishing House has translated and 
d istributed at least five Chinese accounts of economic transformations in China. These 
books emphasise central pol icy-making, management of foreign investment and trade, 
reform of state-owned enterprises, and revital isation of social ist economics as a scientific 
d iscipl ine - all topics dear to the hearts of many top-level Vietnamese leaders. The basic 
term inology, categorisation, formulation of arguments and writing style is fami l iar to 
several generations of Vietnamese readers, whether they agree with what is being said or 
not. It seems l ikely that the NPPH has been instructed to publish such Beijing expositions 
on the Chinese economy as a counterweight to the scores of translations appearing since the 
early 1990s wh ich begin from essential ly capital ist or free market econom ic assumptions. 
Futurology, Globalization and 'Peaceful Evolution' 
In an era of rapid change, Vietnamese are fascinated by books which pred ict in 
sweeping, confident terms what the twenty-first century wi l l  bring to the world at large. 
Most popular of these ' futurology' translations are works by Alvin Toffler, to include 
Future Shock, The Third Wave, Powershift, and War mid A mi-War: Survival at the Daw11 
of the 21"' Celltury. On the cover of the 1992 Vietnamese translation of Powershift, the 
publ ishers t i t i l late the public by repeating the phrase d11 bao t11011g lai (forecasting the 
1 1  Mot Cach Nhi11 ve Cai Cach Kinh Te Viet Nam (A way of viewing Vietnam 's Economic 
Reforms) (Hanoi, 1 998). 
1 2  Bon Muoi Nam Kinh Nghiem Dai L oan  (Taiwan 's Forty Years of Experience), issued by 
the World Affairs Review (Hanoi, 1 992). 
Understanding the World Outside 1 29 
future) four times, then printing khong Luu hanh rong rai (not for broad circulation) on the 
title page, implying access to privi leged internal information. Toffler offers Vietnamese a 
humanistic, non-threatening, outwardly de-pol iticized interpretation of technological 
advance and global ization, wh ile also providing guidance on how to succeed in the 
expanding international market economy . 1 3  Le Mai, recently deceased Deputy Foreign 
Min ister, and perhaps Hanoi 's  most sophisticated advocate of global engagement, often 
chose to quote Toffler in his annual publ ished essays on Vietnam 's foreign policy and 
Vietnam's overall place in the world .  
However, other futurology translations are not as sanguine as Toffler, for example: 
Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe and 
A merica; Peccei and Ikeda, Before it is Too Late; and Maridon Tuareno, The World Tumed 
Upside Down. Dating from the first decades of the twentieth century, Vietnamese readers 
are already equipped with vivid Social Darwinian images of struggle and survival of the 
fittest, so they will find such forecasts sobering but not necessarily d isruptive. For 
additional interpretations they can consult translations of Paul Kennedy, Pl-eparing for the 
2t" Celltury, and David Halberstam, The Next Century. 
As relations gradual ly  improved between Vietnam and the United States in the early 
1990s, a number of introductory books were translated, which we have categorized here as 
'Understanding America ' .  These range from eminently practical manuals, for example 
Doing Business with the United States, by the law firm Baker and McKenzy, to the more 
broadly  philosoph ical Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in A merican 
Life, by Bellah, Madsen, Sul l ivan, Stoidler and Tipton. The latter was translated from a 
Russian edition, and given the bland Vietnamese tit le of Van Hoa va Tinh Cach cua Nguoi 
My (Culture and Character of Americans). A popular Russian description of America by 
Tsetinski i-lchaerskii was translated and publ ished under the title of Nuoc My: Muon Mat 
Doi Thuo11g (The United States: A Thousand Faces of Everyday Life). A French 
interpretation was translated as wel l ,  L 'etat des Etats Unis, edited by Lennkh and Toinet. 
Several Vietnamese authors compiled their own guides to the United States for the 
edification of fel low cit izens preparing or hoping to leave on the Orderly  Departure 
Program (ODP), an interesting exception to our earl ier point about the paucity of first­
person interpretations. The most critical translated view of America was What Uncle Sam 
Really Wants, by Noam Chomsky, fol lowed by Getting to the 21" Centltry, by David 
Korten. Clearly much room exists for the recently establ ished U.S. Embassy to introduce 
prospective titles and sponsor t ranslations. 
In the post-Cold War international environment, some Vietnamese try to understand 
the new strategic equations and ascertain what pol icy adjustments are necessary. 
Traditional ly, international relations research has been the prerogative of a t iny e l ite group 
1 3  Toffler has played a similar role in China from the late 1 970s onward. 
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working under stern confidential ity restrictions, a pattern sti l l  reflected in subordination of 
the Institute of International Relat ions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the absence 
of IR programs in un iversit ies. However, doors have opened in Hanoi to a string of foreign 
IR special ists, and a few Foreign Affairs employees are embarked on postgraduate degree 
programs overseas. No international relations textbook has been translated and publ ished 
yet. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, by Paul Kennedy, offers Vietnamese readers a 
prediction that U.S. power wil l decl ine in the post-Cold War era because of arrogance, 
over-extension and mi l itary expenditures outpacing economic resources. A translation of 
A merica 's Role i11 A sia: lllterests and Policies, by the Asia Foundation, was publ ished in 
1993. President Cl inton 's A Natio11al Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 
appeared in Vietnamese four years later. A Japanese mi l itary assessment of strategic 
competition in the South China Sea area was publ ished in 1994, under the title Ve Van De 
A 11 Ninh o Khu Vue Dong Nam A (Concern ing Security Problems in the Southeast Asia 
Region), complete with Vietnamese publisher's warn ing that the issues were 'big and 
compl icated ' ,  the original text ' l acked objectivity' i n  places, and certain ' unnecessary 
passages' had been deleted from the translation. Three books about the American CIA 
have been translated recently, reflecting Vietnamese curiosity about a long-revi led 
opponent. 
Since the early 1990s, substantial Vietnamese effort - particularly within the 
ministries of defense and interior, and the central Party apparatus - has focused on 
translation and publ ication of Chinese critiques of 'peaceful evolution ' ,  the term coined to 
characterize alleged continuing U.S. imperial ist attempts to destabi l ize social ist states and 
to topple communist parties in power. The terminology, intel lectual assumptions and 
practical policy impl ications of these books stand in stark contrast to most of the 
translations discussed above, reflecting a divided Vietnamese el ite view of the world today. 
Vietnamese editors insert prefaces or long introductions which relate Chinese arguments to 
Vietnam 's specific circumstances, as wel l as inserting the standard d isclaimer about 
conditions in the two countries not being identical .  The book tit les convey some of the 
apocalyptic mood of the texts, for example Cuoc Do Sue giua Hai Che Do X a Hoi: Bai1 ve 
Chong 'Dien Bien Hoa Binlt ' (The Test of Strength Between Two Social Systems: 
Discourse on Opposing ' Peaceful Evolution'), or Hay Cai1h Giac cuoc Chien Trai1lt The 
Gioi kho11g co Kiwi Sung: Ngltien C1111 ve Vai1 De Chong 'Dien Bien Hoa Binlt ' (Remain 
Vigilant in  the World War Without Guns: Researching the Question of Opposing 'Peaceful 
Evolution '). 
Sensitive Terrain: Politics, History and Philosophy 
Many educated Vietnamese feel a pressing need to reexamine a wide range of pol itical ,  
h istorical and philosophical questions in l ight of new economic and strategic imperatives, 
not to mention feel ing the psychological frustration of so many decades of censorship and 
self-censorship. During the late 1980s, the lid on Pandora's box appeared to open, only to 
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be pushed down by the authorities i n  1990-91,  but not as tightly as before, and not without 
a few greml ins continuing to roam at wi l l .  The Communist Party endorses the necessity of 
pol it ical renovation, but neutral izes any attempt at public d iscussion of pol itical options, 
preferring instead to concentrate on promulgating laws and reorganizing the bureaucracy. 
In such a c l imate, the range of translations on pol it ical , h istorical and phi losophical topics is 
l ikel y to suffer, yet some publ ications still manage to attract considerable reader interest. 
Two pol itical science textbooks have been translated, a 1971 Russian h istory of world 
pol itical theories, fina l ly  publ ished in Vietnamese in 1993, and Institutions politiques et 
dmit constitllliona/: /es grands systemes politiques, by Maurice Duverger, translated and 
publ ished in 1995. Other texts have been proposed for translation and use in conjunction 
with eventual pol itical science course curriculums, but seem to have been delayed pending 
further Party scrutiny. Meanwhile, readers can consul t  translations of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, a compilation of articles by Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Li 
Peng, or What is Scientific Socialism, by Kazuo Shi i .  
In  1993, Party General Secretary Do Muoi was attracted to  a book by the famous post­
modern ist Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The state of debt, the work of mouming Olld 
the new imemationa/, citing it in at least one speech and ordering i ts translation and release 
in Vietnamese. Whi le capital ists gleefu l ly  point to the collapse of the Soviet Union as 
evidence that Marx ism was dead, Derrida argues that the ghost of Marx is return ing to 
haunt the international capitalist system, which is encountering many of the fundamental 
contrad ictions Marx pred icted. The Vietnamese editors have added a preface lauding 
Derrida's cal l  to ' return to Marx' ,  but caution ing readers that Derrida is st i l l  ' a  bourgeois 
scholar viewing conditions from his own class in order to restore the honor of the author of 
Capita/'. 1 4  
The study of  law i s  somewhat less del icate than pol i tical science in contemporary 
Vietnam. In addition to business law translations, mentioned earl ier, books describing the 
legal systems of Ch ina, Japan, France, the Un ited States and Sweden have been translated 
and publ ished. A 1989 Moscow textbook on trade, civi l and fami ly law in capital ist 
countries was translated and released in 1993, with 'Capital ist ' being altered to ' Western ' 
in the Vietnamese tit le. China's 1991 White Paper 011 H11m011 Rights was publ ished in 
Vietnamese th ree years later, and in 1995 a French text book on human rights appeared in 
Vietnamese as part of a larger government project on this pol itical ly sensitive subject. 
More interested in col lecting evidence of deviant behaviour, the People 's Pol ice Publ ish ing 
t 4  Nhung Bong M a  cua M ac  (Hanoi, 1 994), p .  6 
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House translated a h isto[5 of criminology, the first volume devoted to physical ev idence, 
the second to pathology. 
History has long been contested terrain  in Vietnam, with the state always determined to 
define and project an authorized corpus, while d issidents, private researchers and local 
luminaries dare to put forth alternative interpretations. Most of the argument is over 
Vietnamese h istory, hence essentially considered a domestic affair, but occasional ly  the 
work of foreigners will be appropriated to help defend one position or another. At least 
five translations on topics unrelated to the Vietnam War have appeared in recent years, 
beginning with a Russian study on the Dai Viet state in the 101h- 141h centuries, then 
proceeding to Insun Yu 's Law a11d Society i11 Seve11tee11th a11d Eighteelllh Century 
Vietnam . Georges Boudare l 's  three decade-old French language study of Phan Boi Chau, 
early 201h century anticolonial activist, appeared in  translation in 1998. By far the most 
ambitious effort to translate French scholarship on Vietnam is taking place in Hue, where 
the entire 1 914- 1944 run of the Bulletin des A mis du Vieux Hue is being translated and 
publ ished one year at a t ime. 1 6  The editor of the original Bulletin, Fr. Leopold Cadiere, is 
best known scholastical ly for his three volume Croya11ces et Pratiques Religieuses des 
Vietnamie1111es, from which 1 6  chapters have recently been translated and publ ished. 1 7  
Ironical ly, for decades Cadiere was denounced b y  the Vietnam Communist Party a s  a 
reactionary colonial ist, whereas now concern is expressed that his admirable work must be 
translated or it wi l l  be lost to younger generations of Vietnamese who cannot read French. 
Given the central ity of the Vietnam War experience to the Communist Party's image of 
its own right to rule, one imagines that considerable  thought is given to any proposal to 
translate and publ ish a foreign account of those events. Among recent French h istories of 
the first phase of the Vietnam War (1945-54), only one has made it past this screen ing 
process: Paris-Saigon-Hanoi: les archives de la gue1Te, 1944-1947, by Phi l ippe Devi l lers. 
Why Vietnam ?: Prelude to A merica ·s A lbatross, by Archimedes Patti, was probably 
cleared because of its very favorable portrait of Ho Chi Minh, and its argument that the 
1 5  Guyec Oien Tooc Van (?), 100 Nam Khoa Hoe Hinh Su The Gioi (One Hundred Years of 
World Crimonology) (Hanoi, 1 994). 
1 6  Nhung Nguoi Bllll Co Do Hue (Hue: Thuan Hoa Publishing House). The 1 9 1 4, 1 9 1 5, and 
1 9 1 6  volumes were published in 1 997. Translated by Vuong Hong. Simultaneously, the 
Hanoi office of the Ecole Fram;aise de l 'Extreme Orient published a CD-ROM compi lation 
of the Bulletin. 
1 7  Ve Van Hoa va Tin Nguong Trnyen Thong Nguoi Viet (Hanoi :  Van Hoa Thong Tin, 1 997). 
Forward by Paul Boudet, Introduction by Dao Hung. 
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United States m issed a precious opportunity to avoid war in 1945. 1 8  A Bright Shining Lie: 
John Paul Vann and A merica in Vietnam, by Nei l  Sheehan, appeals to the Vietnamese 
sense of ethics, in  which the war can be seen as a vast moral ity play, with Vann 
symbol izing hubris, dupl icity and decadence. Facing the Phoenix, by Zalin Grant, is a 
searing critique of American pacification operations. 
The Vietnam War translation which occasioned the most interest i n  Vietnam was 
Robert McNamara 's In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam . Approval must 
have been gained very qu ickly at Party Pol itburo level , since only a couple of months 
passed between New York release of the original in  1 995 and translation, printing and 
d istribution of the Vietnamese version. The translation was rev iewed by an e l i te Party team 
in Hanoi, another ind ication of high-level approval for what was seen as McNamara 's (and 
thus to some degree America 's) most pub l ic mea culpa.  Numerous book rev iews appeared 
in Vietnamese newspapers, all emphasizing that the former Secretary of Defense had 
finally admitted the error of his ways. When McNamara was permitted to . visit Hanoi for 
the first time, shortly after release of the Vietnamese edit ion, he chided Tran Nham, head of 
the National Pol it ics Publishing House, for not requesting permission and paying royal ties. 
Al though McNamara probably meant i t  as a gentle d ig, and did not expect sign ificant 
Vietnamese proceeds, the western press and American publ isher picked up the anecdote, 
leading Tran Nham to apologize publ icly. 1 9  
I f  book translations are any ind ication, Vietnamese are fa r  more interested in the 
h istories of China and Japan than any other countries or regions. At least ten titles have 
been translated and publ ished on China's top-level pol itical struggles since foundation of 
the People's Republ ic in 1949. These are highly personal ized, colorful ,  popular h istories, 
in the trad it ion of tales about charismatic commanders, powerful emperors and scheming 
courtiers - quite a contrast to the dry, ideological ly  correct h istories which both Chinese 
and Vietnamese bookstore have stocked for decades. Two of these books treat the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolut ion, two the rise and fal l  of Lin Piao, two the secret l ives of 
Chairman Mao and his retinue, one the fal l  of the Gang of Four in 1976, one the careers of 
the Red Army's ten marshals, one the spread of corruption from the top, and one the l ife of 
1 8  Up until the late 1 980s, Hanoi history books considered Patti and other OSS members in 
Vietnam in 1 945 as enemy agents, whereas more recently they are considered friends who 
failed to make a policy difference in  Washington. S ignificantly, Patti ' s  book was translated 
by Le Trong Nghia, who had worked closely with him in August-September 1 945, and later 
achieved high rank in mil itary intell igence before being purged in the 1 960s 'Anti­
revisionism' campaign. 
1 9  David Marr meeting with Tran Nham, Hanoi, 4 August 1 995. Mark Sidel discussions with 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, July-August 1 995. 
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Kang Sheng, head of the Chinese Communist Party 's security apparatus for many decades. 
A number of these translations are publ ished by Vietnam's Publ ic Security Publ ishing 
House, presumably to help convince readers that Hanoi has long been an oasis of leadership 
recti tude and sol idarity compared to Beij ing. 
The d iplomatical ly  most sensitive translation effort from Chinese was the selected 
works of Deng Xiaoping during which Vietnamese tussled with the Chinese Embassy over 
a passage in which Deng restated Beij ing's position on the Paracel and Spratly island 
groups in  the South China Sea. Vietnamese pol itical authorities and the Party-run National 
Pol i t ics Publishing House decided to delete the passage, concerned that i t  m ight be 
regarded as formal acknowledgement of Chinese jurisdiction, and perhaps also not wishing 
to accept blame for al lowing such words to appear in print inside Vietnam. When this 
deletion came to the attention of staff at the Chinese Embassy, they complained and 
threatened to withdraw a promised publ ishing subsidy of $30,000. Vietnamese Party 
academics responsible for translation argued internal ly for retention of the offending 
passage, in the name of 'scientific integrity ' ,  to no avai l .  No subsidy was forthcoming from 
Beij ing, but somewhat later, when the Vietnamese translation was being launched publ icly 
in Hanoi, the Chinese Embassy provided a donation of $3,500.20 
Translated h istories of Japan reflect Vietnamese desire to understand the cultural, 
social and pol i t ical as wel l  as economic underpinnings of Japanese success. It also helps 
that the Toyota Foundation has subsid ized six out of the seven titles located. All seven of 
the original publ ications are in Engl ish, reflecting the paucity of qual ified translators from 
Japanese. Most ambitious is a translation of the classic three volume A History of Japan, 
by George Sanson. Vietnamese readers are l ikely to be especial ly  interested in The 
Jap011ese Social Stnicture: Its Evolutio11 i11 the Modem Century, by Tadashi Fukutake, 
which examines transformations since the Meij i  Restoration, but also social l im its placed 
on post-World War II democratization. 
Vietnamese natural ly possess considerable curiosity about events leading up to the 
col lapse of the Soviet Union and eastern European communist regimes, but so far no 
scholarly h istory has been translated and publ ished. Instead, they can read two popular 
Russian condemnations of former General Secretary Gorbachev, the memoirs of current 
President Boris Yelts in,  an expose of Yeltsin by his former security ch ief, the memoirs of 
Poland's General Jaruzelski, and the memoirs of East Germany's former General Secretary, 
Erich Honecker, written in prison. 
20 Separate meetings of the authors with Vietnamese academics responsible for translation, 
Hanoi, 3 March 1 995 and 1 6  August 1 995. About the same time the memoirs of Deng's 
daughter were also translated and published: Deng Maomao, Cha toi Dang Tieu B i11h (Deng 
Xiaoping: My father) (Hanoi, 1 995). 
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Five h istories of the western world have been translated and publ ished: the biography 
of Napoleon which attracted Do Muo i 's interest; the studies by Edward Said and Fernand 
Braudel also mentioned earl ier; another work by Braudel, titled Grammaire des 
civilisations; and a somewhat dated textbook, Civilisation in the West, by Crane Brinton, 
John B. Christopher and Robert Lee Wolff. Other regions of the world, for example South 
Asia, Africa, Lat in America and Austral ia/New Zealand, have so far been ignored entirely. 
The only exception is A History of Southeast A sia, by D.G.E. Hal l ,  translated and 
publ ished with assistance from the Toyota Foundation. Such important neighbors as 
Cambod ia, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia remain untouched, at least in  our sample, 
when it comes to translations of country h istories. 
In keeping with the Communist Party's insistence that phi losophy be a sub-category of 
pol itical ideology, phi losoph ical translations long focused almost entirely on the works of 
Marx, Engels and Lenin, with the occasional teleological nod to Kant and Hegel .  In the 
1 950s and 1960s, Josef Sta l in and Mao Tse-lung also were regarded as philosophical 
giants, hence being translated and publ ished in large quantity. Today, al though it is sti l l  
impossible to translate 201h century Marxist phi losophers not in the Lenin ist l ine of 
succession, pre-Marxist phi losophers are being given their most sympathetic reexamination 
since the early 1 940s. A translat ion of Du co11trat social, by Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
attracted intel lectual attention when it was publ ished in 1992. The French government then 
sponsored L 'esthetique de Hegel, edited by Bernard Teyssedre, and a translation of 
Montesquieu's 1 81h century classic, Le Esprit de lois. To meet the need for a deta iled 
history of western philosophy, however, Hanoi turned to a Chinese Marxist, Liu Fangdong, 
whose Triet Hoe Phuong Tay Hie11 Dai (Modern Western Phi losophy) actual ly  stops at the 
1 9•h century.2 1 This was followed by translation in Ho Chi Minh City of a 14-year old 
Russian phi losophy textbook.22 
Vietnam's most original phi losopher of the 201h century, Tran Due Thao, who wrote 
largely in French, final ly had his Recherches sur l 'origi11e du la11gage et de la co11scie11ce 
translated posthumously into Vietnamese.23 This translation is the only one by a 
Vietnamese author to show up in our survey of bookstores. It is pol itical ly s ign ificant 
because Tran Due Thao was one of the most prominent victims of the late 1950s 
2 1  Published in four volumes i n  1 994-95 by the NPPH. The tenth printing of the original 
Chinese opus was released by Beijing's People's Publishing House in 1 992. 
22 J .K. Melvil, Cac Co11 Duo11g cua Triet Hoe Plruo11g Tay Hien Dai (The Paths of Modem 
Western Phi losophy) (Ho Chi Minh City: Giao Due Publishing House, 1 997). 
23 The original was published by Editions Sociales in Paris in 1 973, while the translation was 
distributed by Culture and Information Publishing House (Hanoi) in 1 996. Only 800 copies 
were printed. 
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Communist Party crackdown on intel lectuals, eventual ly being perm itted to m igrate to 
France, only recently being rehabi l itated to the extent of having his rema.ins returned to 
Vietnam and his writings selectively compl imented in the press. 
Far more publ ic attention is now being devoted in Vietnam to classical Chinese 
philosophers (e.g. Confucius, Mencius, Hsiin-tzu) than was permissible a decade ago. 
Vietnamese translations of the four books and five classics have been re-issued, and a 
wealth of secondary studies of eastern philosophy have appeared, part of the broader, 
pol it ical l y  s ignificant d iscourse on 'Asian values ' .  Nonetheless, we could only locate one 
translation of a book on the theme of contemporary Asian values: T11yen 40 nam Clzinh 
luan cua Ly Quang Die11 (A Forty Year Selection of Upright Exposition by Lee Kwan 
Yew). 
In the realm of popular phi losophy, Vietnamese have long been attracted to self­
improvement or personal development manuals. Recent offerings include two of Dale 
Carnegie's exhortations, How to Win Friends and Influence People, and How to Stop 
W onying and Start Living, as wel l as one by his wife, Don 't Grow Old, Grow Up! .  Three 
different Mekong delta publ ishers released these Carnegie t itles, suggesting l ively 
commercial competition. One Japanese popular philosophy, by Cho Sakaue, was translated 
under the title of Ba Nguyen Tac S11y Nghi de Thanh Cong (Three Principles of Th inking 
in Order to Succeed).24 
Slim Pickings 
A number of other social science discipl ines have aroused much less interest, if 
translations are a rel iable indicator. Only three translations on rel igion have been publ ished 
- two h istories of Buddhism by Japanese and French authors, and a Chinese Buddhist 
exegesis. Sociology has received more translation attention recently, boasting three general 
textbooks, a text devoted to social organisation, a study on the sociology of rel igion, and 
Emile Durkheim's classic, The Rules of Sociological Method. Anthropology is represented 
inadequately  by a d ictionary of symbols and Dan Sperber's Le savoir des anthropologues: 
trois essais. Linguistics has one translated textbook, while psychology possesses merely a 
translation of the eccentric essay by Roberto Assagiol i ,  La developpement tra11sperso1111el. 
The relatively new field of Communications Studies is represented by L 'explosion de la 
communication: la naissance d'une nouvelle ideology, and a popular manual titled Non­
verbal Communication: How to get it, How to use it for Love, Profit and Pleasure, by Al lan 
Pease. Literature can boast only a general h istory of French l iterature, and Lu Hsiin's 
classic h istory of Chinese fiction, translated from an Engl ish translation. 
Environment/Ecology Studies possesses one textbook: L 'environment, by Jacques Vernier. 
24 Translated from a Taiwan Chinese version, and published by World Publishing House, 
Hanoi, 1 995. 
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We d id not manage to locate any recent translations in the fol lowing d isciplines: 
Archaeology, Human Geography, Demography, Arch itecture, or Urban and Regional 
Planning. 
How Books are Selected for Translation 
In the early 1980s, the (U.S.) Association for Asian Studies donated several hundred 
books and journals to the History Institute l ibrary in Hanoi, while the U.S. Comm ittee for 
Scient ific Cooperation with Vietnam donated hundreds of titles to other institutions in the 
capita l .  Many of the books remained stacked in damp, dusty comers - uncatalogued, 
unpubl ic ized and unread . By the late 1980s the intel lectual mood was far more open, yet 
the insti tutional framework failed to keep pace. In 1 993, the Harvard-Yenching Library 
sponsored d istribution of over two hundred classics in the western humanities and social 
sciences to seven l ibraries throughout Vietnam. Subsequently the American Council of 
Learned Societies, the Ford Foundat ion and other funders have also provided book sets to 
key institutions. In many cases the books remained inaccessible or unknown to academics, 
much less students, journal ists, publ ic servants and other potential readers. Meanwh ile, 
lack of fore ign currency prevented Vietnamese l ibraries from in itiating thei r  own 
purchasing strategies. 
With l ibraries lagging behind, it is much more common for ind ividual Vietnamese 
officials or academics to bring home a couple of books from overseas meetings, perhaps 
review a favorite title in a newspaper or journal ,  and eventua l ly  share their personal book 
acqu isit ions with col leagues. At the same time, representatives of foreign embassies, 
international agencies and NGOs, as wel l  as foreign academic visitors to Vietnam, bring 
books to the attention of Vietnamese counterparts and often make gifts of specific titles. 
From these encounters the question of whether a particular book deserves translation to 
Vietnamese or not arises qu ite natura l ly. 
Certain Vietnamese organ izations are more eager to promote translations than others. 
Since the late 1980s, the Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) has played a 
key role in identifying and sponsoring translations on economics topics. The Vietnam 
Historical Science Association has fostered relevant d iscussions, especial ly  via its month ly 
journal, X ua va Nay (Past and Present). The Ho Chi Minh National Pol it ical Academy 
(Party School) has long sponsored translations of foreign texts, includ ing most of 
Vietnam 's translations of human rights documents and commentaries. Editorial teams at 
Engl ish-language newspapers routinely d iscuss foreign books, to include possible 
translation, and individual members take part in specific translation efforts. On a more 
restricted basis, the Social Sciences Information Institute surveys foreign materials, 
c irculates Vietnamese synopses, and occasional l y  recommends books for ful l-scale 
translation to the Social Sciences Publ ishing House. The Second Department of the 
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Ministry of Defense does much the same, with translation recommendations going to the 
National Pol itics Publ ishing House. 
Among foreign organizations, the Toyota Foundation took first init iative in the 1980s 
in recommending tit les for translation, not l im iting i tself to Japan-related top ics or to 
Japanese-language titles.25 The French Ministry of Culture became increasingly active 
from the early 1990s in promoting Vietnamese translations from French, as part of i ts 
international Francophone strategy. The Chinese government has done l i kewise with books 
on Chinese economic reform, as well as the selected works of Deng Xiaoping, mentioned 
earl ier. By contrast, the Swedish International Development Authority has tended to 
sponsor more diverse translations from Engl ish. The Ford Foundation has supported 
translations of foreign social science perspectives unl ikely to ach ieve circulation in 
Vietnam through other channels. 
Financial subsidies, whether domestic or foreign, continue to play an important part in 
determining what is translated to Vietnamese. In the early days, Toyota translation grants 
were so large that they amounted to an operat ional subsidy for the particular Vietnamese 
institute or department involved. This set an unfortunate precedent, not simply in terms of 
cost per translation, but also encouraging some Vietnamese institutions to lobby for grants 
without much thought to what was proposed for translation. More recently, some foreign 
donors have offered partial or matching grants, leading some Vietnamese to criticize them 
as parsimonious. Nonetheless, domestic subsidies are smaller. 
Market forces have spurred on translations to Vietnamese in certain realms, notably 
fiction, but also econom ics and accounting textbooks, entrepreneurial primers, 'futurology ' 
books, and personal improvement manuals. A few t i tles have already undergone mult iple 
printings. However, many books that undoubtedly would sel l wel l  in  translation remain 
out-of-bounds due to Party and government content restrictions. 
Translators 
Vietnam lacks a professional association of translators and interpreters to be able to 
define and safeguard technical standards, protect the interests of members, and foster public 
appreciation of quality language skil ls .  Nor is there sustained discussion among 
intel l ectuals about the art of translation, the enrichment of Vietnamese vocabulary through 
neologisms, or the amount of effort which ought to be al located to translation versus 
25 The Toyota Foundation also sponsored translation of Vietnamese tit les into Japanese, Thai, 
Indonesian and Tagolog, a remarkably open-minded approach compared to other 
foundations or government cultural agencies. 
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teaching people to read in foreign languages. Only among devotees of French or Russian 
l iterature does one occasional l y  see attention devoted to such questions.26 
Most of the h ighly respected French translators have d ied or ret ired, al though a few of 
the latter continue to accept commissions to be able to supplement the ir  meagre pensions. 
Many wel l - regarded Russian translators are still avai lable, but there is l ittle cal l for their 
services. Vietnamese who received advanced train ing in  China in the late 1 950s and 1960s 
are qu ite active again, after a h iatus during the period of intense Sino-Vietnamese animosity 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. A smal l group of translators led by Nguyen Huy Quy, 
Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the National Center for Social Sciences in 
Hanoi, has energetical l y  selected, translated and arranged publ ication of a number of 
economic, pol i tical and ' peaceful evolution ' volumes from China.  Because very few 
leaders in the Party, government or mi l itary can read Chinese fluently, the efforts of 
Nguyen Huy Quy and h is col leagues are assigned h igh priority, beginning with special 
access to source materials from China, the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi ,  and Vietnamese 
diplomats in Beij ing and Guangzhou .27 
As m ight be expected, the demand for qual ified Engl ish-language translators has 
completely outstripped supply in recent years .  The first smal l group of Vietnamese fl uent 
in Engl ish from the 1 940s is now mostly gone.28 Many of those who mastered Engl ish in 
South Vietnam during the 1950s and 1 960s fled the country after April 1975. The minority 
who remained were systematical ly excluded from employment, al though in recent years, in 
m iddle age, they have dusted off their Engl ish and sometimes found remunerative jobs. 
Another group studied Engl ish in Austral ia in the late 1970s, and can now be found at 
upper or m iddle levels of the bureaucracy, occasional l y  turning their talents to translation. 
When perusing Vietnamese publ ications translated from Engl ish, one is immediately 
struck by the extreme variation in translation qual ity. Some are h ighly  proficient, some 
erratic from chapter to chapter, some very inaccurate or barely comprehensible. Translators 
are normal ly  paid by the page, with the most h ighly regarded Engl ish-to-Vietnamese 
translators receiving US$8.00 per page in 1998. Individuals at this level receive most of 
26 See especially the bi-monthly journal Van Hoe Nuoc Ngoai (Foreign Literature), published 
by the Vietnam Writers Association. Biographical sketches of translators of specific texts 
are provided. 
27 Mark Sidel, 'The reemergence of China studies in Vietnam' ,  The China Quarterly (June 
1 995). 
28 One from that era, the composer and writer Do Xuan Oanh, headed the Vietnam Committee 
for Sol idarity with the American People in the late 1 960s and 1 970s, and continues to work 
as an English translator in Hanoi. Another, Pham Van Chuong, is Executive Vice 
Chairman of the Party 's External Relations Commission. 
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their income translating documents or reports for foreign companies and international 
agencies, often leaving them l ittle time or energy for booklength projects. At best they are 
able to join a bevy of translators, take responsibi l ity for one section, and leave i t  to others to 
i ron out discrepancies. Often the ed itor or publisher pays a senior academic or official to 
scrut inize the translated segments, comment and make recommendations (hieu di11h), but 
these individuals are not necessarily  selected because of high language competence, and 
even those who possess the necessary expertise may find the job too daunting, simply 
return ing a dubious manuscript for publ ication. 
The weakest translations we encountered seem to have been completed by one person 
working in isolation, then printed without further assessment by small  local publ ishing 
houses hoping to make a qu ick profit. Stories of such disastrous translations are wel l  
known among Vietnamese intel lectuals and the object of much scorn or amusement. Even 
the most serious translated publ ications usual ly  lack a translator's preface to describe 
problems encountered and measures taken. Few translations possess annotations to 
elucidate al ien terms or explain unfami l iar events, people and places. We noticed, for 
example, that the key Engl ish term 'business' was translated in five different ways in 
Vietnamese, without explanation: kinh dom1h, dom1h 11ghiep, dom1h t/111011g, co11g 11ghiep, 
and buon bm1. Of course, piece-rate remuneration does not encourage translators to pause 
over words, consider alternatives, and provide annotations. More fundamental ly, 
translators today lack esprit de corps or practical ways to help each other improve 
performance and secure better contract provisions from employers. One tightly-knit group 
associated with the Party's External Relations Commission has accompl ished some of the 
strongest translations, especial ly  relating to strategic and development issues. The group 
also enjoys ready access to relevant publ ications and rout ine contact with foreign 
consultants, senior visitors and representatives of international organ izations, not to 
mention rapid access to Party approval mechanisms. 
· Publishers 
Publ ication of Vietnamese translations is dom inated by three or four publishing houses, 
but with a large number of other houses able to produce the occasional translation, as can 
be seen from the following table: 
Number of Viet11amese Social Scie11ce Tra11slatio11s Released by Specific Publishers 
Chinh Tri Quoc Gia (National Pol it ics) 
Khoa Hoe Xa Hoi (Social Sciences) 
Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh (Ho Chi Minh City) 
Khoa Hoe va Ky Thuat (Science and Technology) 
The Gioi (World) 
Thong Ke (Statistics) 
Van Hoa Thong Tin (Culture and Information) 
Cong An Nhan Dan (Peoples Pol ice) 
76 
34 
1 9  
1 1  
9 
8 
8 
8 
(31 .8%) 
(14.2%) 
(7.9%) 
(4.6%) 
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Giao Due (Education) 
Mui Ca Mau (Ca Mau Peninsula) 
Other 
Unknown 
Total 
7 
5 
42 
-11 
239 
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The National Pol i t ics Publ ishing House has released a clear plura l i ty o f  foreign 
translations since the early 1990s, and appears to be strengthening its position with each 
passing year. It has the best re lationsh ip with Vietnam's central leadership, the least 
problem obtain ing perm ission to publish, the read iest access to domestic subsid ies, the 
capacity to cut across all bureaucratic obstacles when seeking foreign contacts or foreign 
language materials ,  and the most extensive book d istribution network in the country. As an 
entity, NPPH results from the early 1990s merger of three Party publ ishing houses and the 
former Law Publ ishing House. NPPH books are read by h igher and m iddle level officials 
and sen ior academ ics in Hanoi and Ho Ch i Minh City, and they make the ir way to other 
local ities via Party and government channels, the National Library 's d istribution system to 
local l ibraries, and avai labi l ity in local bookstores. 
What is not clear is how many NPPH books are purchased and how many are 
d istributed gratis, not to mention how many copies are actual ly read by ord inary cit izens. 
Compared to the largest of its predecessors, Truth Publ ishing House, the NPPH operates 
under much looser ideological instructions, hence can release ' l iberal ' translations that 
reflect capital ist values, or non-communist pol it ical theories, and even critique social ist 
development pol icies, wh ile on the other side translating 'conservative ' Ch inese 
condemnations of ' peaceful evolut ion ' of interest to some Party groups and the min istries 
of interior and defense. If a specific publ ication encounters subsequent criticism, whether 
in the press or via confidential leadersh ip memos, as has happened on more than one 
occas ion, NPPH is in a good pos ition to protect translators and editors from retribution. 
Ult imate respons ibi l i ty for translated content rests with the publ isher, large or small ,  
but the censorship process is far from straightforward or transparent. Al l  publ ishing houses 
are state-owned, and all houses contain Communist Party cel ls, yet local entrepreneurial 
and inte l lectual in terests are often wel l  represented in decision-making. A great deal of 
self-censorship occurs, whether in decisions by a translator to fudge the meaning of 
sentences in the original text, the choice by an editor to excise entire passages, or the 
decision of a publ ishing house manager to turn down a book ent irel y because of its 
controversial character. Abridgement on pol itical grounds is probably  the most common 
form of censorship, with the only issue being whether or not to insert the notorious [ . . .  ] 
symbol ind icating that a passage has been removed. In recent years, however, a few 
prom inent intel lectuals have stated their opposition to such pol it ical abridgement, argu ing 
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that foreign books should be e ither accepted or rejected in total ity, not carved up accord ing 
to what persons at various levels bel ieve to be acceptable at the moment.29 
Unti l  the mid-1980s, one technique for deal ing with controversial topics was to print 
the warn ing 'L 1111 Ha11/J Noi Bo' (Internal Circulation) on the cover of publ ications and 
l imi t  d istribution to Party government and mi l itary offices only. In practice, however, 
custod ial procedures appear to have been lax, so that copies passed from hand to hand 
among intellectuals, and eventual ly made thei r  way into used bookshops. More recently, 
the warn ing has appeared less and less on publ ication covers; when uti l ized, the purpose 
probably has more to do with suggest ing exciting reading to potential customers than 
l imit ing circulation. A variation is to print 'Saeli Tham Khao' (Reference Book) on the 
cover, especial ly of translations, meaning that the content has not been subjected to 
procedures which make it part of official wisdom. Some translations still appear to be 
d istributed through closed channels 
The 1997 translation of Fforde and de Vylder, From Pla11 to Market, mentioned earl ier, 
may mark a new, healthier phase in Party responses to foreign stud ies conta in ing h igh ly 
controversial assertions.30 Rather than simply delete large chunks of the original text that 
' do not conform to Vietnamese attitudes ', as in the past, the publ ishers appended a seven­
page d isclaimer, taking exception to the characterisation of the earl ier system as 'Neo­
Stal inist ' ,  criticising the author for inadequate attention to the historical effects of war and 
revolution, and rejecting their emphasis on spontaneous, grassroots economic in itiat ives 
rather than central policy formulations. One short section of the book, about l im its on the 
rights of cit izens to travel ,  to meet fore igners and to form independent organ isations, is 
tabled an infringement on Vietnam 's sovereignty, yet st i l l  translated with reasonable 
fidel ity. Publ isher's footnotes have been added in the same spirit. Outright deletions 
appear to be l im ited to a couple of comments about individual Vietnamese personal ities. 
Moreover, the authors were consulted during the process of translation and editing - an 
I d d . . 31 a most unprece ente mnovat1on. 
29 First meeting of Translation Consultative Group, Hanoi, 2 December 1 994. David Marr 
discussions with journalists in Ho Chi M inh City, 5 March 1 996. Discussions with Adam 
Fforde about translation of From Plan to Market, cited below. 
30 Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder, From Plan to Market: The Eco11omic Tm11sitio11 i11 
Viel/lam, published as Tu Ke Hoach de11 Tlri Tmo11g: Su Cliuye11 Doi Ki11/i Te o Viet Neun 
(Hanoi : NPPH, 1 997). 
3 1  Stein, Tonnesson was also consulted during translation of his book, The Viemamese 
Revolutio11 of 1945: Roosevelt, Ho Chi Mi11h a11d de Gca11/e i11 a World at War (London, 
1 991 ), but as of 1 998 too many issues of content remained to permit publication to go 
ahead. 
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Hanoi 's  declarations that it wi l l  abide by international copyright conventions, and the 
recent signing of a Vietnam-U.S. copyright agreement, adds a new dimension to translation 
and publ ication of foreign books. Many of the books we perused did not even bother to 
identify the original title and publ isher. The Vietnamese publ ishing market is sti l l  qu ite 
small from the point of view of major international publ ishers, so that investigations and 
formal complaints are not yet worth the costs involved, unl ike the situation with pirated 
CDs and videotapes. However, foreign textbook publ ishers are making d iscreet joint 
venture soundings in Vietnam, so it is only a matter of time before the whole gamut of 
intellectual property issues are addressed. In the meantime, at least one major Vietnamese 
publ isher is wi l l ing to provide token copyright payment to a foreign publ isher for the right 
to publ ish a translation, al though the transaction is being negotiated via a third party. The 
question of abridgement or modification of the original text when translating is l ikely to 
precipitate as much tortuous discussion as the financial detai ls. 
Distribution 
In the trad ition of the French Depot Legal ,  Vietnamese books usual ly  l ist the print run 
among the publishing detai ls. Most translations surveyed here l isted print runs of 800-
2,000 copies, with an occasional 3,000 or 4,000 copies being l isted. However, i t  is wel l  
known that publ ishers sometimes receive a grant to print a specific number of copies, l ist 
that amount official ly, then quietly produce a smal ler amount to be able to pocket some of 
the grant or share it with the translators. Aware of this practice, some donors have given up 
specifying the print run, instead requ iring the publ isher to provide them several hundred 
copies gratis, which then often col lect dust in the corner of some office, a problem hardly 
un ique to Vietnam. 
Distribution channels beyond Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City remain erratic at best. 
Even in Hue, a city noted for its cultural heritage and pride, the three or four small 
bookshops contain mostly public school texts, fiction, popularized h istory, comic books 
and a smattering of titles from the NPPH, including one or two translations. Conditions are 
sim ilar in Hai Phong.32 An interesting exception may be the Mekong delta, where 
bookshops in My Tho and Can Tho, at least, stock some of the translated business manuals, 
personal improvement books and ' understanding America ' volumes. Other than browsing 
bookstores, potential readers mostly hear about new translations via the grapevine or in 
newspaper reviews and commentary articles. Publ ishers do not yet spend much money on 
advertising. Sales of books are l imited by the h igh retai l  prices, especial ly  for translations. 
On the other hand, i t  is not unusual for a single copy of a highly regarded translation, 
whether purchased or obtained free, to go through four or five sets of eager hands in the 
spate of one year. 
32 David Marr observations in Hue, February 1 996 and April 1 998. Mark Side! ob5ervations 
in Hai Phong, July and Aguust 1 995. 
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Conclusion 
Vietnamese translations of foreign social science publ ications can probably  be divided 
into three categories. First, there are the titles aimed expl icitly at upper and middle level 
cadres, with the content possessing definite pol icy impl ications, at least for purposes of 
internal government del iberation. Second are the translated textbooks meant to be used in 
classroom instruction, not as officially-approved components of the publ ic education 
curriculum, a process which lags years behind, but as informal supplementary reading. In 
fact, many of these translated textbooks are l ikely to be employed more in the host of 
private schools that have cropped up, or in tutorial sessions with privileged students. 
Finally, there are many titles aimed at the general reading publ ic, at least those citizens who 
wish to go beyond amusement, to be educated, informed or inspired. Of course, ind ividuals 
may choose to read across these categories, which is no problem if they l ive in one of the 
major cities and can afford the bookstore prices, or can share battered copies with 
colleagues and friends. 
What is still lacking in Vietnam is publ ic d iscourse about what needs to be translated, 
and how to improve quality and expand readership. With these questions in m ind, a 
Translation Consultative Group was formed in 1994 in Hanoi, chaired by Professor Phan 
Huy Le, of Hanoi National University, and including foreign as wel l as Vietnamese 
members. While two foreign social science titles have been translated and published, and 
four others are in process, the objective of stimulating broader d iscussion about the content 
and technique of translation remains unfulfil led. Translation in Vietnam is still being 
accompl ished by scores of small groups encountering foreign books separately, deciding 
whether to translate or not, and proceeding through the various steps with min imal 
consultation. The exception is the National Pol itics Publ ishing House, which however 
prefers to conduct affairs in confidence. 
If Vietnam is compared with other countries of Southeast Asia in the ongoing 
translation and publ ication of foreign social science works, the picture is by no means grim, 
despite its late start and Vietnam's continu ing low per capita income level. Vietnamese 
readers are more l ikely to look for translations than readers in Singapore, the Phil ippines or 
Malaysia, even when they know how to read Engl ish or some other foreign languages. 
More meaningful comparisons are with readers in Thailand and Indonesia, where larger 
numbers of translations are probably available for purchase than in Vietnam, yet per capita 
consumption of translated books may not be as h igh. Everywhere in Southeast Asia there is 
intense curiosity about foreign ideas, customs and behaviour, yet the desire in Vietnam 
today to test everyth ing against received wisdom, to fathom the d iverse social, pol it ical and 
cultural d ilemmas which accompany rapid economic change, seems especially pronounced. 
With a new contingent of students and scholars returning from overseas, we may see an 
upsurge in intellectual activity in general and translation in particular of the kind which 
characterised l ife in 1920s and 1930s Vietnam. 
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If the pattern observed in Vietnam during the 1920s and 1 930s repeats itself, we are 
l ikely to see very soon an explosion of Vietnamese-authored social science publ ications 
which draw heavi ly on recently acquired information and interpretations from overseas, 
including the several hundred translations surveyed in this essay. Actually this phase has 
already begun modestly, in the form of local ly written textbooks designed to compete 
commercial ly with foreign texts translated to Vietnamese. During an early  1 998 v isit to 
bookstores, new Vietnamese-authored textbooks were noted on the subjects of economics 
(4 titles), accounting (3), management (3), marketing (2), banking and finance (1), 
international law (1), and pol i t ics and law (1).33 Some of these textbooks were qu ite basic, 
perhaps a imed at the secondary school market, and certainly less expensive than the hefty 
foreign translations. Some appeared to translate large chunks of foreign books without 
attribution. One economics text admitted to relying entirely on two sources: Roger Le 
Roy's Economics Today (1991); and the Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics (1993). The 
pol i t ics and law text showed few s igns of change from the rigid 1980s offerings, d ividing 
i ts presentation into the following: classical-feudal-bourgeois ideas; scientific Marxism­
Lenin ism; and Ho Chi Minh thought. 
The next step is for Vietnamese social scientists to advance beyond translations and 
textbook reformulations to original interpretations and analysis. On the bookshelves in 
early 1998, at least two books seemed to be trying to meet this challenge, an expostulation 
on cul tural sociology by Doan Van Chuc, and an international relations examination of 
President Cl inton 's strategy of engagement and enlargement. What comes next will depend 
on a host of variables - commercial , cul tural,  intel lectual and pol i t ical . In any case, return 
visits to bookstores are sure to prove reward ing. 
33 David Marr's observations in bookstores in Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi and Da Nang, March­
April 1 998. 
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REPORTING VIETNAM: 
TRUE CONFESSIONS OF A FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT 
Peter Mares 
When it comes to the activities of the foreign media, Vietnam remains one of the 
most tightly control led societies in the world .  Foreign correspondents are thus 
confronted with a di lemma. In order to satisfy our bosses and advance our own careers 
we must do our best to file lots of stories and to make them as interesting as possible. 
But such reporting can contribute to the inaccurate impression that Vietnam is a country 
steadi ly opening up to the outside world .  Foreign journal ists are in danger of becoming 
unintentional 'spin doctors ' for Vietnam 's commun ist government and its pol icy of 'doi 
moi' or economic reform. 
Editors, readers and audiences are general ly not interested in how hard a story is to 
get unless i t  happens to be something extraordinary ( l ike Nate Thayer's coverage of the 
Khmer Rouge ' trial ' of Pol Pot where getting the scoop is almost as much of a story as 
the story itselt). The bureaucratic and legal istic barriers to accurate reporting do not 
make good copy. With the exception of natural d isasters, and in contrast to the 
country's war-tom past out of which so many famous journal ists bui l t  their careers, 
dramatic news events are rare in contemporary Vietnam. Pol i t ical confl icts are fought 
out in secret and communist party officials have perfected the art of bland 
pronouncements. On the infrequent occasions that a difference of opin ion is revealed in 
publ ic the reference is usual ly obl ique and veiled, requ i ring interpretation and analysis 
by a reporter, rather than making a headl ine in its own right. When social tensions erupt 
into protests or demonstrations, there is an immediate ban on foreign journal ists gain ing 
access to the s i te of the d ispute. 
By describing some of my own experiences during two years in Vietnam as the 
Hanoi correspondent for the Austral ian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), I will attempt 
to outl ine the regulations and practical obstacles that make reporting in Vietnam so 
d ifficult. I wil l  also provide some examples of the suspicion that attaches to the western 
media, including international shortwave broadcasters and foreign language 
publ ications produced in Vietnam. I hope this wil l  go some way to explaining the 
l imitations of foreign media coverage of Vietnam and the frustrations of foreign 
journal ists working in the country. 
I will argue that restrictions on foreign media helped Hanoi to successful ly mou ld 
and manage Vietnam 's international image after the country opened its doors to 
international trade and investment in the late 1980's, but that those same restrictions are 
today backfiring. The resul t  is reduced and consistently negative reporting about 
Vietnam. 
Allow me to begin with an extended anecdote. 
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Burning Bridges in Vinh Long 
My request seemed simple enough. Alexander Downer was heading to Vietnam to 
turn the first sod on the My Thuan bridge, the biggest infrastructure project ever funded 
with Austral ian aid money. I wanted to get some advance footage of the bridge s ite and 
the existing ferry service at My Thuan in order to ship a story to Austral ia in advance of 
the big day. This would spare the cash-strapped ABC the prohibitive costs of 
transmitting the pictures via satel l ite. I would also save the ABC the cost of a camera 
crew by shooting the pictures myself on a mini  d igital camera. Television on the cheap, 
but it helped me to justify the cost of a visit to the Mekong Delta to look at problems in 
the rice industry (a subject of far more importance than the sod-turn ing but not one to 
evince much excitement from my editors). 
I put in my formal travel request to the Press Department at the Min istry of Foreign 
Affairs, the agency that is the official sponsor of all foreign journal ists resident in 
Vietnam and with wh ich we engage in a process of ' mutual cooperation and 
understanding' .  According to the regulations governing the foreign media, all 
journal istic act ivity requires an official permit. If the project involves travel outside 
Hanoi, then the Press Department must also request the assistance of the International 
Relations Department of the provincial Peoples Committee. This is not necessarily a 
straightforward matter. In Vietnam as they say, the power of the emperor ends at the 
vi l lage gate. If provincial authorities do not want a journalist to visit for whatever 
reason, then they can simply refuse to cooperate even though the request comes down 
from on h igh. 
In the case of the My Thuan bridge however, I did not anticipate any cause for 
concern. After all, this a project of national priority, a symbol of the enduring 
friendsh ip between two nations agreed to at the highest levels of government. Along 
with the Austral ian Foreign Minister, Vietnam 's Deputy Prime Minister was also 
scheduled to take part in the sod-turning ceremony. As the only Austral ian journal ist 
resident in Vietnam surely my way to reporting the story would be smooth. 
Accompanied by my col league Jeremy Grant from the Financial Times, I flew 
down from Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City on a Monday morn ing, p icked up a h ire car at 
the airport and headed directly to the Del ta. The Foreign Ministry press assistant 
travel l ing with us was a handsome and styl ish young man called Khang, who seemed to 
have everyth ing in hand. After escaping the choking traffic in Ho Chi Minh City I sat 
back to enjoy the view. As we entered the Delta factories became fewer, bridges and 
canals more frequent and the rice fields a deeper green. 
Four hours later we arrived at the My Thuan ferry and encountered our first 
obstacle. The Press Department in Hanoi had forgotten to process my request to film 
there. When Khang checked the all- important permit that we carried with us ,  My Thuan 
was not mentioned. The permit stated only that I was authorised to carry out 
journal istic work in Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho but here we were in Tien Giang 
province. We chatted with the un iformed guards at the ferry station and I flashed my 
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official journalist card issued by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry - something which I 
dutifull y  carried at all times in accord with government regulations - but which I was 
never once asked to show and which never once proved of any use whatsoever in 
getting me access to anything. This occasion was no d ifferent. The guards pointed to 
the sign that indicated it was forbidden to take pictures around the ferry station and told 
us to come back tomorrow to talk to their sen ior officer who had already knocked off 
for the day. (It was after four o 'clock). Undeterred, the enterprising Khang searched 
out the ferry station boss and found him sipping iced coffee under a shady tree. In his 
most pol ite, most apologetic and most deferential Vietnamese, Khang asked him to 
assist us in our m ission to film the ferry. He refused. He said that we needed 
authorisation from the Peoples Committee in Tien Giang town which was some d istance 
away. We could call them and ask for permission I suggested lamely, proffering my 
mobi le phone. Khang looked at me l ike I was complete fool .  Apart from the fact that it 
was well past knock-off time, such matters must be dealt with in writing or in person. 
Having wasted an hour we gave up and drove on the Can Tho. At this stage I was 
still confident that the problem could be solved. After all we had to drive back to Ho 
Chi Minh City via the same route and I was sure that we would be able to get 
permission to film the ferry on the return journey three days later. 
From Can Tho I contacted the Foreign Ministry Press Department in Hanoi and 
explained the problem. They apologised for the oversight and promised to arrange the 
required permission for our filming schedule. Since we would be approaching the 
bridge from the opposite direction this time, we agreed it would be more convenient to 
' cooperate' with the Peoples Committee in Vinh Long province rather than Tien Giang. 
(The river marks the provincial boundary). 
On the morning in question we set off early from Can Tho. I needed to get the 
filming completed as quickly as possible in order to make a two o 'clock appointment 
back in  Ho Chi Minh City. We arrived at the offices of the International Relations 
Departmerit of Vinh Long Peoples Committee around 8 am and Khang and I went inside 
while Jeremy Grant waited in the car. I naively assumed that it would be a simple 
matter of picking up a stamped document authorising our filming before proceeding on 
to the ferry. I had been in  Vietnam 18 months, long enough to know better. 
Khang and I were ushered upstai rs to the air-conditioned reception room. My heart 
sank. The table  was groaning with platters of rambutan and long an. Plastic bottles of 
Le Ville m ineral water (a rip-off of the dominant La Vie brand) stood ready for 
consumption. Clearly the People 's  Committee had prepared for a large official 
journal istic delegation appropriate to the size and importance of the bridge project itself. 
At the very least they must have expected a complete film crew of three or four people, 
not a single reporter with a mini-digital camera that looked more l ike tourist 
accoutrements than a piece of professional equipment. I real ised that I should have 
asked Jeremy to come inside with me to boost my appearance of weighty 
professional ism. 
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Khang and I sat down on 'our' side of the immense table, whi le four serious 
looking officials all armed with attachC cases sat opposite. The geometry of such 
meetings is always the same; foreign visitors l ine up on one side of the table,  local 
officials on the other, mi rroring the formal ity of h igh-level d iplomatic consultations in 
Hanoi 's  Government Guest House. The rules of engagement also vary little. As the 
visitor and suppl icant, it was up to me to state my business and request the assistance of 
my interlocutor. Adopting my most pol ite manner, I thanked the peoples committee 
officials profusely for their  time and their gracious welcome. I described my project 
and waxed lyrical about the significance of the My Thuan bridge to Vinh Long 
province. My hosts l istened impassively and then responded in kind. Without any 
apparent enthusiasm they told me how honoured Vinh Long Province Peoples 
Committee was by my visit and assured me that the International Relations Department 
would do everything in their power to assist me with my task. The My Thuan bridge 
was a project of national importance being built with the generous assistance of the 
Austral ian government. Because I was an Austral ian journalist special arrangements 
had been put in place on my behalf and I would be given access to film the construction 
site for the bridge. 
I noted that there had been no mention of the ferry and fel t  my first twinge of alarm. 
I knew that without p ictures of the ferry, a TV report on the bridge would be unl ikely to 
make it onto the main evening bulletin. It was one of the only elements of the story that 
held some visual promise; the colour and movement of vehicles and crowds of 
pedestrians getting on and off, ferries pull ing out from the wharf and crossing the 
expanse of river. I had intended record ing a 'stand-up' (or piece to camera) in front of 
the ferry station because it would provide the backdrop I needed to talk about the 
bridge: 'The 1500 metre long My Thuan bridge will replace this creaking and 
overloaded ferry service which currently carries twenty thousand people across the 
Mekong River each day . .  . ' . 
I suppressed my rising feel ings of panic and courteously thanked the Peoples 
Committee for their generous assistance once more. I was very pleased that I would be 
able to visit the construction site for the bridge and, I added careful ly, I was of course 
also looking forward to filming the existing ferry service which was, I explained, an 
essential part of my story. 
The Peoples Committee spokesman responded in kind. Vinh Long was honoured 
by my visit and had gone to great l engths to organise my itinerary so that I would be 
able to film the construction site for the bridge. 
'And the ferry, ' I added. 'The construction site, ' he repl ied. We batted this one 
backwards and forwards a few times l ike pol i te ping pong players until i t  was clear that 
neither side was wil l ing to concede the point. 
There . was an uncomfortable moment of si lence. Then the Deputy Head of the 
International Relations Department ·reached into his attachC case and slowly  drew out a 
fax. It was the letter sent to Vinh Long from the Press Department in Hanoi .  He read it 
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through slowly. 'No mention of the ferry. ' he concluded. 'According to your request 
you want to film the construction site for the bridge. We have arranged that. ' 
'Oh, there must have been a small m isunderstanding,' I said, trying to sound jolly 
as I used the polite code word for 'complete stuff-up' .  In an attempt to build solidarity 
with my hosts and exploit regional resentments towards the central authorities, I tried to 
put the blame on Hanoi. 'You see the people up there don ' t  understand, '  I said. 'They 
think the ferry and the bridge are in the same place. They have not been to Vinh Long 
province. They don 't  real ise that they are 500 metres apart ' .  
The Vinh Long delegation was unmoved. The top man slowly re-read the letter and 
reiterated his earlier point. Hanoi had not mentioned the ferry. 
'Surely in this case there can be some flexibility, ' I said, almost pleading now. 
I was told that existing laws made it impossible to take photographs of the ferry. 
Only the chairman of the Peoples Committee could authorise an exemption. 'Well, let's 
ask him,' I suggested blithely. 
'He's  not available, ' I was told .  
I began grasping at straws. I pointed out the bridge was a high-priority project of 
great significance to both nations, a symbol of friendship between the Australian and 
Vietnamese people and I hinted how embarrassing it would be when I explained to the 
Australian Ambassador that I could not do a TV story about the bridge because the Vinh 
Long Peoples Committee would not allow me to film the ferry. 
My hosts did not bat an eyel id. They passed the Hanoi fax around amongst 
themselves, reading and re-reading it. 'No mention of the ferry, ' they concluded. 
Desperate now, I offered a last d itch compromise. We would go to visit the 
. construction site as arranged and in the meantime I would call Hanoi on my mobile 
phone and ask that they send a new fax explaining the error and requesting access to the 
ferry on my behalf. Everyone breathed a sigh of rel ief. There was a way out of the 
immediate impasse. We broke the seals on our bottles of La Ville and chewed a few 
rambutan. Then, after a pol ite interval, we drove the fifteen kilometres to the bridge 
site, a car load of Vinh Long officials in tow. 
The construction site confirmed my worst fears. There was nothing even remotely 
interesting to film.  A flat expanse of red earth, a flat river and a flat, d istant shoreline. 
There was no work going on, no cranes, no trucks or other equipment with the 
exception of a small compacter parked in the shade. As we piled out of our cars a lone 
worker cl imbed into the compacter and drove it carefully backwards and forwards over 
the already bill iard-table smooth red earth. Real ising that this had been staged for my 
benefit I dutifully filmed the performance, knowing all the while that the pictures would 
be too boring to use. 
In an effort to salvage something from the disaster, I decided to try to film my piece 
to camera on the river bank with the 'colour' of a barge going past in the background. 
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There were a couple of old concrete pi l lars sticking out o f  the water. One o f  the 
people's committee officials told us that they were remnants of the Saigon regime's 
attempts to build a bridge in the same spot in the early seventies. Because of the war, he 
said, the project was abandoned. To the drowning man that I was, this small fact 
appeared to be a l ifeline and I grabbed onto it without question. With Jeremy's 
assistance as stand-in camera operator I positioned myself on the river bank with a 
crumbl ing concrete bol lard in the background, waited for a ferry to go past and recorded 
my piece to camera: 
'You can see the remnants here of a bridge that the government of the former South 
Vietnam tried to build in the 1970's. The Vietnam War put an end to that plan. Now 
the new My Thuan bridge is a h igh national priority for Hanoi ' .  
Hardly incisive journalism but  at least it  l en t  some relevance to  the location - or so 
I thought. After the story was aired on ABC-TV, an AusAID official offended by my 
mild criticism of the My Thuan project took great joy in tel l ing me that what I had said 
in my piece to camera was 'a  complete load of bullshit ' .  The concrete pi l lars were not 
the remnants of an attempted bridge at all. They were for river boats to tie up  to. 
But as I stood squinting into the camera in Vinh Long I doubted whether the story 
would ever be broadcast in any case. An overl it p iece to camera on the riverbank and 
an undersized steam rol ler were hardly the images that I had hoped for from My Thuan. 
We cl imbed into our vehicles and set off back in the direction of Vinh Long town 
and I called Hanoi on the mobile phone to get more bad news. The Press Department 
assured me that they had tried very hard to get permission for me to film the ferry but 
the Chairman of the Vinh Long Peoples Committee was not available to authorise it. 
Furious, I asked the driver of our car to head directly for Ho Chi Minh City. There was 
no point in going back to the offices of the Vinh Long Peoples Committee for more 
rambutan. We flashed the car ful l  of officials with our headl ights and turned around. 
Out of pol iteness I also asked Khang to ring Vinh Long, thank them for their assistance 
and explain that we had urgent business in Ho Chi Minh City. 
When we arrived at the ferry station I got out of the car, m ixed in with the crowd, 
pul led out my camera and began filming. It was a bit rushed and there was no chance of 
recording a ' stand-up' but I basical ly managed to gather the images I needed. Crowded 
buses, vendors, loading and unloading, ferries crossing the river. Then I looked over 
my shoulder and saw Jeremy frantical ly  waving at me to stop filming. Behind him 
Khang was in conference with the bevy of Vinh Long officials who had accompanied us 
to the construction site. I snuck back through the crowd l ike a naughty school boy, 
sidled up to the car on the bl ind side of the officials and dumped my camera on the 
passenger seat. Then I walked up to Khang and the officials to find out what was going 
on, assuming that they had followed us because they suspected my underhand scheme to 
secretly fil.m the secret ferry. I was wrong. The reason that they had driven the 15 km 
back from Vinh Long was that we had failed to pay them the 'organising fee' of 50,000 
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dong (about US$4.50) for their  'assistance' with our itinerary. Such 'fees' are 
commonly demanded of foreign journal ists in Vietnam though receipts are rarely issued. 
I regard myself as even tempered and patient but on this occasion I had reached my 
l imit .  Angry beyond words I ostentatiously pulled out my wallet and thrust a green 
50,000 dong note into the official 's hand. By now a crowd of people were watching our 
negotiations with interest. I had of course made it impossible for him to take the 
money, which should be discretely handed over in  an envelope via my assistant. 
Publ icly humil iated, he gave the money back to the long-suffering Khang and infl icted 
h im to a dressing down. I got in the car and slammed the door, the one and only 
occasion that I had completely blown my cool in Vietnam. It is not a moment of which 
I am proud .  I sent my secret ferry footage back to Austral ia where it was broadcast on 
the 7pm news. There were no repercussions. 
Mutual Cooperation 
In retrospect my trials and tribulations at the hands of the Vinh Long Peoples 
Committee make for an amusing anecdote of l imited journal istic consequence. It was 
simply a matter of gathering some video footage to meet the narrow and pred ictable 
requirements of a brief television news story. However the fact that I ran up against so 
many bureaucratic obstacles in executing such a trivial task is an ind ication of the much 
greater d ifficulties presented by covering pol itical ly sensitive events and issues. Often I 
was prevented from covering a story at al l ,  or at least from doing so adequately. 
In August 1997 for example, I planned to visit Quang Tri province to witness the 
annual Catholic pi lgrimage to La Vang which is held to coincide with the Assumption 
of the Virgin Mary. The pilgrimage celebrates an appearance of the Virgin to Cathol ics 
who were suffering persecution at the hands of the Nguyen Dynasty in the 18th 
Century. This makes i t  both interesting and controversial (as al l  reporting of rel igious 
affai rs is in  Vietnam). The Foreign Ministry Press Department in Hanoi told me that the 
provincial officials in Quang Tri were ' too busy ' to assist me. I remonstrated that I d id 
not need their  assistance, only their  permission, pointing out that I would after all be 
travell ing with my  official Foreign Ministry press assistant. My protests were to no 
avai l .  Press Department officers assured me that they had done their  utmost to convince 
their counterparts in Quang Tri to cooperate and appealed for my 'understanding' that 
bureaucrats in some parts of the country were sti l l  affl icted by 'old  thinking'.  I do not 
know if they were tel l ing the truth or simply passing the buck. 
Another example was the difficulty correspondents encountered in covering rural 
unrest in Thai Binh province just 60 km from Hanoi during m id-1 997 because all 
requests to visi t  the area were rejected. We all worked our contacts as much as possible, 
talking to people who had travel led to the province and placing telephone cal ls to local 
district offices. In the end however, nothing can substitute for first hand experience and 
direct conversations with local people. Of course the option remained open to 
correspondents to defy the regulations and simply travel to Thai  Binh independently. 
One correspondent took this course. She was spotted and immediately ' invited ' into the 
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Press Department ' to drink tea ' - a euphemism for being reprimanded and official ly  
warned. All correspondents rely  on the Press Department for assistance in the s ix  
monthly renewal of their visas. Without the Press Department's assistance a 
correspondent can find themselves forced to leave the country when their current visa 
expires. This happened in 1 996, when Adam Schwarz, correspondent for the Far 
Eastem Eco11omic Review, was effectively expel led from Vietnam. 
Correspondents also rel y  on the Press Department for assistance in  obtain ing 
official interviews and travel perm its, a power wh ich can be turned against those who 
refuse to 'cooperate ' .  I was personal l y  warned in this manner after travel l ing to Kim No 
vi l lage on the outskirts of Hanoi to report on a d ispute over a proposed golf course 
development. Vil lagers were protesting because the local peoples committee was 
attempting to cream off the bulk of the money that had been promised to them in 
compensation for loss of their paddy fields. After my third visit to the v i l lage I was 
invited for tea at the Press Department and informed that I was breaching regulations 
because I did not have perm ission to carry out journalistic activit ies in that d istrict. One 
of the three officials l ined up to reprimand me then pointed out that the Press 
Department could only 'cooperate ' with foreign journal ists who obeyed the laws of 
Vietnam. I interpreted this as an unambiguous warn ing: if I persisted in v isiting the golf 
course s ite then in future I could expect very l ittle assistance in obtain ing official 
interviews and travel permits. I was then asked for a guarantee that I would not visit the 
site again. I tried to dodge the issue by pointing out that the area in question was part of 
Hanoi and that I routinely went about report ing events in Hanoi without requesting 
official perm ission in advance. The head of the press department then referred me to 
the expl icit letter of the law, which states: 1 
' In order to carry out journalistic activities mentioned in the Regulations, the 
resident journal ists must send their requests on a case-by-case basis to the Min istry of 
Foreign Affairs at least 5 days in advance and are not al lowed to carry out those 
act ivit ies before the issuance of the press Permit by the Min istry of Foreign Affairs ' .  
Taken l i terally, Regulation 13  means that I should request written permission from 
the Foreign Min istry five days before I even pick up the telephone to call the Austral ian 
Embassy to ask for a recent trade stat istic. When I put this to the head of the Press 
Department during our tea-drinking session he laughed and said 'You must understand, 
of course we are flexible ' .  
' Flexibi l i ty' means that the  regulation is arbitrary. The last thing the  Press 
Department wants is to be flooded with formal appl ications for permission to carry out 
run of the mi l l  journal ist act iv it ies. Like so many Vietnamese laws, the regulations 
govern ing fore ign media activities are broad brush provisions that can be appl ied to 
prevent a journal ist from engaging in any activity that any official body at any time has 
Article 13 of the 'Regulations on Press and Information Activities of Foreign 
Journalists, Offices and Organisations in Vietnam. 
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decided is off- l imits. One of the most ludicrous examples of this occurred when a 
Dutch tourist was stabbed to death by a thief i n  Ben.Thanh market in Ho Chi Minh City. 
A colleague who happened to be in Ho Chi Minh City that day contacted the local 
branch of the Foreign Ministry Press Department to request the assistance of an 
interpreter to interview market stal l  holders about the incident. Her request was rejected 
because she had not appl ied for permission to report the event five days in advance ! To 
add insult to i njury, the responsible official l ectured my journal ist col league for using 
the word ' murder' to describe the Ben Thanh market death. She was told  that the Dutch 
woman had not been ' murdered ' but ' k i l led while resisting being robbed' ,  an interesting 
d istinction. 
Language is a major difficulty for fore ign reporters in  Vietnam. Few 
correspondents speak good enough Vietnamese to work independently and they are 
required to h ire their  press assistants and interpreters through the Foreign Min istry. 
This creates a number of problems. Firstly, while some press assistants are highly 
ski l led, the pool of talent is not very large. Despite being wi l l ing, many assistants are 
not able; they lack adequate language ski l ls to work as interpreters and translators 
deal ing with complex material . If media organ isations were free to h i re outside the 
Foreign Ministry they could easi ly find competent and highly motivated assistants 
amongst the numerous young graduates looking for work. Secondly, press assistants 
are expressly forb idden from engaging in 'journal istic activities ' themselves.2 This 
means that they cannot attend a media conference and ask questions on behalf of a 
correspondent, let alone write articles or news reports in their own right. This 
diminishes the capacity of foreign news organisations to take advantage of local 
knowledge, renders the press assistants ' job boring and reduces opportunities for ski l ls 
development and career advancement of Vietnamese staff. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, the assistants are expected to guide and monitor the activi ties of 
correspondents. At worst this turns them into spies; at best i t  means that are put in the 
invidious posit ion of having divided loyal ties. Each Saturday afternoon press assistants 
are expected to attend a weekly briefing and may find themselves s ingled out and 
chastised over the activit ies or reporting of ' their '  correspondent or newsagency. Press 
assistants may also find their personal l i fe under scrutiny. For example, any assistant 
who marries a foreigner will be forced to immediately quit their job, regardless of 
whether or not thei r  spouse has any connection to journal ism. 
2 Article 11.C.8 of Circular No 84/ITLB 'Guiding the implementation of the Regulations 
on Press and Informat ion Activities of Foreign Journalists, Offices and Organ isations in 
Vietnam' states: 'The Foreign Press Centre at the MOFA is the only office authorised to 
introduce and provide interpreters and press assistants to, and sign labour contracts with 
resident press bureaus in Vietnam as specified in Article 14 of the Regulations. 
Interpreters and press assistants of the press bureaus are not entitled to journalists' 
status and are not allowed to carry out journalistic activities as the correspondents of the 
press bureaus. ' 
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If a trip to a troubled province l ike Thai Binh is to yield worthwhi le material then 
the journal ist needs help, not only in interpreting but often in  winn ing enough 
confidence and trust from local people to get them to open up to a fore ign visitor. But 
journal ists are only too aware that asking for help from their assistant, or from a 
Vietnamese friend or col league, is to expose that person to unacceptable personal risk. 
It is the Vietnamese helper who may find the i r  career on the skids, their chance to study 
denied, their promotion blocked, their appl ication to travel overseas stal led - at worst i t  
is the Vietnamese assistant who wi l l  end up in  jai l ,  charged with reveal ing state secrets 
or one of the other myriad catch-all offences from Vietnam 's criminal code. What 
stopped me return ing to the Kim No golf course vi l lage was not so much the fear that I 
would be den ied future access to senior government officials (few of whom I found 
worth interviewing i n  any case), but concern for those who had assisted me on my 
earl ier visits. Whi le I was called in to 'drink tea ' my assistant was taken off to another 
room for a separate dressing down which left her visibly shaken and upset. I later 
d iscovered that the driver of the vehicle that had taken us to Kim No had also been 
questioned about the visit . 
The government is also concerned that Vietnam 's new crop of young, enthusiastic 
and increas ingly crit ical domestic journal ists is a potential ly rich source of information 
for foreign correspondents. After all, local journal ists often know much more about a 
given story than they are al lowed to print or broadcast themselves. In order to address 
this issue the government introduced new regulations in September 1997 expl icit ly 
banning Vietnamese journal ists from providing their  foreign col leagues with 
information, photographs or articles without prior approval from the government. The 
,ban will further reduce the already sadly l im i ted interaction between local and foreign 
media. Foreign journal ists are excluded from most domestic media conferences 
organ ised by government departments or agencies in  Vietnam and the Commun ist Party 
clearly wants to l im i t  ideas or information flowing in e ither d i rect ion. In late August 
1 997, the head of the Ho Ch i Minh Pol i tical Academy, Pol itburo member Nguyen Due 
Binh, launched a bl istering attack on western infl uence on the Vietnamese media, 
saying such 'cultural and pol i t ical trespassing . . . .  destroys the boundaries of social order 
and national sovereignty in  press and information activit ies ' .  There also appears to be 
an unofficial ban on Vietnamese journal ists going to the United States to upgrade their 
professional qual ifications or skil ls in  journal ism, though countries l ike Austral ia or the 
United Kingdom still appear to be acceptable places to undertake such study.3 
Despite its role in regulating and reprimanding foreign journal ists, the Foreign 
Min istry must still be regarded as one of the most open and progressive of a l l  
3 In September 1 997, a promising young journal ist from the English language Vietnam 
Investment Review was prevented from taking up a three month scholarship to report 
on lhe opening session of the l/N General Assembly because he could not ol,tain an exit 
visa to travel to New York. However, it is unclear whether this was the result of official 
policy or personal rivalries. 
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Vietnamese government agencies. My own subjective assessment is that the Min istry 's 
Press and· Information Department is not particularly  pro-active in its moni toring 
activities. Rather, the Press Department responds to pressures from other more security 
minded sections of the state apparatus, particularly  the Interior Min istry. 
In the case of the Kim No golf course, for example, I was not called in  because the 
Press Department or the Vietnamese Embassy in Canberra had monitored my critical 
radio reports on the d ispute via the ABC or Radio Austral ia, but because the Interior 
Ministry had complained to the Press Department that foreign journal ists were visit ing a 
sensitive area where unrest was occurring. The Press Department then qu izzed press 
assistants in foreign news bureaus to identify the culprits. 
With the important exception of television stories, the Press Department has no 
means of exerting d irect control or censorsh ip over the material that foreign journal ists 
file from Vietnam. For example, my rad io reports were genera l ly  filed d irect ly over a 
standard telephone l ine. Some of my meetings with critical figures were observed by 
secret pol ice who were either very unski l led in their art, or else del iberately chose to 
make themselves obvious as a form of int imidation. At other t imes people who had 
agreed to see me would suddenly pull out of the meeting at short not ice and without 
explanation. I can only presume that they had been warned off. Of course there are 
other critical figures, such as the ageing d issident Nguyen Ho who is under house arrest 
in Ho Chi Minh City, to whom access is completely impossible. But general ly, if 
someone was wil l ing and able to talk to me then I was able to record their voice and 
send their comments to Austral ia without any hindrances. 
Television is different because of the cumbersome nature of the medium.  Any 
video or fi lm  footage shot in  Vietnam must be cleared by the Fore ign Min istry prior to 
its export or transmission via satel l ite. Courier companies wil l  refuse to carry a tape 
that has not been cleared; Vietnam Television wi l l  refuse satel l ite access to ground 
station fac i l i ties unless the appropriate clearances are obtained first. The clearance of 
tapes is general ly a routine matter, provided that permission to fi lm the story was 
obtained in advance. Given the permit process for carrying out journal istic activities, it 
is rare for a tape to contain any h ighly controversial scenes or comments in any case. 
(Where the subject of fi lming is controversial , then the tape has usual ly been recorded 
without permission and so the journal ist must find an unofficial way to get it out of the 
country.) But even if a report is critical, the Press Department does not general ly argue 
over the selection of individual shots or the comments of interviewees. 
To take an example, I made a short feature on Hanoi 's  pavement culture for ABC 
TV. The idea was to show the vibrancy and diversity of Hanoi street- l ife from early 
morn ing to late evening. Essential ly this was a 'colour' story but I also wanted to 
i l lustrate the problems of a recent government decree on maintain ing order in the 
streets, which had given the police arbitrary powers to hound it inerant traders and 
confiscate thei r  goods. I asked for perm ission to interview the police and film them 
going about thei r  work. My request languished on various desks for nearly two months 
and eventual ly  went al l  the way to the head of the Hanoi pol ice department for approval. 
Reporting Vietnam : Tnte Confessions of a Foreign Correspondelll 1 57 
Final ly I was given perm ission for the interview and invited to the local pol ice station in 
Cho Hom ward. This area contains one of Hanoi 's  busiest markets and the streets and 
pavements are usual ly overflowing with stal ls, traders, shoppers and chaotical ly  parked 
motorbikes. I arrived to find that a Potemkin l ike scene had been arranged for our 
benefi t. Reinforcements had been cal led in and there were two or three smil ing 
pol icemen patrol l ing on every street and chatting pol itely with local c i t izens; traders ' 
stal ls had been banished from the neatly swept footpath and there was no sign of the 
usual army of wandering women who sel l goods from a pai r  of baskets slung from a 
pole across their shoulders. In the market itself hardly a lettuce leaf was out of place. 
Luckily we had already recorded other footage of typical ly heavy handed pol ice action 
amongst the usual chaos of Hanoi 's  streets. So in the final version of the story we were 
able to show up this staged scene for what it was. 
The Press Department did not object to, or even question, any of the raw footage 
that I shipped back to Sydney for that story. On another occasion the Press Department 
was actual ly my saviour in getting tapes out. At that stage (prior to November 1996), 
the Min istry of Culture and Information rather than the Fore ign Ministry was 
responsibl e for approving the export of tapes. I was making a feature on return ing 
boatpeople with a camera crew that had flown into Hanoi on a repatriation fl ight from 
Hong Kong. The crew had fi lmed sequences in the detention camps there and some of 
the boatpeople interviewed had made very negative comments about Vietnam. When I 
submitted the ful l  set of tapes for export approval, officials at the Min istry of Culture 
and Information withheld that footage. They did not expl icitl y object to the content of 
the tapes but complained that they had been brought into Vietnam i l legal ly. Accord ing 
to regulat ions the tapes shot in Hong Kong should have been declared to customs 
officials at the a irport and then sealed (presumably to stop such subversive material 
from being dupl icated and d istributed within Vietnam). It took several days of d ifficult 
negot iations (with the Foreign Min istry Press Department acting on my behalf) before 
Culture and Information final ly relented and agreed to release the tapes. 
Documentary fi lm makers are not treated as journal ists and must st i l l  work through 
the Min istry of Culture and Information. This means that they experience much closer 
scrutiny than television crews. In 1 997 a film crew working on a documentary about 
charity work amongst street chi ldren in Ho Chi Minh City had to be accompanied at al l  
t imes during the shoot by officials from Cultu re and Information. They found 
themselves argu ing over every shot that portrayed a potential ly  negative image of 
Vietnam such as images of poor shanty dwel l ings or of rubbish strewn along the banks 
of canals. 
Hostile Forces 
Working for the Austral ian electronic media probably  protected me from suffering 
the same intense scrutiny as some of my col leagues in the print media, particularly US 
cit izens and those working for influential regional magazines l ike the Far Eastem 
Economic Review (FEER) or the Asian edition of Time. 
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Magazine articles are easily photocopied and passed around. FEER and Time 
appear once a week on the same day. The table of contents can be easi ly checked for 
stories on Vietnam. Paragraphs or even entire stories that are considered offensive or 
overly critical are frequently blacked out before copies of the magazines are d istributed 
domesticall y. Journal ists working for both publ ications are monitored extremely 
closely. They are routinely called in  to ' drink tea '  and forced to mount a l ine by l ine 
defence of their copy. Newspapers and wire services also receive considerable attention 
and are periodical l y  taken to task for their reporting in commentaries in  Vietnam 's state 
control led press. 
By contrast I was able to go about my work with less harassment and intrusion . 
One reason may be that I was not considered to matter much. Television may be 
extremely influential but the ABC is not CNN. Secondly, given the restrictions outlined 
above and the practical l im itations of the medium, i t  is hard to make real ly penetrating 
and critical television reports in  Vietnam. (For example, i t  was extremely difficult to 
produce any kind of TV report about the 1 997 unrest in Thai Binh because there were 
no pictures to go with the story). 
Radio is much more flexible than television and that is where my best and most 
incisive work was done, although in contrast to print, radio is ephemeral .  I rarely knew 
when my stories would be broadcast, so without rigorous and exhaustive monitoring 
there was l ittle chance that Hanoi officials would manage to keep a close watch on what 
I was writing. The daily shortwave Vietnamese language service of Radio Austral ia 
which broadcast translations of my stories was relatively easy to monitor and had a 
considerable l istenersh ip in Vietnam. However, Radio Austral ia is general ly not viewed 
in such antagonistic terms as the BBC, Voice of America, Radio France International or 
Radio Free Asia.4 
The BBC is sti l l unable to open a bureau in Hanoi and officials continue to chastise 
visiting BBC representatives over the series of extended interviews with the dissident 
Bui Tin broadcast by the Corporation 's Vietnamese service after he first went to Paris in 
1 990. Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are frequent targets of attack in the 
domestic media, of which this commentary from the communist party daily Nha11 Da11 is 
typical :  
'Abusing modem broadcasting technologies under the pretext of ' freedom ' and 
'democracy' ,  a handful of hosti le forces in the United States have been pursu ing a plan 
of ' peaceful evolution ' in  an attempt to interfere in other countries ' internal affai rs, 
destabi l ise and eventually overthrow pol i tical regimes out of their favour . . . . . .  [they] 
4 The closure of Radio Australia's Darwin transmitter by the Howard government in July 
1 997 means that Radio Australia's service is now virtually impossible to pick up in 
Vietnam. 
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intentional ly  use information and cultural means as an invasive instrument [and) persist 
in real ising their scheme cooked up carefu l ly  for heinous purposes. '5 
It is not surprising that Hanoi remains concerned about the infl uence of 
international shortwave radio broadcasts in Vietnamese, g iven the l im ited media choices 
open to most cit izens, particularly in rural areas. Anecdotal evidence suggest that Voice 
of Vietnam rad io fai ls to win much of an audience and, despite h igh l iteracy rates and 
the hundreds of separate press and magazine t itles publ ished in  Vietnam, few rural 
Vietnamese ever have access to a newspaper. (According to a survey of 372 people in 
Hai Hung and Ninh Binh provinces, only 8 per cent had regular access to newspapers. 
Most of those people were teachers, pensioners and government employees/ 
By contrast, Vietnam Television is rea l ly  successful in winning viewers, al though 
the communist party is still concerned that the advent of satel l ite TV threatens to 
undermine the state 's attempts to control pol i t ical and cul tural values. A decree issued 
in late 1996 restricted access to satel l ite d ishes. Only senior party, government and state 
officials, media organ isations, sections of the security apparatus and up-market hotels 
were authorised to receive satel l ite broadcasts. (However, nine months after the decree 
was implemented there sti l l  had been no concerted attempt to crack down on unl icensed 
d ishes.) 
The government also keeps a watchful eye over foreign language magazines and 
newspapers publ ished in  Vietnam, such as the dai ly Engl ish language Viet11am News, 
the weekly Viet11am /11vestme11t Review (VIR) and the monthly Viet11am Eco11omic 
Times (VET). 
For example, Viet11am News ran into problems over the following headl ine: 
' Successful farmers suffering heavy losses due to bad government pol icy says Nhan 
Dan . '  7 As the headl ine suggests, the article was a translation from the communist 
party's own official newspaper, but the choice of the phrase 'bad government pol icy ' in 
the headl ine caused offence. In the body of the article government pol icies were 
labelled ' inappropriate ' .  Late in the evening, as copy deadl ines loomed, a t ired foreign 
sub-ed itor had subst ituted the much snappier and shorter 'bad ' for ' inappropriate ' ,  in 
order to make a headl ine which would fit the available space. This 'error' prompted 
Interior Ministry investigators to visit the Viet11am News offices and re-trace the 
ed itorial path of the story. 
Images can be equally controversial .  In early 1996 embarrassed staff from the VIR 
came knocking on doors asking subscribers to return copies of the magazine that had 
been del ivered the day before. The problem was a front page photograph accompanying 
a financial story. The photograph showed a cycl ist riding past the State Bank building 
5 Niimi DOii, 22/10/97. 
6 N Iran DOii, 6/1 0/96. 
7 Vietnam News, 1 512/91. 
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in Hanoi. In the comer was a small inset photograph of Prime Min ister Vo Van Kiel. 
Apparently the relative size and placement of the Prime Minister's image caused so 
much offence that the entire issue had to be recalled. VIR also produces a weekly 
le isure insert cal led 'Time Out ' .  In mid  1 996 the cover of a special summer edition of 
'Time Out' showed a young woman lying on a blue and white striped beach towel with 
a piece of green star fruit  over each eye. Staff at the magazine were chastised for 
surreptitiously trying to reproduce the American flag! Astounded by the unintended 
symbol ism that had been read into their innocent image, staff then decided to test the 
official capacity for deciphering coded messages. A subsequent issue of 'Time Out' 
featured a picture of two Soviet watches one laid over the other. The watch underneath 
had the word ' perestroika' wri tten on the dial - the top watch read 'glasnost ' .  But this 
subl iminal message about the primacy of pol i t ical over economic reform passed 
unnoticed. 
V IR is a joint venture between Vietnam's Min istry of Planning and Investment and 
Austral ian business interests, including media tycoon Kerry Packer. Former Managing 
Director Alex McKinnon did not deny that the magazine's l inks to the government set 
the paper's overal l  editorial agenda. 'Well  I don 't  think we are afraid to say that we are 
in fact, if you l ike, a public relations department of the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment' ,  he told me in an interview for the ABC. ' I  mean that 's why we came here, 
to promote Vietnam, '  he added. 
VJR has to play down the role of expatriate staff who remain crucial to the 
production of its Engl ish language edit ion. In 1996 the magazine celebrated its fifth 
anniversary and was awarded a labour medal for its contributions to the nation by the 
Vietnamese government. However, at the official award ceremony the magazine's 
foreign staff were asked to sit unobtrusively at the back of the hal l .  They were also 
instructed to make themselves scarce when then President Le Due Anh made a tour of 
the editorial offices. 
VIR has a resident censor from the Min istry of Culture and Information who holds 
the post of Deputy Editor and who, in McKinnon's words, ' monitors al l the material . . .  
to  make sure i t  is OK. ' McKinnon admits that ' there 's sti l l  an incredible amount of 
paranoia '  when i t  comes to the press in Vietnam but he also says that VIR 's editorial 
team put up  a sol id fight to push out the boundaries of acceptable journalism. Certainly 
the magazine has nurtured and encouraged some of the most ski l led journal ists in the 
country, al though the more prominent and successful they become, the more l ikely they 
are to face professional difficulties. 
Despite continuing suspicion towards domestical ly produced foreign language 
publ ications, government agencies also seek to use them to thei r  own advantage, albeit 
rather clumsily. In mid 1997 VJR ran the text of an 'exclusive interview' between 
Reuters newsagency and Nguyen Tan Dung, Pol itburo member and a rising star within 
the Communist Party. In reality no interview had taken place. Reuters Hanoi office had 
submitted an interview request, accompanied, as is general l y  required, by a l ist of 
proposed questions. In return they had received written answers. Because no face-to-
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face interview had taken place, and because the answers were in  any case entirely 
predictable and uninteresting, Reuters journal ists d id not even bother to fi le  a story. 
However, someone e ither in Dung's office, or in the Press Department, decided to share 
the transcript of Dung's ' exclusive interview' with VIR, who dutifu l ly  publ ished it in  
fu l l .  
In  September the  monthly  VET publ ished a s imi lar  interview wi th  Dung under the 
headl ine 'The Voice of Youth ' (Dung is 47). The article was accompanied by a 
flattering picture of su i t-wearing Dung, his hand in mid a ir, as if in the m idst of a l ively 
exchange with an unseen journal ist. Again, no such meeting had actual l y  taken place 
and the ' interview' was written transcript suppl ied by Dung's office. 
Turning Sour 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s many of the western journal ists who arrived in 
Hanoi to open up offices on behalf of foreign news organisations harboured a 
considerable residue of sympathy for Vietnam as a result of the war years and the 
subsequent economic embargo. Thei r  in itial reporting of the country focussed on 
business opportun i ties for foreign investors, and on the nation 's own attempts to reform 
and rebui ld its economy and society. Much of this coverage was broadly  optimistic in 
tone, supportive of the reform process and enthusiastic about the nation 's ach ievements. 
By late 1997 the mood had soured dramatical ly .  Some early advances in 
journal istic and editorial independence in the Vietnamese media had been reversed and 
controls on the act ivit ies of both the foreign and domestic press had been tightened. 
With a slowdown in foreign investment Vietnam was producing very few positive 
news stories. In fact after two years of inward looking pol i t ics and sta l led reforms, as 
the commun ist party negotiated a generational change of leadership, there were very 
few stories at a l l .  After the 20th anniversary of the fal l/l iberation of Saigon, interest in 
war-related ann iversaries had d imin ished; the long saga of the boatpeople was all but 
over; normal isation with Washington had been ach ieved and the process of drafting a 
USNietnam trade agreement was too protracted and prosaic to excite much interest. 
Newsagency journal ists kept fil ing, but found that less and less of thei r  copy was being 
picked up international ly;  other correspondents found that their  editors needed them to 
be in Bangkok, Jakarta, KL, Rangoon or Hong Kong more often than Hanoi. The ranks 
of the Hanoi press corps began to thin. Both The Nation and the Bangkok Post closed 
their bureaus due to financial problems associated with the collapse of the Thai baht. 
The ABC closed i ts Hanoi office due to government budget cuts in Austral ia. A number 
of other media organisations remained operational i n  name only, hoping to maintain 
precious multi-entry v isas for thei r  bureaus despite the fact that their correspondents 
were now spend ing almost al l  of their  t ime in other countries. 
In this environment Hanoi 's  heavy handed controls over the media have become 
counter productive even to the regime 's narrowly defined interests. Firstly, they foster a 
cl imate of negativism and frustration amongst foreign journal ists. This process reached 
its apotheosis just prior to the Communist Party's Eighth National Congress, when 
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Vietnam stopped issu ing visas for foreign tourists to visit the country. The restrictions 
were confirmed by travel agents, by foreign embassies in Hanoi ,  by Vietnamese 
embassies in overseas capitals and by individual travellers, yet when foreign journal ists 
asked for clarification from the government we were told that 'Vietnam's visa pol icy 
remains unchanged. '  Such blatant doublespeak can only encourage total cynicism 
towards all official statements. 
Secondly, the restrictions h inder the accurate and timely report ing of real problems, 
and compounds the spread ing of rumours and inaccuracies. For example, when foreign 
journal ists were prevented from v isit ing Thai Binh to report on farmer's protests in the 
province, this opened the way for some overseas Vietnamese groups to portray unrest as 
the beginning of a massive uprising against communist rule. Such v iews fed back into 
Vietnam via shortwave rad io and other media, with no effective counter. When I was 
interviewed by the BBC World Service about events in Thai Binh, I found myself 
sounding almost l ike a propagandist for the regime; I had to fend off suggestions that 
the unrest heralded the death knell for commun ism by explain ing that the protests were 
a local ised response to specific grievances in the province. The interviewer then 
challenged me by asking whether I could be sure that the situation in Thai Binh was not 
much worse than I imagined; I had to admit that I could not. 
Thirdly, if foreign investors are not confident that they can get reasonably accurate 
statistics and timely information, then they wil l  approach Vietnam with added caution. 
When State Bank officials fail to answer questions on the pressing issue of bad loans 
this was a missed opportunity to restore international faith in Vietnam 's 
creditworthiness and calm fears that the mountain of problem loans could overwhelm 
the entire financial structure. 
While Vietnamese officials repeatedly stress that they want foreign journal ists to 
' understand Vietnam ' ,  the real intention of existing regulations is exact ly the opposite; 
the aim is to corral correspondents into acceptable corners where they can cause 
minimal embarrassment to the regime. When foreign journal ists are summoned in to 
the Press Department for criticism sessions, it is usual ly because their understanding of 
what is going on around them is too acute. It is knowledge, rather than ignorance, 
which general ly causes offence. 
In restricting the activities of the foreign media, the Communist Party's overriding 
aim is to maintain a superficial image of pol itical stabil ity and harmony by keeping the 
l id on negative stories. But in the cut-throat world of international competition for 
capital and markets, media coverage is a crucial weapon, and the only thing worse than 
negative stories is to be ignored al together. 
If Hanoi were to take a more l iberal approach to foreign journal ists it would 
undoubtedly mean that more critical information about Vietnam found its way into the 
international media; but it would equal ly  mean that foreign journal ists would be more 
l ikely to demonstrate sympathy for the challenging and complex task of admin istering a 
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developing country undergoing rapid social change as it attempts to catch up with the 
rest of the world .  
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The Mass Media in Vietnam 
Transformations in print publication, radio, film and television are an integral 
part of broader changes taking place in Vietnam since the mid- l 980s . 
Although the Communist Party continues to scrutinise content, and every 
mass media outlets is formally state-owned, new market economy 
imperatives, technological upgrades,  international linkages, and persistent 
audience demand for novelty all serve to propel media experimentation and 
innovation, whatever the intentions of Hanoi's  elderly leadership. As a result, 
today's media would be almost unrecognisable to Vietnamese citizens living 
only fifteen years ago. This is  the first book in English to describe these 
significant changes, drawing on the knowledge and experience of both 
Vietnamese and foreign experts. 
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